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Abstract
Assessing Educators’ School Safety and Security Preparedness at a New Jersey K-12
Nonpublic School. Ronald P. Rinaldi, 2016: Applied Dissertation, Nova Southeastern
University, Abraham S. Fischler College of Education. Key words: school safety and
security, school emergency management plans, school shootings, targeted school
violence, first responder training
School shootings and emergencies have created the need for educators to be proficient in
emergency response procedures; yet they do not always receive the requisite training.
The lack of an established delineated training program for New Jersey, kindergarten to
Grade 12 institutions has created a situation where educator preparedness varies
immensely at schools. Numerous national events of targeted school violence have
exemplified the need for quick and proper responses by educators to mitigate the tragic
results until first responders arrive.
The purpose and goal of this study was to assess educators’ perceptions and to determine
the best practices in creating a comprehensive safety and security training program to
prepare educators for school crises in order to offer a model for stakeholders to follow or
gain ideas to improve their institution’s specific school safety and security emergency
plans.
Guided by the U.S. Department of Education’s best practices in developing high-quality
school safety plans, this study analyzed the perceptions of 60 educators in one New
Jersey kindergarten to Grade 12 school on the effectiveness of training. A mixed-methods
approach, using a survey questionnaire and interviews, measured changes in the
perceptions of these educators after the 15-week program. Data results included a
revelation of the implementation of a comprehensive school safety and security plan with
related training program resulted in a statistically significant increase in the perceptions
of educators’ knowledge and abilities to respond effectively to school targeted violence
and emergencies. These findings support the concept that best practices in the field of
school safety and security management include appropriate and comprehensive school
safety and security plans and training for educators to combat and mitigate school
targeted violence and emergent events.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Statement of the Problem
Although not a new phenomenon, the critical issue of targeted school violence has
been recognized as a serious problem and garnered both national and state interest, as
well as interdisciplinary debate, since the school shootings by two students at Columbine
High School in 1999 (Birkland & Lawrence, 2009; Borem, Cornell, Modzeleski, &
Jimerson, 2010; Burdick, 2006; Cornell et al., 2004; Cullen, 2009; Langman, 2015;
Muschert, 2007, 2009; Schanlaub, 2009; U.S. Department of Education [USDOE],
2013a). The national fear and subsequent changes in school safety and security policies
that had resulted from that one event has been called the Columbine Effect (Muschert,
Henry, Bracy, & Peguero, 2014). Active shooter events between 2000 and 2010 occurred
more frequently at both public kindergarten to Grade 12 (K-12) schools and institutions
of higher education (IHEs; Blair & Martaindale, 2013; Blair & Schweit, 2014). A 2000 to
2013 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) study of active shooter events at educational
facilities noted 12 IHE events and 27 kindergarten to Grade 12 (K-12) events (Blair &
Schweit, 2014). The phenomenon is not limited to K-12 institutions, IHEs, or even
educational institutions here in the United States as targeted school violence has occurred
in Erfurt, Germany in 2002; Beslan, Russia in 2004; Tuusula, Finland, in 2007;
Winnenden, Gerrmany, in 2009; Kenya, Africa, in 2015; and Saskatchewan, Canada, in
2016 (Allen, Cornell, Lorek, & Sheras 2008; Fisher, 2007; Nickel & Gordon, 2016;
Spicer, 2015).
Part of the debate on the phenomenon has been the symbiotic relationship
between law enforcement and educational institutions in combating the active shooter
incident. The first organization, respectively, is responsible for reaction and response of
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law enforcement first responders and special weapons and tactical teams (SWAT) to
active shooter incidents (Browman, 2001; Martinez, 2012; O’Brien, 2008a, 2008b). The
second organization, the educational institutions, are responsible for providing a safe and
secure environment for students and ensuring school emergency plans are in place to
respond to targeted school violence (Adams & Kritsonis, 2006; Fein et al., 2002;
USDOE, 2013a; Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2004).
Because of the Columbine tragedy, crisis management in the educational setting
became a priority and both disciplines have been under pressure to better combat the
active shooter on a school campus (Gainey, 2009; Muschert et al., 2014). Law
enforcement across the country have subsequently re-evaluated their thinking, training,
and protocols to incorporate this new phenomenon of the school shooter (active shooter)
into their training scenarios and programs (Allen, 2015; Caster, 2008; Manger, 2014;
Martinez, 2012; Moore, 2010; Nichols, 2006; O’Brien, 2008a, 2008b; Police Executive
Research Forum, 2014; Scanlon, 2008). Educational administrators, responsible for
taking reasonable steps to protect students from foreseeable dangers under the legal status
of in loco parentis, have initiated and employed various procedures ranging from zero
tolerance to threat assessment to identify substantive threats and prevent targeted school
violence (Cornell, 2003; New Jersey School Security Task Force [UJSSTF, 2015;
USDOE, 2013a).
Today, educators and law enforcement personnel are more educated and attuned
to the warning signs of active shooters and are better prepared to mitigate the number and
severity of the events. However, as the number of incidents of targeted school violence
since the December 2012 massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut
have remained prolific and high profiled events continue, such as Cummings Middle
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School in Texas in January 2012; Taft-Union High School, California, in January 2013;
Santa Monica College, California, in June 2013; Arapahoe High School, Colorado, in
December 2013; Berrendo Middle School, New Mexico, in January 2014; MarysvillePilchuck High School, Washington, in October 2014; Wayne Community College, North
Carolina, in April 2015; Umpqua Community College in Oregon in October 2015; Alpine
High School, Texas, in September 2016; and Townville Elementary, South Carolina, in
September 2016; educators and law enforcement need to remain vigilant (Christensen,
2016; Everytown for Gun Safety, 2014; Fantz, Knight, & Wang, 2014). These numerous
deadly incidents in the last few years reinforce the ineradicable nature of the phenomenon
and the necessity for best practices in school safety and security preparedness. It is
understood the question is not whether targeted school violence will happen again, but
when will it happen again. The cultural mindset that these events always occur in other
places, however, creates a challenge and is a culture that must be changed within the
school community. According to Hull (2000),
The potential for a school crisis exists every day classes are in session. A few may
believe that these traumatic events will never happen in their schools. For school
personnel, the real question is not will an emergency happen in my school, but
when the emergency occurs, how prepared will we be to handle the situation? (p.
68)
School community prevention and mitigation requires school officials to
overcome the long held belief that the event will not happen at their school (Greenberg,
2007b). More than 15 years after Columbine, even after the tragic events at various types
and geographical locations of educational institutions ranging from Sandy Hook
Elementary to Umpqua Community College, the same warning against the denial mindset
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continues to be heard from school violence experts. As posited in their most recent report
on school safety issues and recommendations, the New Jersey School Security Task
Force [NJSSTF] (2015) warned educators school safety and security should not be taken
for granted and stakeholders cannot act as if the “worst case of unimaginable violence
won’t happen here” (pp. 14-15). School leaders need to proactively act through the
implementation of emergency management (i.e., school safety and security) plans.
The threat of emergency crises demand educational institutions create school
safety and security plans (SSSPs) to have measures in place which will prevent or
mitigate crisis events (USDOE, 2013a). Despite the emergent demands of these crises,
preventative and preparation are only recommended and not required by the USDOE. No
federal laws exist mandating states have emergency policies or procedures for the K-12
districts or IHEs (U.S. Government Accountability Office [USGAO], 2007a). Greenberg
(2007a) noted there is no federal agency, central authority, national policy center,
information clearinghouse, center for model practices, research center, or educational
institution dedicated solely to school campus safety and security. Minimal assistance
creating SSSPs has been offered by federal or state agencies and the USDOE and Office
of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (2007) noted “research on what works in school-based
crisis planning is in its infancy” (p. 4). The USGAO (2007a, 2007b) national survey in
2007 found that only 32 of 50 states had established their own laws or policies requiring
K-12 institutions have some form of emergency management plan and many of these
plans did not include recommended practices. Additionally, the USGAO (2007a, 2007b)
survey found that school emergency management plans varied in content; many
emergency plans in place did not fully cover the safety needs of special needs students at
these schools, and that a significant number of schools did not train with first responders

5
nor were trained to implement their emergency management plans on a regular basis
(USGAO, 2007a, 2007b).
New Jersey is one of the states with established laws mandating K-12 public
school districts have a SSSP, and practice mandatory drills (New Jersey Department of
Education [NJDOE], 2015a). However, New Jersey school district safety and security
plans are similar in composition as those found nationally by the USGAO (2007a, 2007b)
and varied in depth, composition, content, and detail. No one plan or template is issued
for school districts to follow. Instead, the (NJDOE & Office of Preparedness and
Emergency Planning, 2011b) offers a checklist of 91 generic elements for education
administrators to use when creating the safety and security plan. Educators are charged
with this huge responsibility yet are underprepared to respond effectively to a school
emergency.
The Topic
The topic explored in this study was the educators' (teachers, administrators, and
support staff) perceptions of the effectiveness of SSSPs with related training classes and
drills to enhance their abilities to prepare, react, and respond effectively to an emergency
crisis, such as an active shooter incident, at one New Jersey K-12 private school. With the
phenomenon of targeted school violence, a daily threat and new protocols in place for
law enforcement and educators, the preventative and preparative measures to protect
students from targeted school violence incidents fall upon the teachers, administrators,
and support staff (counselors, psychologists, health care professionals, resource
professionals, secretarial, and custodial) at the school level as mandated by the state law.
Educators are tasked to be aware of various emergency procedures and ready to react
under high stress situations, especially as the first to respond during an active shooter
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incident, yet educators are not provided the tools or training to become proficient in this
area of responsibility (Graveline, 2003). Unlike police departments that schedule regular
training and ensure their officers are proficient in emergency response procedures and
prepared for stressful incidents, schools vary in their emergency management training, if
they train at all, and teachers’ self-efficacy related to emergency response skills is often
low or nonexistent (Bergh, 2009; Brown, 2008; Church, 2011; Collier, 2006; Dube, 2012;
Graham, 2009; Kandakai & King, 2002; Kanner, 2015; McDaniel, 2003; Rider, 2015;
Session, 2000; Taylor, 2008).
Research Problem
The research problem investigated in this study was that the teachers,
administrators, and support staff at one private New Jersey K-12 school have minimal
awareness and preparedness knowledge in school emergency safety and security
procedures and their abilities to properly respond to an emergent crisis are affected as a
result. In the state of New Jersey, school safety and security is the responsibility of school
superintendents at the public school level and school leaders at the private school level.
State law mandates school leaders have an emergency management plan (SSSP) in place.
All school employees must be trained in safety and security procedures, and mandatory
security drills be held. Without the state making available to school leaders a
comprehensive delineated SSSP to follow, the fact there are no formal training classes
offered to educators, and the creation of SSSPs, the training of school personnel in these
plans, and the time devoted to these responsibilities result in a varied and sometimes
nonexistent state of educator awareness and preparedness from school to school. To
magnify the problem, the accountability and burden of this system falls to school
administrators who have little experience and no training themselves in the field of
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school safety and security, and who have a myriad of other educational administrative
issues to deal with, many schools are not prepared even minimally for an emergent crisis
(Deegan, 2010). As a result, many educators perceive their abilities to respond to a school
emergency crisis, especially the feared active shooter incident as minimal or insufficient.
This lack of confidence stems from inadequate education and training in school safety
and security issues (Bergh, 2009; Brown, 2008; Church, 2011; Collier, 2006; Dube,
2012; Graham, 2009; Kandakai & King, 2002; Kanner, 2015; McDaniel, 2003; Rider,
2015; Smith-Greer, 2001).
New Jersey law mandates school administrators hold two drills per month, one
fire drill and one security drill for each month a school is in operation throughout the
year, with security drills designed to the various types of emergencies, such as active
shooters, bomb threats, nonfire evacuations, and lockdown drills (NJDOE, 2010a, 2010b,
2010c, 2015b). Yet despite this rigorous drill schedule to ensure the most effective
emergency responses by educators, they are not supplied with adequate education and
training in school safety and security needed to prepare them to perform these actions
(NJSSTF, 2015).
In the researcher’s experience, as both a law enforcement officer having been
assigned to a SWAT team and as a teacher at both the secondary and higher educational
levels, a unique perspective was garnered from working in both disciplines. The
researcher has observed a disconnect between the two disciplines, which are joined in a
symbiotic relationship in the field of school safety and security, and a fundamental flaw
in a process whereby the accountability for the emergency plans, responses, and training
to a targeted school violence incident is designated the responsibility of those only
trained in education. As a police officer and a SWAT team officer, the researcher had to
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attend extensive training courses, obtain certifications, and regularly recertify in the
acquired skills to maintain a high level of proficiency in emergency response procedures.
As an educator, the researcher attended classes, passed assessments, and obtained
teaching certifications to show proficiency in all areas of responsibility (classroom
management, curriculum development, learning theory, assessment creation, content
knowledge, and teaching strategies) except one--school safety and security. This lack of
required safety and security preservice education for teachers and administrators fails to
create a high or even moderate level of self-efficacy among educators regarding their
responsibilities to their students (McCarty, 2012; Sela-Shayovitz, 2009; Session 2000).
Subsequently, if a school’s safety and security plans and related training and drills are
minimal or nonexistent, the educators’ response effectiveness to emergencies, such as an
active shooter incident, are seriously affected.
Background and Justification
Events of school violence have existed since the beginning of the establishment of
the institution of education (Midlarski & Klain, 2005), but, in the 1990s, the type of
violence found at schools took on the more serious feature of shootings (Volokh & Snell,
1998). Several high profiled school shootings from the 1990s began to gain public
attention as this type of criminal activity was shocking to parents (Kleck, 2009; Leary,
Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips, 2003; Muschert & Carr, 2006; Newman, Fox, Harding,
Mehta, & Roth, 2004). The devastating results of targeted school violence and of the term
active shooter was made a national concern in 1999 when the Columbine incident
occurred and became the iconic event that focused the attention of the members of the
media, politicians, and school safety professionals to the problem (Altheide, 2009;
Birkland & Lawrence, 2009; Borem et al., 2010; McCabe & Martin, 2005; Muschert,
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2009; Muschert et al., 2014). The frequency of active shooter events (one or more
persons engaged in killing or attempting to kill multiple people in an area) has increased
since 2000 (Blair & Martaindale, 2013). An analysis of 272 campus attacks at IHEs since
1900 determined that the majority have occurred in the 1990s and 2000s (Drysdale,
Modzeleski, & Simons, 2010). A study by the FBI of 160 active shooter incidents from
various public venues in the United States between 2000 and 2013 shows that these
incidents are on the rise and that the second most common incident location was in
schools (Blair & Schweit, 2014). Although only 39 of the 160 incidents were school
related (27 schools, 12 IHEs), the study findings included that two of the four incidents
with the highest number of casualties occurred in educational settings (e.g., Virginia Tech
in Blacksburg, Virginia and Sandy Hook Elementary School, Newtown, Connecticut).
According to Blair and Schweit (2014), while other academic settings also had high
casualty counts “Northern Illinois University in DeKalb, Illinois (five killed, 16
wounded) and Santana High School in Santee, California (two killed, 13 wounded;” p.
15).
When an active shooter event begins, the most important element in minimizing
the devastation is time (Blair, Nichols, Burns, & Curnutt, 2013; Blair & Schweit, 2014;
Ergenbright & Hubbard, 2012; Martinez, 2007; Parker, 2008; Scanlon, 2008). Response
times can vary for law enforcement to an active shooter incident. An average active
shooter event lasts 12 minutes with 37% of events shorter than 5 minutes (Nicoletti,
2012). According to Cader (2013), the average first responder’s response time can be as
long as 18 minutes while Blair, Martindale, and Nichols (2014) calculated a 3-minute
median response time. Within that 3-minute, median, response time, an active shooter can
inflict so much damage that the five highest casualty events since 2000 happened even
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though police arrived within that short time (Blair et al., 2013). One analysis of 84 active
shooter events occurring between 2000 and 2010 revealed that 49% ended before police
arrived (Blair & Martaindale, 2013) while the FBI study of 160 active shooter incidents
between 2000 and 2013 found that 60% ended before their arrival (Blaire & Schweit,
2014). According to Blaire and Schweit, regarding the length of time of active shooter
incidents, the FBI identified that “64 incidents ended in 5 minutes or less, with 23 ending
in 2 minutes or less” (p. 8). From the moment of the first 9-1-1 call alerting first
responders (police, SWAT, and medical personnel), all students, staff, and visitors need
to be immediately notified of the event and emergency procedures, such as lockdowns, to
be implemented quickly to minimize the damage and number of victims, which can be
inflicted in such short periods of time. Lack of training and knowledge of emergency
procedures by teachers inhibits the timely manner in which such emergency protocols are
performed.
Targeted school violence in the form of an active shooter is a major fear for
educators and parents, but other emergent crises, such as bomb threats, gas leaks,
dangerous weather conditions, and suspicious persons, require quick and effective
responses by school personnel as well. One critical aspect of school safety and security
training is the implementation of the correct safety responses by the school population.
Invariably, the varied levels and models of SSSPs found at different schools inherently
contain weaknesses that stem from the individual profiles of each institution and lack of
an overall best practices mandated procedure.
The challenges of a quick and effective response to an emergent event on a school
campus follow: creating a SSSP; ensuring best practices in the field are part of the
institution’s plan; educating, training, and drilling school personnel in the procedures of

11
the emergency plan; drilling and educating the student population in proper responses to
an emergency; and sharing and coordinating information among the school’s staff. These
challenges, if not met, leave many unaware of what to expect in a crisis situation (Bergh,
2009). Training teachers, administrators, support staff, and students using drills
simulating actual crisis situations to minimize panic is vital (Bennett-Johnson, 2004;
Bergh, 2009; Kramen, Massey, & Timm, 1999; Zdziarski, Dunkel, Rollo, & Associates,
2007). Nicoletti and Spencer-Thomas (2002) stated, "to survive a violent incident, people
need to learn how to overcome inappropriate instincts, impaired senses, motor skills, and
tunnel vision" (p. 136). Although police agencies regularly train for these situations,
many schools do not (Harvey, 2011; Kapucu & Khosa, 2012; Mitroff, Diamond, &
Alpaslan, 2006). An absence of state or federally mandated procedures for preparing,
drilling, or implementing emergency responses, such as those for an active shooter,
schools are left to individually prepare their own and the resulting policies and
procedures vary in content, comprehensiveness, and frequency of practice (Brown, 2008;
Church, 2011; Greenberg, 2007a, 2007b; Kandakai & King, 2002; Government
Accountability Office, 2007a, 2007b).
Deficiencies in the Evidence
Much has been written on the phenomenon of targeted school violence, most
studies were addressing the roots of school violence (Cornell, 2006; Fast, 2008; Jimerson,
Nickerson, Mayer, & Furlong, 2012; Newman et al., 2004; Thomas, R. M., 2006), the
events of school violence (Blair & Schweit, 2014; Fast, 2008; Langman, 2009, 2015;
Lenhardt, Farrell, & Graham, 2010; Newman et al., 2004; Vossekuil, Reddy, Fein,
Borum, & Modzeleski, 2000), and the prevention of school violence (Bataille & Cordova,
2014; Jimerson et al., 2012; USDOE, 2013a, 2013b; Volokh, & Snell, 1998; Zdziarski et
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al., 2007). However, a few included an examination of teacher preparedness related to
security training (Bergh, 2009; Brown, 2008; Cooper, 2008; Dixon, 2014; Graham, 2009;
Kanner, 2015; Perkins, 2015; Rider, 2015; Session, 2000). Additionally, the participants
in these studies based their views solely upon abilities perceived from training activities
and not through actual crisis events implementation. McKenzie (2008) analyzed the
perceptions from actual gun on campus crisis incidents where emergency plans were
employed. Five school leaders were asked to evaluate their school plans and the
effectiveness in responding to the incidents. This study, however, was limited in both
number of participants and scope as it did not include teachers on those campuses who
are not the ones responsible for creating effective emergency response plans and may
have had different perceptions due to their positions.
Understanding these aspects of the phenomenon may have better educated those
in the field of school safety attempting to meet its challenges, but will not eradicate this
violence completely. Because there is no one comprehensive answer to ending the
phenomenon, educators and law enforcement must be effectively prepared to mitigate the
damage that occurs when targeted school violence strikes. School safety best practices
dictate the formation of threat assessment teams and emergency management plans at the
school level to prepare for and mitigate the effects of such events.
The researcher found a gap exists in the literature when it comes to empirical
studies understanding the importance and effects of proper preparation of educators for
school emergency crises. There is a number of qualitative and quantitative studies
examining educator’s perceptions regarding educators’ safety in school (Bryden &
Fletcher, 2007; Dixon, 2014; Gilliland, 2015; Kelling, 2006; Ricketts, 2007; Roberts,
Wilcox, May, & Clayton, 2007; Siaosi, 2006; Vettenberg, 2002). Some studies included a
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focus on school leaders’ abilities to manage crises (Folks, 2008; McDaniel, 2003;
McKenzie, 2008), teachers’ ability to manage a crisis (Folks, 2008; Graveline, 2003;
Kanner, 2015; McDaniel, 2003; McKenzie, 2008; Perkins, 2015; Rider, 2015; Session,
2000; Smith-Greer, 2001; Taylor, 2008; Werner, 2014), and perceptions on violence in
schools (Ashford, Queen, Algozzine, & Mitchell, 2008; Church, 2011; Collier, 2006;
Finley, 2004; Hemphill, 2008; Henriques, 2010; Jackson, 2015; Peterson, 2006;
Schubarth, 2000; Smith & Smith, 2006; Sobel, 2009). Some of these perception studies
have a focus on armed personnel in schools (Reyes, 2015), safety related to students with
disabilities (Bon, Faircloth, & LaTendre, 2006), terrorist attacks preparedness (Dube,
2012), and active shooter drills (Ryals, 2014). Overall school emergency plans (Cooper,
2008; Graham, 2009; Kehoe, 2015) and overall current levels of safety and preparedness
(Bergh, 2009; Boyd, 2011; Brown, 2008; Church, 2011; Dixon, 2014; Dube, 2012;
Gilliland, 2015; Graham, 2009; Henriques, 2010; Jackson, 2015; Kanner, 2015; Perkins,
2015; Reyes, 2014; Rider, 2015; Swiontek, 2009) were also examined through the eyes of
the educators.
All of the studies included a snapshot of teachers’ perceptions of their current
abilities to handle various types of emergencies according to the training they had been
given. However, Cooper (2008) surveyed teachers’ perceptions of their crisis preparation
before and again after teachers attended a 6-week training program in a crisismanagement plan to measure the effectiveness of training. The plan used was modeled
after the Virginia Department of Education Resource Guide for Crisis Management in
Virginia Schools (Atkinson, 2002) and the Jefferson County Crisis-Management Plan.
According to Cooper, “these plans describe in detail examples of format, policies,
procedures, checklists, forms, and background information” on crisis management (p.
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23). Both guides focused on the preparation for crises and followed the Code of Virginia
that mandates the development and implementation of crisis planning. The results of the
study included findings of overall improvement in teacher preparedness for a crisis.
It must be noted that the perceptions of teachers’ abilities in these various studies
were not the result of the actual implementation of security responses (except McKenzie,
2008). None of these educators had experienced an attack at their school, but are in
response to teachers’ opinions about school violence based on their individual
experiences or based upon information on school violence events educators observed
discussed in the media and the fear news coverage creates (Dixon, 2014). Therefore, the
perceptions were not based upon a real-life emergency crisis and implementation of the
training to measure its validity or effectiveness. Without an actual event of a school
shooter or other major crisis occurring to test the training, the only other way to measure
educators’ perception of self-efficacy is through training, drills, and scenarios. Cooper
(2008) implemented training as an intervention, but the training was guided by a formal
state school crisis management plan for all Virginia schools, which was comprehensive in
content and delineated steps schools needed to take to create a plan. Additionally, the
teachers in that study took a 6-week training program. Having both well-written
comprehensive state guidelines for an emergency management plan and 6 weeks for
teachers to attend specific security and safety training, according to the literature, is the
exception and not the norm.
In order to fill the gap of empirical evidence found by the researcher this study
included an examination of educators’ perceptions regarding the effectiveness of safety
and security training and drills to enhance their preparation for a school crisis by
implementing a school emergency management training program and obtaining data
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preintervention and postintervention. The training program intervention was implemented
under the similar time constraints faced by administrators when affording in-service
training for teachers. Finally, the emergency management plan and training program was
created with the minimal resources and guidelines school administrators are offered by
the state of New Jersey.
Additionally, in this applied dissertation study, several recommendations for
future research made by Rider (2015) were addressed: “first, research related to the
specific training needs of teachers for active shooter incidents; [second, research
conducted in] other regions” of the country to account for possible variations in needs
and perceptions of educators related to active shooters; third, research encompassing not
only high school, but K-8 educators as well; and, fourth, research conducted with
teachers to improve understanding their perceptions of preparation to respond to active
shooters (pp. 153-154).
Audience
This study included an assessment of the perceptions of teachers, administrators,
and support staff regarding their abilities to appropriately respond to a school emergency
crisis preintervention and postintervention of a comprehensive SSSP with the related
training program. Educators have been charged with both understanding and practicing
various school emergency drills in order to be aware and ready to respond appropriately
and effectively.
The information in this study would benefit school administrators who were in
charge of implementing new or updating school security training programs for their
teachers and support staff. Administrators would be able to better understand the
importance of comprehensive in-service training and identify the weaknesses that may
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exist in training programs. Additionally, administrators could gain insights to the
importance of collaborating with law enforcement to create or update school security
training programs as the skill set for school security and safety was not one school
leaders were trained in and was only attained through many years of schooling, training,
and experienced law enforcement had from their job responsibility.
Teachers, administrators, and support staff would also benefit from this study as
they gained a clearer understanding of the difference between school safety awareness
and readiness (Greenberg, 2007b). Educators needed to be made aware of safety and
security issues and the related proper responses from information packets or minimal
participatory interactions, as well as to be made ready to respond through in-depth
training programs and drills which are repetitive, collaborative, substantive, reflective,
and constantly updated for best practices (Greenberg, 2007b).
The results presented in this research study would help to identify and examine
school security best practices at New Jersey K-12 level schools and allow school
administrators to use this information when implementing either new protocols or
improving already established protocols at their schools. The results of this research
study would serve private K-12 school administrators who need to establish emergency
management plans and safety and security training for their teachers and support staff,
according to their needs, and also offer valuable insights to public K-12 school district
administrators responsible for multiple schools’ emergency management plans and
educators’ training.
Finally, the information in this study could be of use to school leaders in other
states as well. The basic threats of school violence, like the active shooter, are universal
and no matter what individualistic state laws require their educators do as a response to
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the varied emergencies they prepare for, comprehensive and regular in-service, school,
security training programs would need to be implemented to make all educators aware
and ready to respond.
Definition of Terms
The following terms were used in this applied dissertation and may be unfamiliar
to individuals not involved in the field of school safety and security.
Active shooter is a subject who is actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill
people at a location using firearms, many times without a method of selection of victims
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008).
Crisis is any unexpected event that disrupts the operations of an institution and
poses a threat to personnel or property (Zdziarski, 2006).
Crisis management is a systematic approach of planning and decision making for
and responding to a wide range of crises that occurs within an organization (Mitroff et al.,
2006; Sherwood & McKelfresh, 2007; USDOE, 2007).
Crisis planning is a term referring to the proactive assessment and addressing of
vulnerabilities to prevent or minimize the effects of a crisis (Hough & Spillan, 2005).
Crisis planning is also referred to as incident planning or emergency planning.
Safety and security plan is a term that refers to a plan that establishes the policies,
procedures, and organizational structure for an organization to respond to emergencies of
any nature. The plan includes a description of the roles and responsibilities of emergency
management teams, stakeholders, and other individuals during emergency situations.
Safety and security plan also has been referred to as emergency response plan or crisis
response plan.
Targeted school violence refers to violent incidents involving an identifiable
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subject (perpetrator) who possesses the intent and potential to cause harm to an
identifiable target at an educational institution (Borem, Fein, Vossekuil, & Bergland,
1999).
Threat assessment is referred to by the Secret Service and FBI as the set of
investigational and operational techniques used by law enforcement to identify, assess,
and manage the risk of targeted violence by an individual or group who communicate a
threat or engaged in some kind of threatening behavior (Cornell, 2010; Fein, Vossekuil,
& Holden, 1995).
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this mixed-methods study was to assess the perceptions of
educators preintervention and postintervention of a comprehensive SSSP with related
training program at one K-12, private, New Jersey school. The researcher measured
changes in the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and support staff members of their
abilities to respond to a number of different school emergencies (e.g., active shooter,
evacuations, shelter in place, lockdown, and bomb threat) by using a Likert-type scaled
questionnaire given preintervention and postintervention of a school safety training
program. The researcher also examined any measurable increase in the preparedness
knowledge and capabilities of the participants through interviewing participants,
observing emergency drills, and examining archival documents, such as school drill logs,
emergency reports, and emergency protocols already established. School personnel took
part in a school safety and security preparedness and response training program created
by the researcher, which took place over a 15-week period. During the training program,
school personnel attended classes, were given resource materials to study and use, and
took part in state-mandated emergency drills. The implementation of this training for
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educators at a private K-12 New Jersey school served to examine any change in
educators’ perceptions of their own abilities once they had been exposed to formal
training. The researcher also assessed the effectiveness of a comprehensive safety and
security training program, uncovered the challenges facing administrators in preparing
their schools for emergent situations, and identified best practices in the field of
emergency management training for educators.
Summary
The phenomenon of targeted school violence and the problem of its severity since
national concerns highlighted it with Columbine in 1999 were introduced in chapter 1.
Studies have proliferated ever since by experts in all fields to determine the causes and
find the solution to prevent future incidents. The dozens of incidents post-Columbine,
such as Virginia-Tech and Sandy Hook, which resulted in some of the phenomenon’s
highest casualty rates, exemplified the ineradicable nature of this phenomenon. The
responsibility of meeting the challenges of targeted school violence had fallen to both law
enforcement and school educators. Law enforcement revised its response procedures after
Columbine to respond quickly and effectively as first responders to an incident through
comprehensive and updated training. School administrators were required to have their
staff respond equally quickly and effectively as first responders as well, yet the training
has not been as equally comprehensive or updated. With the varied levels of knowledge
and experience school administrators had in school safety and security, and the minimally
delineated training requirements mandated by the state, effective emergency response
training and drilling at the school level was inadequate, especially in the opinions of the
educators themselves. The purpose of this mixed-methods study, therefore, was to assess
the perceptions of educators preintervention and postintervention of a comprehensive
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SSSP with the related training program at one New Jersey, private, K-12 school.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Overview
In the literature review, an overview and evaluation of the topic of targeted school
violence was provided and the theoretical framework of the study was explored. A
history of the topic of targeted school violence included a review of the phenomenon as it
relates to secondary and higher education and the responses by law enforcement and
school administrators. The review includes an address of the responsibilities of educators
to provide a safe learning environment, theories of school safety as grounded in
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, Marzano’s school effectiveness, and Bandura’s selfefficacy, and best school safety practices suggested by the experts. A discussion of the
studies on educators’ perceptions of school safety, response preparedness, and training,
and the evolution of school safety law in New Jersey outlined the challenges at the time
of this study posed by the phenomenon and established the core theory of this study.
The majority of studies and surveys included an examination of the phenomenon
of targeted school violence were conducted and written since the beginning of this
century. Since the late 1990s, federal to local organizations attempted to understand
exactly what targeted school violence is and how it could be predicted and stopped before
it starts (Blair & Schweit, 2014; Crews, 2007; Hinkle & Henry, 2000; Jimerson et al.,
2012; Langman, 2015; Lenhardt et al., 2010; Police Executive Research Forum, 2014;
Reddy et al., 2001; Zdziarski et al., 2007). The major focus of these studies and surveys
consists of attempting to identify who these perpetrators are and why they attack in order
to prevent further incidents. Common elements addressed in each follow: delineating the
various types of school crises faced by educators, establishing proactive steps for
detecting crisis situations early on, creating effective crisis management plans to meet the
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challenges, creating crisis response teams of professionals from various professional
fields, and engaging the appropriate stakeholders when developing and maintaining these
emergency or crisis school plans and responses.
History of the Phenomenon
According to Cornell and Mayer (2010), “School violence is not so much a new
problem as a recurrent one that has not been adequately recognized for its persistence and
pervasiveness throughout the history of education” (p. 7). School-targeted violence has
been part of the American education system since colonial times (Crews & Counts, 1997;
McCabe & Martin, 2005). In fact, one of the worst mass killings at a school was in 1927
when a school board member exploded a bomb at the Bath Consolidated School in Bath,
Michigan, and then detonated a second bomb in a car, while first responders tried to help
killing 45 and injuring 58 (Lindle, 2008). Although this phenomenon dates back as far as
education itself has been part of society, academic interest in it has steadily grown since
the 1970s (Cornell & Mayer, 2010). Before the school shootings by two students at
Columbine High School in 1999, the issue of targeted school violence had been
recognized as a serious problem with a number of previous publicized incidents in the
1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s (Caulfield, 2000; Fast, 2008; Fein et al., 2002;
Hinkle & Henry, 2000; Kleck, 2009; Langman, 2009; McCabe & Martin, 2005;
Midlarski & Klain, 2005; Nicoletti, & Spencer-Thomas, 2002; Nicoletti, SpencerThomas, & Bollinger, 2010; Rydeen, 2013; Schanlaub, 2009; Warnick, Johnson, &
Rocha, 2010; Wike & Fraser, 2009; Zdziarski et al., 2007).
A sudden wave of targeted school violence between 1997 and 1999 exposed a
serious trend, which continued into the new millennium (Fisher, 2007). Hinkle and Henry
(2000) stated that
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the American school system had witnessed the most profound shock since its
founding in the 1800s: 25 dead in 1997, 42 dead in 1998, and, to date in 1999, 24
more, making 211 in all since 1992. American education would never be the
same. (p. 8)
One of the first targeted school violence incidents to which law enforcement had
to respond, react, and terminate occurred 50 years ago when Whitman killed 16 and
wounded 32 on the University of Texas in 1966 (Blair et al., 2013; Kolman, 1982;
Nicoletti et al., 2010; Snow,1996; Zdiarski et al., 2007). Since the Texas Tower shooting,
the necessity for law enforcement to provide specialized equipped and trained officers to
handle such incidents has been identified (Blair et al., 2013; Kolman, 1982; Lavergne,
1997; Liebe, 2015; Nichols, 2006; Snow, 1996). This targeted school violence incident,
coupled with the civil disorder and riots of the 1960s, charged law enforcement agencies
throughout the United States with more formidable responsibilities, which only a new
tool (full-time tactical teams with specialized resources) could adequately face (Blair et
al., 2013; Kolman,1982; Liebe, 2015; Nichols, 2006; Snow, 1996). The evolution of
SWAT teams since the mid-1960s and the University of Texas tower shooting has led to
the incorporation of this tactical asset as a supplemental tool for first responding patrol
officers who lack the necessary training and equipment to face highly critical targeted
school shooting situations that may involve heavily armored and trained individuals
employing homemade bombs, booby traps, and automatic weapons (Anselmi, 2008;
Assenmacher, 2008; Blair et al., 2013; California Commission on Peace Officer
Standards and Training, 2005; Felts, 2004; Haughton, 2007; O’Brien, 2008b; Snow,
1996; Yarbaugh, 2008).
Although there had been devastating targeted school violence incidents for many
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years, it was the highly profiled incident at Columbine that captivated national and state
interest, as well as interdisciplinary debate (Muschert, 2009; Muschert et al., 2014). The
debate focused upon the reaction and timely response of law enforcement to active
shooter incidents (Allen, 2015; Blair et al., 2013; Caster, 2008; Kalk, 2000; Martinez,
2012; Moore, 2010; Nichols, 2006). Two elements of law enforcement respond to these
situations, the initial responding officers and the subsequent responding SWAT (Special
Weapons and Tactics) teams. After the events at Columbine both of these law
enforcement elements across the country subsequently reevaluated their training and
protocols to incorporate the phenomenon of the school shooter (active shooter) into their
training scenarios and programs. Since then, containing the threat and waiting for SWAT
officers to match the dangerous weapons involved is no longer adequate and reevaluated
training protocols encompassed preparing and requiring the first few officers on scene to
confront active shooters immediately instead of waiting for the full SWAT team to arrive
(Allen, 2015; Anselmi, 2008; Blair et al., 2013; Buster, 2008; Caster, 2008; Dino, 2009;
Howe, 2006; Martinez, 2012; Nichols, 2006; O’Brien, 2008a, 2008b; Police Executive
Research Forum, 2014; Scanlon, 2008; Schanlaub, 2009; Yarbaugh, 2008).
The other major aspect of the debate addressed the educational response to active
shooter incidents. Educational institutions have had to incorporate emergency
management plans; create crisis management teams; and institute training for faculty,
staff, and students to confront targeted school violence events (USDOE, 2013a). Safety
on K-12 campuses and IHEs post-Columbine gained additional exposure as a national
issue after September 11, 2001, when, in a testimony before the U.S. Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence of the United States, FBI Director Mueller (2003) stated
schools and universities were categorized as soft targets for terrorist attacks.
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Altheide (2009) posited Columbine and other school shootings have been referred
to as terrorist activities ever since the 9/11 attacks. As a result of this categorization and
the high profile targeted school violence incident at Virginia Tech in 2007, changes in
safety policies, the creation of emergency management plans, safety and security training
programs with drills for educators, target hardening activities on school campuses, and
updated emergency warning systems ensued on campuses of K-12 and higher education
across the country (Flynn & Heitzmann, 2008; Fox & Savage, 2009; Gajda, 2006; Gray,
2008; Gunther, 2010; Halligan, 2009; Healy, 2014; Kautzman, 2011; Major Cities Chiefs,
2009; Murr, 2007; Pollack, Modzeleski, & Rooney, 2008; Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008;
USDOE, 2007, 2013a, 2013b).
Black Swan Event
Targeted school violence events are random, unexpected, high profile, and hard to
predict incidents that are out of the norm. Facts gathered after each tragedy are analyzed
to develop an explanation of why that event happened and produce conclusions that it
should have been predictable. But as school shootings and other acts of violence continue
to occur despite prevention and mitigation practices, the phenomenon continues to
demonstrate it is not predictable, but instead a black swan event. The black swan theory
developed by Taleb (2007) included an explanation of the existence of events, which
have the three traits: are rare, have significant consequences, and seem to be predictable
retrospectively; however, are not. Most importantly, Taleb’s theory included a
postulation that the black swan event is one that was not even ever contemplated to occur.
The black swan metaphor included references of the ancient belief that all swans were
white until the discovery of black-colored swans in Australia in 1697 (Taleb, 2007). The
unexpected finding defied what was thought possible and made the unpredictable
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conceivable.
Considered rare events, incidents of school shootings invoke widespread concern,
fear, and vulnerability when they occur because of their significant impact,
unpredictability, intensive mass media coverage, and the dissolution of society’s
perception of school safety when an incident makes the headlines (Borem et al., 2010;
Chenault, 2004; Hendry, 2015; Lindle, 2008; Muschert, 2007; Schuster, 2009; Stein,
2000; Thomas, P., 2006). These events create emotion-driven reactions by the public that
are then followed up with studies by government and educational officials to prevent,
mitigate, and predict an undefined and little understood phenomenon (Fein et al., 2002)
and by the Congress and state legislatures attempting to pass laws aimed at reducing the
recurrence of these events (Heilbrun, Dvoskin, & Heilbrun, 2009; Lindle, 2008).
Theories on Active Shooter Phenomenon
When discussing the active shooter type of event (e.g., Columbine or Virginia
Tech), targeted school violence distinguishes a school-based attack in which a perpetrator
preselects targets at an educational institution (Reddy et al., 2001; Vossekuil et al., 2000,
2002). This phenomenon has been recognized by experts as one with issues that cannot
be completely understood, simply defined, nor resolved by one method alone (Cornell, &
Mayer, 2010; Fein et al., 2002; Henry, 2000; Muschert, 2007; O’Toole, 2000).
In the attempt to answer the pressing question of how to prevent targeted school
violence, the various disciplines involved focused on the science of profiling the school
shooter. Experts in psychology, sociology, criminology, law enforcement, education, and
the mental health fields have analyzed targeted school violence shooters in several ways.
The most common format consists of dissecting specific shootings cases to gain insights
(Blair & Schweit, 2014; Fast, 2008; Langman, 2009, 2015; Lenhardt et al., 2010; Meloy,
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Hempel, Mohandie, Shiva, & Gray, 2001; Newman et al., 2004; O’Toole, 2000;
Vossekuil et al., 2004). The pioneering study in this format was conducted by the U.S.
Secret Service and USDOE, which created the Safe School Initiative (Vossekuil et al.,
2000). The Safe School Initiative applied the Secret Service’s expertise in physical
protection and threat assessment in targeted violence to the USDOE’s problem of school
violence in hopes of understanding and preventing targeted school violence. The study
examined 37 school shootings involving 41 attackers analyzed the data and facts of each
case, and developed general characteristics about school shooters and the events. One
major finding was that profiling a school shooter was an ineffective way to identify a
potential perpetrator or predict a possible targeted school violence event (Sewell &
Mendelsohn, 2000; Vossekuil et al., 2000).
Representative of the numerous possibilities for causes of targeted school
violence was one study which used the methodology of surveying students themselves for
answers to this phenomenon (Gaughan, Cerio, & Myers, 2001). Data collected from over
2,000 respondents in Grades 7 to 12 who were asked to rate 16 possible reasons for
school violence identified the top four reasons: being picked on and bullied, revenge, life
had little value, and victims of physical abuse at home. However, this study in itself was
more significant for the wide range of the 16 choices listed, eight of which follow:
(a) revenge, (b) boredom, (c) violent movies and video games, (d) mental health
problems, (e) peer pressure, (f) uncaring teachers, (g) alcohol and drugs, and (g) ease of
gun access.
A multitude of studies assign blame for targeted school violence on specific
reasons for student anger. A backlash against corporal punishment was posited by Arcus
(2002) while perceived challenges to masculinity was postulated by Kalish and Kimmel
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(2010) and Tonso (2009). Peers were at the center of many reasons in the form of
homophobic bullying and teasing (Kimmel & Mahler, 2003), bullying and harassment
(McCabe & Martin, 2005; Vossekuil et al., 2004), paranoia of rejection by peers (Dutton,
White, & Fogarty, 2013; Leary et al., 2003), and romantic rejection (Leary et al., 2003).
Other personal issues are also attributed to these violent acts like stressful issues in
society (Newman et al., 2004; Stein, 2000); strain from, according to Levin and Madfis
(2009), “negative experiences or disappointing events” in life (p. 1230); student-teacher
conflict (Freie Universitaet Berlin, 2014; Heilbrun et al., 2009); and the characteristics of
schools that foster feelings of anonymity or alienation (De Apodaca, Brighten, Perkins,
Jackson, & Steege, 2012; Frymer, 2009; O’Toole, 2000).
Many targeted school violent events are seen as the result of mental health issues
(Flynn & Heitzmann, 2008, Heilbrun et al., 2009; Langman, 2009, 2015; Metzl &
MacLeish, 2015;Siegert & Seigert, 2013; Shah, 2013a), psychiatric medication
(Langman, 2009, 2015), identity confusion and childhood abuse (Fast, 2008), and gender
and ethnicity issues (DeFour, 2005). One political scientist even attributed school
violence to the schools themselves (Thompson, 2014). In a thought provoking hypothesis,
Thompson (2014) posited that in progressive education, intellectual subjectivism is
taught and students are unable to experience reality or failure. According to Thompson,
the end result is a generation of students “with unjustifiably high opinions of themselves”
who become confrontational and react with violence when they are criticized, teased, or
unsuccessful (p. 216).
Many events are believed to be the result of influential factors. Copycat reasons
have long been posited due to exposure to media violence coverage of school shootings
(Anderson et al. 2003; Hong, Cho, & Lee, 2010), simple contagion effect initiated by
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other school shootings like Columbine (Newman et al., 2004; O’Toole, 2000), viewing
perpetrators as stars and a way to gain fame (Fast, 2008; McCabe & Martin, 2005), and
even influenced by popular culture: music, movies, and video games (Anderson, 2004;
Ferguson, 2008, 2015; Ferguson, Coulson, & Barnett, 2011; Lawrence & Birkland, 2004;
Newman et al., 2004). Additionally, nonanger motivating issues are seen as causes as
well, such as the ecological system theory (Hong et al., 2010) and using violence as a
way of escaping the sense of meaninglessness felt by students in society (Staples, 2000).
Various types of criminal activities (Flannery, Modzeleski, & Kretschmar, 2013), the
prevalence of guns (Kleck, 2009), and the lack of respect for firearms (NRA News, 2015)
have also been other suggested causes for these events.
A review of hundreds of controlled studies by Cornell (2006) dispelled many of
the myths and misconceptions about school violence created by some of the studies and
suggested that school violence prevention programs and mental health services are more
valuable than the emotional reaction educational policies and practices of boot camps,
metal detectors, zero tolerance, school uniforms, and Drug Abuse Resistance Education.
According to Pollack et al. (2008), the Safe School Initiative program by the federal
government even tried to prevent further attacks at schools by analyzing why
“bystanders,” students who had prior knowledge of targeted violence incidents from
schoolmates, chose to either come forward or not with their information (p. 4). This
study, although utilizing a very small sample size of only 15 students, highlighted key
findings, which require further investigation. Students who failed to come forward with
information about a planned attack reported they disbelieved the threat, failed to
recognize the immediacy of the attack, or felt they would possibly face negative
consequences for reporting a threat. These results have significant implications for school

30
leaders who should foster a climate of trust at schools to encourage students to share this
valuable information to prevent shootings. Whatever factors these various studies
identified as possible causes for targeted school violence, most experts and scholars
acquiesce to the inevitable realization that school attackers cannot be easily or effectively
profiled (Blair et al., 2014; Heilbrun et al., 2009; Langman, 2015; Mulvey & Cauffman,
2001; Pollack et al., 2008; Tonso, 2009; Vossekuil et al., 2000). According to O’Toole
(2000), one expert even admitted that “trying to draw up a catalogue or checklist to detect
a potential school shooter can be shortsighted, even dangerous” (pp. 2-3).
Some of the empirical research addressed the prevention of targeted school
violence by identifying the etiology of school shootings and violence or finding common
characteristics (typology) in the actors in order to disseminate these warning signs to
stakeholders responsible for school safety (Eng, 2001; Furlong, Bates, & Smith, 2001;
Henry, 2009; Langman, 2009, 2015; Levin & Madfis, 2009; Muschert, 2007; Newman et
al., 2004; Royer, 2003; Thomas, R. M., 2006). Shortly after Columbine, Eng (2001)
analyzed the potential effectiveness of the philosophies of school antiviolence policies
and suggested these policies were only reactive and not addressing the social problems
kids faced in schools. In a pioneering sociological study, Newman et al. (2004)
established five necessary, but not sufficient, conditions that together may explain these
events. These conditions involve marginalized boys with psychosocial problems who do
not exhibit behavioral problems, have access to guns, and cannot cope with the cultural
expectations of the small town, familial communities where they live. Newman et al.
argued that these rampage school shootings occur in small towns because they have
close-knit, school- and church-run communities where social solidarity and conformity
exacerbates the feelings of marginalization of the shooters. Levin and Madfis (2009)
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suggested a five-stage sequential model of sociological events, which culminates in a
school shooting: chronic strain, uncontrolled strain, acute strain, planning stage, and
massacre. These stages evolve and develop over years before the actual event and,
therefore, long-term prevention techniques are possible and necessary for prevention.
Fast’s (2008) psychological explanation for targeted school violence, derived
from analyzing 15 shooters, was the shooters’ quest for a ceremonial event–one in which
they planned and prepared for so they could take part in a final significant symbolic act
before they said good-bye. In a more in-depth clinical analysis of why children kill,
Langman (2009) established there were the numerous psychological interwoven variables
of “genetics, family relationships, individual personality traits, psychiatric symptoms, and
peer relationships” at play when contributing to the makeup of school shooters (p. 193).
In a psychological study, Langman (2015) expanded an analysis of school shooters to
include not only secondary-level students, but college students and non-school-affiliated
shooters as well. Analogous to Langman’s (2015) earlier study’s typology, the 48
perpetrators in this analyses were characterized as either psychopathic (narcissistic and
arrogant), psychotic (schizophrenic and delusional), or traumatized (victims of abuse).
Langman (2015) admitted that these characteristics do not stand alone and can be
influenced by other factors and are not necessarily the only reasons for school shootings,
but can enable professionals to understand why some perpetrators are more susceptible to
environmental stresses like bullying, abuse, failure, or rejection.
Despite the apparent all-encompassing approach by the numerous disciplines in
analyzing targeted school violence and the resulting multitude of identified reasons for
the phenomenon, Muschert (2007) stated the difficulty in understanding why school
shootings occur is the disjuncture among the scholars studying the issue. The experts
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from the different disciplines arrive at their many different perspectives because of what
Muschert calls the Rashomon effect, a term referring to the “subjective construction of
reality in which observers of a single event perceive incompatible, yet plausible versions
of what happened” (p. 61). Due to the mixture of mass media popularized reports, the
postincidents scientific reports, the varied types of school shootings, and the multiple
points of view from scholars approaching the topic, Muschert asserted there is no unified
scholarship on the subject.
Mayer and Furlong (2010) echoed this lack of a unifying framework in
understanding the phenomenon, positing the subject is analyzed by the individual
domains of “education, psychology, sociology, criminology and public health” with little
interdiscipline communications and a resultant research-to-practice gap (p. 19). In the
end, the numerous causal factors of targeted school violence, various typologies of
attackers, and inherent individualistic issues of the perpetrators makes identifying an
individual that will commit targeted school violence extremely difficult at best (Crews,
2007; Heilbrun et al., 2009; Langman, 2015; Mulvey & Cauffman, 2001; Vossekuil et al.,
2004; Weatherby, Stratchila, & McMahon, 2010).
Threat Assessment
Noting the weaknesses and ineffectiveness of using the inductive approach of
profiling to identify a possible perpetrator or impending targeted school violence event,
Reddy et al. (2001) argued a deductive scientific approach through the use of threat
assessment was more suitable to identify and assess risks posed by students’ intent on
these acts. This deductive strategy called threat assessment was originally created by the
Secret Service and was adopted subsequently by professionals in the field of school
safety (Reddy et al., 2001).
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In a seminal study the FBI’s National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime
conducted an analysis of 18 school shootings in an attempt to understand the roots of
school-targeted violence and prevent future incidents (O’Toole, 2000). By utilizing the
expertise of educators, law enforcement, and mental health professionals, it was
concluded that profiling was basically ineffective and suggested threat assessment plans
to identify future perpetrators to assist in averting future school shootings. Supporting
these findings was a study created out of a collaborative effort between the USDOE’s
Office of Safe and Drug Free Schools and the U.S. Secret Service undertaken from 1999
to 2001 analyzing 37 school shootings involving 41 attackers (Vossekuil et al., 2000).
Two subsequent published reports documented the findings of that study (Fein et al.,
2002; Vossekuil et al., 2004). These reports discussed and advocated schools adopt a new
strategy to mitigate school attacks–threat assessment (Cornell & Williams, 2012; Fein et
al., 1995, 2002; O’Toole, 2000; Pollock, Modzeleski, & Rooney., 2008; Vossekuil et al.,
2004). This new strategy was initiated using the Secret Service’s process for identifying,
assessing, and managing assassins on public officials (Borem et al., 1999; Fein &
Vossekuil, 1999; Weisbrot, 2008).
Applying a process of evaluating a threat to determine its seriousness and if it was
substantive or transient to school violence was the suggestion by the FBI and Secret
Service (Cornell, 2006). If a student’s threat was considered viable and the student able to
carry it out the threat would be considered serious or substantive. Conversely, a passing
threat made with rhetorical remarks by a student whose temporary frustration or anger
subsides would be taken as not serious or transient. Cornell (2006) reported, “Threat
assessment is a process of evaluating a threat, and the circumstances surrounding the
threat, to uncover any facts or evidence that indicate the threat is likely to be carried out”
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(p. 177). According to Cornell (2010), IHEs should have well-designed emergency crisis
plans for when incidents occur and also a threat assessment plan to prevent an incident.
Threat assessments for targeted school violence define the gamut of problems faced by
school administrators (from traditional bullying to weapons offenses on school grounds)
and delineate the warning signs school officials should look for in a prospective school
shooter, and are the most prolific topic covered in the literature of active shooter studies
(Bauer, Hill, Neiman, & Ruddy, 2010; Cornell, 2006, 2010; Cornell et al., 2004; Dwyer,
Osher, & Warger, 1998; Eng, 2001; Flannery et al., 2013; O’Toole, 2000; Pollock et al.,
2008; Sokolow, Lewis, Wolf, Brunt, & Byrnes, 2009; Sewell & Mendelsohn, 2000;
Vossekuil et al., 2004; Weisbrot, 2008). Advocated as the best practices model in
violence prevention strategies for schools and IHEs, threat assessment strategies continue
to be reviewed and advocated by experts for their effectiveness in violence prevention
(Borem et al., 2010; Cornell, 2010; Cornell & Williams, 2012; Flannery et al., 2013;
Langman, 2015; Matthews, 2013; Reddy et al., 2001; USDOE, 2013a, 2013b).
Arriving at the same ineluctable conclusion as many of the studies on targeted
school violence, Langman (2015) cautioned the most effective method to preventing
school shootings is through threat assessment by campus threat assessment teams that can
evaluate potential attackers and respond to the violence. Summing up an analysis of 48
major school, college, and adult school shooting incidents, Langman concluded there is
no one solution to prevent school shootings from occurring. Looking at IHEs, Langman
also posited that members on the crisis management teams should include top
administrators, staff at all levels, local law enforcement staff, and other emergency
support responders. Additionally, Langman recommended that students at IHEs should be
trained how to identify the warning signs of an individual preparing to commit violence
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and know the proper reporting process of that information as they are usually in the best
position to observe these signs.
Theoretical Framework
Educators are normally taught about classroom management, individualized
learning needs, and creating a positive environment for their students to encourage
learning. These are lessons they learn from legal and psychological educational theories
they are exposed to in their schooling for the profession (Morrison, 2009). These theories
play a crucial role within the social concerns over targeted school violence as the
proximity of teachers to these emergency crises place them at the center of the events.
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Maslow’s (1943) theory of hierarchy of needs has
fundamental applications to classroom management and student learning, and equally
apposite applicability to school safety and security. A psychologist who studied
humanistic theories of self-actualization, Maslow (1943, 1954) analyzed the physical,
emotional, social, and intellectual qualities of an individual and how they impact
learning. According to Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy, there are five fundamental needs all
humans have and must have met so that an individual reaches self-actualization–one’s
full potential as a person. These five needs are listed in the order in which they motivate
an individual and have often been represented in a hierarchical pyramid starting with the
most basic and moving up to the higher growth needs. These needs include physiological
needs (e.g., air, water, food, clothing, shelter, sleep), psychological need of safety (e.g.,
freedom from threat of physical or psychological harm), social needs (e.g., friends, social
belonging, affection), and esteem (e.g., respect, recognition, achievement, attention). The
fifth and final, or highest, need is considered a higher growth need called selfactualization (e.g., wisdom, fulfilling potential, and meaning).
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According to Martin and Joomis (2007), the second level of Maslow’s theory,
safety, one of the four deficiency needs that a person will be anxious about if not met, can
inhibit a conducive learning environment. This aspect of Maslow’s theory is related
directly to the major issues of school security and safety in the school environment and
culture at the time of this study. If students do not feel safe or perceive any environment
is safe, they will not be able to fulfill that need and focus upon learning. In their study on
pupils’ feelings of safety in school, Mooij and Fettelaar (2012) confirmed in order for
students to function well in school, they need to believe their schools are safe places
where they can attend without fear of being confronted with safety issues, such as
bullying or violence. Students who feel that they are not safe in the school environment
are more likely to skip school or drop out of school (Davis & Davis, 2007; Shelton,
Owens, & Song, 2009). It is incumbent upon school administrators and teachers to
establish that safe environment as they are the key components in creating a safe school
plan (Sindhi, 2013).
Marzano’s levels of school effectiveness. Similar to Maslow’s theory, Marzano
(2013) explained that for a K-12 school to become a high reliability school, one that is
accountable for specific outcomes, there is a need for an established hierarchical structure
of five factors that schools must meet: (a) safe and orderly environment, (b) an
instructional framework, (c) a guaranteed and viable curriculum, (d) standards-referenced
reporting, and (e) a competency-based system. Marzano postulated without school safety
“all other activities will suffer” (p. 13). Indicators exemplifying a school has met this
Level 1 requirement follow: (a) faculty, staff, student, and parent feelings of safety at
school; (b) plans for emergency procedures; (c) knowledge of the procedures and
implementation of these plans by the school personnel; (d) updating of emergency plans;
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and (e) coordination with law enforcement agencies (Marzano, 2012).
Bandura’s theory of self-efficacy. Without the necessary training, educators may
have low self-efficacy in their abilities to perform emergency response procedures
correctly (Bandura, 1997; Graveline, 2003). Self-efficacy was the theoretical construct of
psychologist Bandura (1977, 1993, 1997) who defined it as a belief in one’s ability to
control a specific situation and influence the outcome. Self-efficacy is a situationspecified self-confidence, which motivates an individual to work harder to ensure success
and derives from knowledge, mastery of skills, success in performance, and
encouragement. Bandura (1977) reported, “the strength of people’s convictions in their
own effectiveness is likely to affect whether they will even try to cope with given
situations” (p. 193). Essentially, if individuals believe they have the knowledge and skills
to handle a situation, then the stronger their perceived self-efficacy. It then follows,
according to Bandura, that the stronger the self-efficacy, the more effort and persistence
will be expended in the face of obstacles and adverse situations. When educators face
school-targeted violence and are required to respond appropriately, only self-efficacy in
their abilities will determine the extent of their effectiveness. According to Heath, Ryan,
Dean, and Bingham (2007), “the real challenge is not in stating what needs to be done,
but in the face and disaster and trauma, carrying out crisis plans and ensuring effective
results” (p. 218).
Educators’ Safety Responsibilities
Similar to law enforcement, school leaders have had legal responsibilities in their
profession for the protection of those they serve–the students. As with the law
enforcement, educators have reevaluated and revised their responses to school violence in
the face of the new threats of the active shooter since Columbine. Guided by federal and
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state law, as well as local educational policies, school administrators have had to add
school safety and security to their repertoire of school management skills. The proximity
of teachers to these emergency crises and role as the first responder has made school
safety and security a more salient responsibility of educators.
In loco parentis. Stuart (2010) reported in loco parentis, which is Latin for, in the
place of a parent, is a doctrine describing the legal responsibilities an individual or
organization has during the care and custody of a child in the place of the child's parents.
The legal source of this relationship as it applies to schools is usually credited to
Blackstone’s 1765 to 1769 treatise on English common law, Commentaries on the Laws
of England, and posits educators share the responsibility of controlling and protecting the
child, as a parent would, when in their custody (Stuart, 2010). Students have been
entrusted to the school teachers and administrators who must look out for their interests
with three legal duties: to instruct students, to supervise students, and to provide for the
safety of students (Essex, 2012). It places an affirmative obligation on school personnel
to ensure student safety and provide an advantageous learning environment. Under tort
principles of negligence, educators have the duty to anticipate foreseeable dangers and to
take reasonable steps to protect students from that danger (Essex, 2012). Thus, school
leaders are driven, in part, by this legal theory to create and maintain a safe learning
environment for their students.
Federal mandates. Although few in number and extremely general in scope, the
result of increased targeted school violence on school campuses in the 1990s saw the
initiation of several federal policies to attempt to mitigate school violence. These policies
had to be adopted and followed by school administrators as part of the safety and security
obligations. In 1994, the Gun-Free Schools Act was passed mandating expulsion for a
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period of not less than 1 year of any student bringing a firearm to school (Dunn, 2002).
Under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, states were required to report school safety
statistics to the public and school districts had to use federal school-safety funding to
establish a plan for keeping schools safe and drug free. Included in these plans were
discipline policies, security procedures, prevention activities, student codes of conduct,
and a crisis management plan for responding to violent or traumatic incidents on school
grounds (No Child Left Behind Act, 2001). In 2011, Presidential Policy Directive 8:
National Preparedness was authorized by President B. Obama with policies intended to
guide how the nation, from federal level down to private citizens, was going to prevent,
mitigate, respond to, and recover from threats posing risk to the security of the country
(Brown, 2011). In the Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness, national
preparedness was outlined around five mission areas: (a) prevention, (b) protection,
(c) mitigation, (d) response, and (e) recovery. These missions of planning were to be used
nationally so all first responders and organizations would be able to work together and
confusion would be eliminated during responses to crises. Subsequently, a federally
created guide using this framework and delineating six principles for creating a
comprehensive school emergency operations plan was published for schools to use when
developing their individual emergency management plans (USDOE, 2013a). The goal of
the federal guide is to align school emergency plans with national, state, and local
emergency procedures and responses so that school leaders and their emergency first
responders can work in sync when a school crisis occurs.
Educators as first responders. School personnel are often the first to encounter
perpetrators of targeted school violence as the initial responders to the crisis (Buerger &
Buerger, 2010; Hull, 2010; Tonn, 2005; USDOE, 2013a; Weimerskirch, 2006).
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Guidelines by both federal and state organizations have underscored and reinforced this
position (Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of
Justice, & International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2009; Dwyer et al., 1998; Fein et
al., 2002; Kramen et al., 2009; Major Cities Chiefs, 2009, NJDOE, 2007a, 2007b;
NJSSTF, 2015; Pollock et al., 2008; Scala, 2008; USDOE, 2013a, 2013b; Vossekuil et
al., 2004). The Department of Homeland Security (2015) clarified that a “first responder”
could be anyone, credentialed or not, who is initially at a scene of a crisis and essential
for caring for people who may be injured.
Though not normally considered traditional emergency first responders, according
to the USDOE (2013a), school personnel are recognized by the federal government as
such because they “provide first aid, notify response partners, and provide instructions
before first responders arrive” (p. 1). Buerger and Buerger (2010) posited that in the
absence or incapacitation of school administrators during a school emergency, such as an
active shooter, teachers and other school staff may have to make autonomous decisions to
protect their students. Events, such as the April 2003 shooting at Red Lion Area Junior
High School in Pennsylvania when a 14-year-old student shot and killed the school
principal in the cafeteria; the November 2005 Campbell County Comprehensive High
School shooting in Tennessee where a student shot the school principal and two assistant
principals after being confronted over a gun, and the December 2012 Sandy Hook
Elementary School shooting, all exemplify the first responder status of school staff (Shah,
2013b; Tonn, 2005). After the Sandy Hook Elementary tragedy, Shah (2013b) reported
that many school officials debating the pros and cons of arming teachers with concealed
weapons have come to the conclusion that they are “the first responders” (p. 14). In
January 2016, New Hampshire Democratic Representative K. Rogers stated school
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shootings have made teachers first responders and acknowledged their important
contributions as such when Representative K. Rogers suggested a bill for state funding
for any public school worker who dies in the line of duty (Ramer, 2016).
Understanding this immense responsibility of educators and administrators to
create and maintain a safe and secure environment, the Department of Education,
Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Health and Human Services
recommended emergency management best practices to include regularly scheduled
coordinated practice among educators, law enforcement first responders, and community
partners (USGAO, 2007a). Yet in 2007, 8 years after Columbine and the same year as the
Virginia Tech tragedy, the USGAO (2007b) assessed the state of emergency management
planning and preparation by school districts nationwide and shared four findings:
1. Most school districts had taken federally recommended steps to plan and
prepare for emergencies, but many emergency management plans did not include the
federally recommended practices.
2. Many schools did not have procedures in place to train with first responders.
3. Twenty-seven percent of school districts had never trained with any first
responders in implementing emergency management plans.
4. Ninety-five percent of all school districts had emergency management plans,
but the content varied significantly.
Two years later, the National Center for Educational Statistics published a report
on the findings of the 2007-2008 School Survey on Crime and Safety, which documented
a serious lack of active shooter drills (Neiman & DeVoe, 2009). While 83.0% of schools
had emergency procedures for active shooters in their plans, only 52.5% conducted drills
for those procedures.
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Many times, school personnel will only respond like first responders and will be
the only ones to encounter perpetrators, as a study of active shooter events from 2000 to
2010 well-illustrated when it was found 49% of active shooter incidents ended before
police arrived and 56% were still ongoing when police arrived (Blair & Martindale,
2013). Under these conditions teachers, administrators, and school staff are critical to
rendering proper scene management and care for people injured by an active shooter
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015). To ensure teachers, administrators, and
staff respond appropriately to emergency incidents, it is necessary to give them proper
and specific training (Allen, 2015; Bergh, 2009; Browman, 2001; Brunner & Lewis,
2005; Dorn, 2015; Dorn, Dorn, Satterly, Shepard, & Nguyen, 2013; Harvey, 2011;
Klinger, 2008; Strahler & Ziegert, 2015; Zdziarski et al., 2007).
Emergency Management Guides
As their role and responsibility has evolved from the basic doctrine of physical
control and correction under in loco parentis to full-scale safety and security against
numerous school emergency crises, educators have utilized assistance from federal- and
state-authored guidelines. School campus safety concerns in the wake of more serious
and frequent targeted school violence and various incidents increasingly have
underscored and reinforced the responsibilities of educators in the protection of students.
The evolution of school safety and security responsibilities of educators resulted in a
proliferation of school safety guides and plans by federal organizations to assist in their
preparedness (Dwyer et al., 1998; Fein et al., 2002; Kramen et al., 1999, 2009; Major
Cities Chiefs, 2009; USDOE, 2010, 2013a, 2013b; USDOE & Office of Safe and DrugFree Schools, 2003; Vossekuil et al., 2004).
The number of high-profile targeted school violence incidents in the 1990s first

43
prompted federal legislators, law enforcement experts, and education experts to react
with studies and guides to assist school personnel in facing the active shooter
phenomenon (Pagliocca & Nickerson, 2001). Initially, these guidelines written for
schools outlined the warning signs for school leaders to watch for when trying to stop
targeted school violence. After the targeted school violence attack at Thurston High
School in Springfield, Oregon, in 1998, the USDOE with the U.S. Department of Justice
developed an early warning guide for spotting troubled youth. The guide, Early Warning
Timely Response, sent to all schools, essentially listed 16 warning signs for educators to
use to profile possible violent students and how to respond (Dwyer et al., 1998).
Meanwhile, the FBI’s National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime initiated a
research project in May 1998, which conducted an analysis of 18 recent school shootings
prior to this study in an attempt to understand the roots of school-targeted violence and
prevent future incidents (O’Toole, 2000). By utilizing the expertise of educators, law
enforcement and mental health professionals, the major conclusion of the report, The
School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective, was that profiling was basically
ineffective and, according to O’Toole (2000), “can be shortsighted, and even dangerous”
when trying to prevent an attack (p. 2). The FBI instead suggested schools utilize a threat
assessment procedure, which entailed examining each individual threat for validity and
substantive nature, and responding appropriately to identify future perpetrators in
averting future school shootings (Cornell, 2003; Weisbrot, 2008).
In response to 22 targeted school violence incidents between 1992 and 1999, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police recommended the use of school resource
officers in addition to technology, such as cell phones, two-way radios, metal detectors,
cameras, and alarms in their Guide to Preventing and Responding to School Violence
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(Kramen et al., 2009). The guide delineated the role of all stakeholders involved in school
safety: school administrators, teachers, staff, students, parents, law enforcement officers,
and community members. Each stakeholder had certain responsibilities that were
explained in detail, while the International Association of Chiefs of Police emphasized
creating various programs to address issues that can minimize school violence, such as
reducing alienation, promoting respect, after-school activities, counseling services,
conflict resolution, diversity, and bullying.
Following the Columbine attack, the U.S. Secret Service and USDOE jointly
studied 37 targeted school violence incidents from 1974 to 2000 to identify warning signs
of targeted school violence for educators to better understand how to prevent them
(Vossekuil et al., 2004). The safe school study found that targeted school violence events
were usually planned out well in advance by their perpetrators and often the acts were
known by other students before they occurred. This valuable information meant that
educators could now attempt some formal preventive techniques. As a result of this
information (Fein et al., 2002), the USDOE and U.S. Secret Service published a guide for
educators to “identify, assess, and manage students who may pose a threat of targeted
violence in schools” (p. iii). Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing
Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates incorporated the threat
assessment process used by the Secret Service to protect the president and other major
political officials, and the findings from the USDOE and Secret Service safe school study
about school shootings to guide school leaders in the use of threat assessment teams to
combat the phenomenon (Fein et al., 2002).
In January 2007, the USDOE released the first guide to crisis planning for schools
based upon federal emergency management practices by Federal Emergency
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Management Agency and was essentially a checklist to follow when schools and
communities created a crisis plan (USDOE, 2007b). The USDOE (2007b) noted that the
“research on what works in school-based crisis planning is in its infancy [and] there is
little hard evidence to quantify best practices” (pp. 1-4). The guide, using four phases of
emergency management (prevention-mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery),
outlined steps to consider for the various emergencies schools may encounter: natural
disasters, severe weather, bus crashes, fires, bomb threats, acts of terror or war, shootings,
outbreaks of disease or infections, chemical or hazardous spills, and student or staff
deaths. In April 2007, the Virginia Tech shooting occurred and the IHEs had been thrust
into the forefront of national concerns over the phenomenon of targeted school violence.
In response to that incident, the USDOE’s Office of Safe and Drug Free Schools
convened an expert panel on emergency management in the field of higher education in
Washington, District of Columbia (Drysdale et al., 2010). Acknowledging the differences
between K-12 institutions and college and university campuses when creating school
safety plans, published a separate guide for IHEs (USDOE, 2010). The IHEs were given
the same framework for creating emergency management plans using the four phases of
emergency management to address their specific and individualistic challenges: larger
geographical areas, campuses with numerous buildings, residential areas, research
facilities, constant flow of population on a daily basis, decentralized organizational
structures, and perpetrators with different problems and agendas.
Shortly after the release of the USDOE’s 2007 guide for K-12 schools, the
Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance updated its original 1999 guide
providing strategies for responding to and preventing school violence (Bureau of Justice
Assistance, 2009). The 2007 guide included an addressing of the roles of the various
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school personnel and also of the members of the local community, law enforcement, and
the justice system explaining how these stakeholders could collaborate effectively to
formulate violence prevention strategies to create safe learning environments.
To date, the most comprehensive compendium of effective best practices for K-12
school leaders to reference is the Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency
Operations Plans (USDOE, 2013a). This guide, collaboratively developed by the
USDOE, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, and Federal Emergency Management Agency,
included an offer to K-12 school planning teams expertise in national emergency
preparedness and the best practices recommendations to develop or revise their campus
emergency operation plans. Aligned with the concepts of the National Incident
Management System, the guide includes the best practices in protocols and structures for
managing disasters and emergency incidents so that schools can more effectively work
with first responders (USDOE, 2013a). Moreover, the guide offers common terminology
and procedures used nationwide and allows any school implementing the practices to
align its emergency plans on a national scale.
A sister guide was also published separately for IHEs that addressed the
characteristics and specific challenges college and university campuses and their
populations present in the field of school safety and security (USDOE, 2013b). Both
guides were formulated using the best practices learned over the years from incidents of
targeted school violence, terrorist attacks, hurricanes, and other emergencies; and the
nation’s updated approach to preparedness as called for in the 2011 Presidential Policy
Directive 8. Ultimately, what had been learned over the years was that emergency
planning was best accomplished through a team approach (USDOE, 2013a). The team
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consisted of school and community stakeholders who needed to collaborate, coordinate,
and integrate efforts towards safety preparedness.
Crisis Management Teams
The most effective combative method to minimize targeted school violence is
developing and maintaining proper crisis management teams, emergency plans, and the
inclusion of all stakeholders to prepare schools for emergencies (Astor, Guerra, & Acker,
2010; Booker, 2014; Borem et al., 2010; Cornell & Williams, 2012; Davies, 2008;
Dunkel & Stump, 2007; Furlong, & Mayer, 2010; Hough & Spillan, 2005; Kramen et al.,
2009; Langman, 2015; Larson & Busse, 2012; Matthews, 2013; Sherwood &
McKelfresh, 2007; Spencer-Thomas & Nicoletti, 2010; USDOE, 2013a, 2013b). There
are numerous stakeholders in the field of campus violence, such as administration,
faculty, staff, students, mental health professionals, counselors, campus security or
police, local law enforcement, local fire and medical first responders, other emergency
management professionals, and community associations (Cornell & Williams, 2012;
Mitroff et al., 2006; Spencer-Thomas & Nicoletti, 2010). Forming what is called a
coalition by Spencer-Thomas and Nicoletti (2010) these stakeholders bring various
expertise and ideas, foster cooperation, and improve communication in an emergency.
According to Astor et al. (2010), schools are complex human organizations that
bring together several interacting
groups—students, teachers, teaching assistants, counselors and psychologists,
social workers and nurses, support staff, principal, parents, and other relevant
constituents in the community. Each group may have unique perspectives on
school violence, including how safe the school is as a whole and how to address
safety issues. (p. 70)
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Discussing the importance of crisis planning in organizations, Hough and Spillan
(2005) defined crisis planning as “proactively assessing and addressing vulnerabilities to
avoid or minimize the impact of crises” (p. 20) and claimed using a five-step process:
establishing a crisis team, analyzing vulnerabilities, employing strategies, utilizing the
crisis plans, and assessing the effectiveness of these plans can net these organizations
effective crisis preparedness. Critical components of this five-step process include
choosing the right people who can perform well under stress to form the crisis
management team and ensuring employee preparedness through comprehensive training
and drills, which will enable effective and efficient responses.
Emergency Training for Educators
After the Virginia Tech massacre a panel of law enforcement and school
governance convened by Virginia Governor Kaine investigated the events and compiled a
list of seven lessons learned (Davies, 2008). In addition to providing mental health
services, accessing students’ mental health records, considering more gun control, and
needing a better understanding of FERPA laws, the panel found that emergency planning,
communication among stakeholders, and coordinated training among first responders and
IHEs were extremely crucial to a well-organized response (Davies, 2008; Zdziarski et al.,
2007).
Examining the Sandy Hook School shooting report and interviewing several
participants, Campus Safety Magazine analysts arrived at seven major lessons learned
from that tragedy (Dorn et al., 2013). Three of the lessons centered on stakeholders being
trained in emergency responses positing that staff and students need to learn how to react
correctly to the crisis, respond under stress, and change responses as the situation unfolds
(Dorn et al., 2013).
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Understanding the responsibilities of educational administrators to create and
maintain a safe and secure environment under the threat from so many emergency crises
the USDOE, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Health and Human
Services issued guidelines. These documents recommended emergency management best
practices include regularly scheduled, coordinated practice among schools, the first
responders, and community partners (USGAO, 2007a). However, these best practices are
only created and initiated at the school district or school level by educational
administrators undertrained in school safety and security themselves. In a study of K-12
school administrators’ school crisis competencies and preparedness, McCarty (2012)
found that 43.8% of administrators received their crisis training through personal
experience only, and not through any formal, competency-based, training programs, and
their familiarity with various phases of crisis management was minimal. Security training
all too often lags behind the need; therefore, according to Bergh (2009), as “teachers are
learning the procedures while employed as educators in schools” (p. 38).
Lack of preparedness and training for a targeted school violence event was
identified as one main problem in the post-Virginia Tech shooting analysis. The Virginia
Tech Mass Shootings Report (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007) documented that the
campus’ emergency response plan covered preparedness and responses to various
emergencies, but did not contain policies for shootings. Further, the reported included a
notation that emergency situation training for staff and students did not include shooting
scenarios. A national study of the IHE crisis plans and preparedness by
SimpsonScarborough (2007) revealed that training in emergency response was minimal.
The survey of 93 respondents from the National Association of Presidential Assistants in
Higher Education yielded the following data: only 68% of IHE emergency plans covered
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a campus shooting incident, only 43% of these institutions tested their plans through
tabletop discussions, and just 30% tested plans through mock drills. Even more telling of
the unpreparedness situation was the frequency of the testing done. Less than half (45%)
of IHEs tested their emergency plans once per year, a quarter (25%) tested less than once
per year, while 16% tested twice per year (SimpsonScarborough, 2007). Analyzing the
relationship between the IHE faculty or staff training and effective emergency response,
Harvey (2011) concluded that despite many institutions are prepared with emergency
management plans, the plans are not studied or comprehended and there was little
participation by stakeholders in training, most notably by faculty.
Once an emergency response plan is developed by a school staff, the
dissemination of pertinent information to all stakeholders and the training and practicing
of responses to emergent incidents is a critical component to increase the efficacy of a
school’s crisis response (Bergh, 2009; Harvey, 2011; Heiselt & Burrell, 2013; Hough &
Spillan, 2005; Thrower et al., 2008; Kapucu & Khosa, 2012; USDOE, 2007a, 2007b,
2013a; Wilson, 2007; Zdziarski et al., 2007). Taleb’s (2007) black swan theory included
an explanation that individuals need to adjust their thought process to the existence of
these events and create systems that can handle the unpredictable not just attempt to
predict an incident. Those systems include educating and training the stakeholders in
crisis response. The USDOE identified emergency exercises as a major element of a
school’s emergency management plan (USDOE, 2007b) and posited that conducting
collaborative emergency exercises are useful to verify school emergency management
plans; identify the strengths, weaknesses, gaps, and limitations of a plan; and offer all the
participants the chance to understand their roles (USDOE, 2006). Zdziarski et al. (2007)
explained that a crisis response requires a regularly scheduled training so all staff can
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understand their various responsibilities and be prepared during a crisis.
That training can be in the form of conferences, workshops, tabletop exercises,
drills, and full-scale simulation exercises (Harvey, 2011; Kapucu & Khosa, 2012; Wilson
2007; Zdziarski et al., 2007). Bergh (2009) suggested a training method for educators
beginning with content-level training (i.e., crisis theory and applicability to schools) for a
basic understanding and then the implementation of actual simulated drills (p. 42).
Exposure to comprehensive emergency simulations and drills, according to Hough and
Spillan (2005), increases the likelihood of a successful crisis response.
The International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Bureau of Justice
Assistance, and the U.S. Department of Justice espoused the importance of practicing
crisis management plans with faculty, staff, students, and law enforcement several times
a year utilizing scenarios in a school guide for responding to school violence (Kramen et
al., 2009). The USDOE (2010) posited,
routine, multihazard training should be conducted with faculty, staff, and other
support personnel, focusing on the protocols and procedures in the emergency
management plan. Training should be conducted in conjunction with community
partners, as well as integrated with responders’ expertise, to ensure consistent
learning. (p. 5)
Educators are expected to perform emergency responses under stressful situations,
which are hard to create during normal drills. Often, an individual may not be able to
react or respond during a crisis because of emotional, physiological, cognitive, or
behavioral responses (Kramen et al., 1999). In a study of police officers’
psychobiological stress responses to a reality-based school shooting scenario, Strahler
and Ziegert (2015) concluded that training scenarios held in a natural and realistic
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environment were a more valid approach to understanding stress perception and
biological responses of individuals in these situations. According to Strahler and Ziegert,
by integrating “biological and emotional responses into training programs,” individuals
can better prepare themselves in handling these responses while engaged during real-life
stressful situations (p. 89). School personnel, students, and other stakeholders facing an
active shooter or other crisis will experience the same biological and emotional responses
of fear, anxiety, and disorganization and should train to learn the cues for these responses
and how they may react (Brock, Sandoval, & Lewis, 2001; Kramen et al., 1999). Reallife training scenarios are recognized as a best-practices method of managing critical
incidents. According to the USDOE (2013a), “The more a plan is practiced and
stakeholders are trained on the plan, the more effectively they will be able to act before,
during, and after an emergency to lessen the impact on life and property” (p. 21).
Educators’ Perceptions
The Columbine tragedy and subsequent increased media attention on targeted
school violence phenomenon led to discussions about the legitimacy of the new fear
surrounding school safety–whether it an issue to panic over or a just media-produced fear
(Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014; Schuberth, 2000). Schuberth (2000) reported that an
examination of students’ and teachers’ perceptions of school violence at schools in
Saxony, Germany included findings that there was a true profile of school specific
violence and warned “we should take seriously the perceptions of pupils and teachers and
their primary experiences rather than disparage them as a product of an erroneous
approach to the problem of violence” (p. 80).
Building upon Schuberth’s empirical method of data collection from students’ and
educators’ perceptions of school safety, there have been a number of qualitative and
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quantitative studies completed analyzing educators’ perceptions. These studies were
conducted at various types of schools from several geographical regions to gauge the
effectiveness of school security plans, training, and preparedness (Bergh, 2009; Boyd,
2011; Brown, 2008; Church, 2011; Collier, 2006; Connolly, 2012; Cooper, 2008; Dixon,
2014; Dube, 2012; Graham, 2009; Graveline, 2003; Harvey, 2011; Kanner, 2015;
McKenzie, 2008; Perkins, 2015; Rider, 2015; Ryals, 2014; Session, 2000; Smith-Greer,
2001; Swiontek, 2009; Taylor, 2008; Werner, 2014). The importance of studying the
perceptions of educators is gaining an understanding of their physiological and
psychological needs to respond to emergency situations. Common themes of minimal
training, underpreparedness, and perceived inability to handle a school emergency crisis
by educators permeate these studies and signal that changes in procedures to improve
training are needed. Analyzing these perceptions may also identify reasons for the lack of
comprehensive training in order to remediate the problem of inadequate emergency
preparedness.
In an early study, Session (2000) analyzed perceived school preparedness of
teachers in Mississippi schools. Session documented that almost half reported they did
not receive training for school violence and over 90% “perceived a need for
comprehensive school violence training for all teachers” (p. 63). Similarly, Church
(2011) found Midwestern, urban, kindergarten to Grade 6, school staff lacked training to
cope with school violence and believed professional development opportunities should be
made a priority to support teachers in the classroom. Collier (2006) explored perceived
preparedness for school violence and perceived training needs among middle school
teachers on the Hawaiian Island of Oahu. The survey data included findings that more
than 25% of the respondents felt unprepared at all or too minimally prepared to manage
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school violence and over 70% wanted more training for school violence. With the
responses to a survey of faculty and staff at a mid-Atlantic intermediate school, Cooper
(2008) revealed 90% agreed there was no comprehensive school safety emergency plan,
98% did not understand the concepts involved in crisis response, and 95% claimed there
was no system in place to prepare them for school crises.
Bergh (2009) conducted a study of Michigan school teachers’ perceptions of their
abilities to perform a lockdown response while experiencing the physiological,
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral human responses of a crisis situation. Bergh
reported survey findings that some teachers had low levels of confidence in their abilities
to conduct lockdown procedures and most teachers wanted more “in-depth training” and
realistic drill scenarios to better prepare them for the stressful conditions, which
accompany a lockdown emergency (p. 122). This same theme of realistic drill scenarios
was discovered by Perkins (2015) when Rhode Island teachers’ perceptions of school
crisis preparedness were analyzed. Perkins (2015) stated that only 40% of the teachers
felt they were prepared to face a school crisis, while 63% reported they “never or rarely
[trained for crisis preparedness. Teachers stated the] need for a sense of realism” during
drill exercises through collaboration with first responders and holding drills during
inconvenient times during the school day (pp. 145-159).
Two studies addressed active shooter response preparedness specifically. Ryals
(2014) examined 93 school leaders’ perceptions of conducting active shooter drills in
public and parochial K-12 schools in Louisiana. Uncovered was a significant difference
in preparation: Public school leaders considered their schools more prepared to conduct
an active shooter drill than their parochial counterparts. Despite this difference in
perceptions, according to Ryals, the two types of schools did share the fact that they had
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crisis emergency plans in place yet their respective leaders were not fully “confident in
their competency to practice the plan” (p. 124). Rider (2015) studied perceptions of high
school teachers in the state of Mississippi to determine whether teachers believed their
school districts adequately trained them to respond effectively to an active shooter
incident. Although Rider’s results included a finding of a common theme of teachers’
confidence in their abilities being “related to the number of times active shooter
preparation drills take place, [it also uncovered the disturbing fact that] 35.9% of
participants stated their school did not practice active shooter incident drills at all,” which
is in direct violation of Mississippi education law (p. 148).
Smith-Greer (2001) analyzed California teachers’ perceptions of their
preparedness levels to respond to school violence. An overall perceived lack of training
in school violence for these California teachers and administrators left them asking for
more training. Graveline (2003) surveyed suburban high school teachers in Connecticut
in their self-efficacy at handling a school crisis and found many feared their crisis
responses would be ineffective due to a lack of documented roles and responsibilities and
minimal training.
Brown (2008) surveyed K-12 teachers from schools in Mississippi, Alabama,
Tennessee, Georgia, and Florida for perceptions of personal abilities to handle a school
safety crisis. Brown’s results revealed a majority of teachers did not “feel adequately
trained to handle a crisis at their schools” (p. 108). Kanner (2015) interviewed 10 K-12
teachers from the eastern region of the country for their perceptions of their efficacy in
handling school violence. Most (70%) expressed concern that they were not adequately
trained to be effective in handling violent incidents in their schools and, thus, were illprepared. Werner (2014) surveyed Missouri school counselors’ perceptions of individual
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and school-wide crisis preparedness and crisis training. The results indicated the more
involved school counselors were in school emergency management planning process, the
more they felt prepared for a crisis.
Opposing preparedness perceptions between teachers and school administrators
were found in two studies. Taylor (2008) studied the perceptions of teachers, support
staff, and administrators in handling school violence in California and found teachers’
perceptions of preparedness were lower than support staff, while administrators had the
highest perceived preparedness level. Graham (2009) surveyed Texas teachers and
administrators for perceived preparedness in the planning and preparation for school
emergencies. Although Graham reported teachers and administrators felt their schools
were minimally prepared for emergencies overall, teachers had a “significantly lower
[perception of preparedness for emergencies than administrators and a] significant lower”
perception of leadership’s commitment to this preparedness than administrators (p. 63).
Two studies found different results from the others. Boyd (2011) conducted a
study examining levels of preparedness to respond to acts of violence among Mississippi
middle school teachers, assistant principals, and principals. The results of Boyd’s study
indicated that all viewed themselves as being prepared to respond to violent acts. Dixon
(2014) interviewed 10 K-12 teachers from a midwestern city to gain their perceptions of
school safety and preparedness after the Sandy Hook Elementary tragedy. Even though
the teachers in this study generally believed they were prepared to face a school
emergency, many did express the desire for more training and increased frequency of
training in school violence response.
Regarding perceptions on the efficacy of school emergency plans and the
comprehensiveness of those plans, Swiontek (2009) surveyed North Dakota
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superintendents’ perceptions of school preparedness plans. Although most of the school
districts did report having an emergency plan, only a small number of those plans were
perceived comprehensive in nature and more were rated inferior (9.8%) than superior
(2.0%). Additionally, only 38.0% of school districts took part in a state-run school
security and training program for their staff. McKenzie (2008) investigated the
perceptions of school leaders at five Oregon schools that experienced a gun-on-campus
incident on the effectiveness of their emergency plans. All five school leaders reported
that they felt their individual school responses worked well when the incidents occurred
and their staff needed to respond according to the crisis plans they had in place.
Focusing on a specific school emergency crisis, terrorist activities, Dube (2012)
collected data on Rhode Island school administrators’ perceptions of preparedness to
meet a terrorist threat from public and private schools. Dube’s study significantly
discovered unpreparedness: 35.0% of school administrators discounted the possibility of
a terrorist event at their school and unnecessary to prepare for, 25.0% did not feel they
were prepared, 9.0% said their staff was not provided training in school security and
safety, and 41.3% did not receive training themselves.
At the higher education level Harvey (2011) discovered emergency crisis training
for faculty and staff at 27 locations of 2- and 4-year institutions in Missouri was minimal.
Further, Harvey revealed even after the widespread movement by IHEs across the
country to either create, improve, or just update campus emergency plans after the 2007
Virginia Tech shooting, the emergency management plans from institutions in the study
still lacked comprehensiveness, contained inconsistencies, and failed to address proper
protocols for communication and lockdown procedures. Connolly’s (2012) study on
preparedness perceptions at universities found that 50% of faculty and staff did not have
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a copy of the campus emergency plans; 75% of the adjuncts, 58% of the administrative
staff, and 73% of the nonadministrative staff were unaware of how to report a suspicious
person on campus; and 74% of the staff were unsure of what they were expected to do
during an emergency. According to Connolly (2012), emergency preparedness on college
campuses is nonexistent if stakeholders do not train and know their roles.
With teachers and school administrators directly confronting school emergency
crises, it is undeniable that the need the tools and resources was necessary to be effective
as first responders. Zdziarski et al. (2007) noted training can offer a crisis repertoire from
which to draw when individuals may get nervous or panic and can also build criticalthinking skills necessary to react effectively in crisis situations. These studies in
educators’ perceptions of their efficacy in awareness, training, preparedness, and abilities
documented most educators feel undertrained, unaware of procedures, and unprepared to
react in times of crisis under the pressures that stress human emotions. Zdziarski et al.
also suggested that there may be different views on preparedness between administrators
responsible for the overall program at each school and the teachers in those schools. The
studies intimate educators want more training and drills and call for more realistic
exercises to hone their skills. Training for targeted school violence incidents needs to
include both the physical responses of a lockdown where blinds are closed, doors are
locked, and lights are shut off; as well as the emotional and physiological responses
experienced by staff during highly stressful situations, yet the latter two responses are
often not incorporated in the training (Bergh, 2009).
School Security in New Jersey
There are no federal mandates requiring schools to create or follow a specified or
delineated crisis emergency management plan, only that they should have one in place
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(Folks, 2008; USGAO, 2007b; Greenberg, 2007a; USDOE, 2013a). School safety and
security has remained the responsibility of the individual states which have had varied
levels of approaches over the years to face the challenges.
The education and training of New Jersey school personnel in the field of school
safety and security for public schools has been designated the responsibility of the
various school district leaders, according to the 2010 NJAC 6A:16-5.1(d):
The district board of education shall develop and provide an in-service training
program for all district board of education employees to enable them to recognize
and appropriately respond to safety and security concerns, including emergencies
and crises, consistent with the district board of education’s plans, procedures and
mechanisms for school safety and security and the provisions of this section.
At New Jersey private schools, the responsibility and accountability of this
training is even more localized resting with each individual school’s chief administrator.
Again, the substance and depth of the training is the result of the school’s chief
administrator’s prioritization of, expertise in, and intrinsic motivation to school security
and safety. With the myriad issues facing administrators operating a school, such as
financial solvency, allocation of resources, and meeting educational mandates school
safety and security does not always get the attention it should, nor the time needed, and
may not be a high priority until a high profile targeted school violence event occurs
(Allen et al., 2008; Folks, 2008; Greenberg, 2007a, 2007b; Sindhi, 2013). However, there
are no specially designed, mandated classes offered for training and proper response
procedures to teachers, administrators, and support staff at K-12 schools even though all
school personnel are required to have training to ensure both an understanding and an
expected level of competency in those skills (NJSSTF, 2015).
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Without specific criteria delineating the format, content, and frequency of training
the ultimate implementation of an in-service, security, training program varies greatly in
scope and effectiveness among schools and is greatly dependent upon the knowledge of
safety practices and priority assigned to this issue by those administrators in charge
(Dube, 2012; Greenberg, 2007a, 2007b; Hull, 2010; McCarty; 2015; Schuster, 2009).
Educators in New Jersey initially addressed the issue of school safety in 1988
when the Department of Education and New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety
first created the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). This document, a mutual
agreement, outlined and explained the responsibilities of the two organizations to
collaborate in their efforts to address the alcohol and drug problems of school-aged
children (NJSSTF, 2015). This agreement, which has been revised in 1992, 1999, 2007,
2011, and 2015, has evolved to encompass the myriad of new school related safety and
security problems of the past 20 years, such as guns in schools, bullying, harassment,
computer-crime, safety plans, staff training, school searches, gangs, and child abuse.
Public schools, charter schools, and approved private schools for students with
disabilities are required to annually adopt and implement the MOA with their local law
enforcement agencies (NJDOE, 2015a). Nonpublic schools are exempt from the MOA at
this time. Implementation of a school emergency management plan is required by the
MOA and each school is supposed to have a school safety security plan (SSSP), which
includes communication and decision-making protocols consistent with the provisions of
the N.J.A.C. 6A:16-5.1 (p. 42). Section (a) of the 2015 NJAC 6A:16-5.1 (a) statute
includes a description of the minimum necessary content of those plans:
1. The protection of the health, safety, security and welfare of the school
population.
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2. The prevention of, intervention in, response to and recovery from emergency
and crisis situations.
3. The establishment and maintenance of a climate of civility.
4. Support services for staff, students and their families. (p. 51).
As for the training necessary to prepare for that plan, the New Jersey Department of Law
& Public Safety and NJDOE (2015) MOA specifically reads:
School officials shall annually consult with law enforcement personnel regarding
the in-service training program required for all district board of education
employees, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:16-5.1(d), to enable them to recognize and
appropriately respond to safety and security concerns, including emergencies and
crises, consistent with the school district’s plans, procedures and mechanisms for
school safety and security and the provisions of N.J.A.C. 6A:16-5, School Safety
and Security. (p. 43)
No template or specific details are offered to New Jersey school leaders to write the SSSP
and no specified training curriculum is offered to them for creating a training program for
educators.
Describing events of school violence as a continuum, the NJDOE (2001) initially
offered a guide to schools for developing comprehensive safety plans. To assist school
personnel in understanding how to create SSSPs and establish best practices in school
safety and security the NJDOE issued the School Safety Manual: Best Practices
Guidelines in 2004, which was updated in 2007 (NJSSTF, 2015). This manual described
some best practices in the field of school safety and security covering creating planning
teams, collaborating with law enforcement, school building access, updating sharing of
emergency information and contact information among all stakeholders involved, and
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providing building blueprints and emergency procedures to police, fire, and medical first
responders. The update in 2007 included site assessments for schools, target-hardening
measures, formal communication protocols, gang awareness policies, and health
awareness regarding pandemic influenza (NJSSTF, 2015).
To enable school leaders to meet the requirements established in the MOA and
implement school safety best practices from the 2004 School Safety Manual, school
administrators were issued guidelines on how to implement the plans and drills in the
2007 guide School Administrator Procedures: Responding to Critical Incidents (NJDOE,
2007b). The guide included instructions and procedures on how administrators and staff
should respond to active shooters, bomb threats, evacuations, lockdowns, and public
information communication. Each of these crisis responses require a number of steps to
complete and the coordinated efforts of the entire school staff. While these steps were
outlined in the school administrator procedures guide, it would require practice to train
the staff and perform the responses effectively. To this end, in January 2010, Governor
Corzine signed into law PL 2009, c. 178, which is referred to as the School Security Drill
Law (NJSSTF, 2015). The law requires every school to conduct at least two drills during
school hours, one security drill and one fire drill, every month the school is in session.
The security drills were meant to allow staff to practice for active shooter incidents,
school lockdown events, bomb threats, and nonfire evacuations.
To improve upon the content of SSSPs and incorporate the myriad issues and
activities found on a school campus, the NJDOE and Office of Preparedness and
Emergency Planning (2011a) issued the School Safety and Security Plans: Minimum
Requirements, which listed the required elements to be included in every school district’s
SSSP (NJDOE & Office of Preparedness and Emergency Planning, 2011a). According to
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the NJSSTF (2015), the purpose of the list was “to enhance the development of school
district-wide safety and security plans and clearly define its policies and procedures” (p.
11). The document listed the required elements each school needed to address in their
plans and came with an accompanying checklist (NJDOE & Office of Preparedness and
Emergency Planning, 2011b). However, according to the NJDOE & Office of
Preparedness and Emergency Planning (2011a), this document was described in its
introduction as not being “a step by step guide for completing a comprehensive
emergency response plan” (p. 3). Thus, the creation of a fully comprehensive SSSP was
still the responsibility of school administrators who subsequently still had no training or
experience in this field; needed to lead the collaborative effort with other stakeholders,
such as law enforcement and emergency first responders; and were only given a checklist
with no substance.
The state reiterated the necessity for school leaders to improve SSSPs and train
educators in emergency responses shortly after the Sandy Hook Elementary school
shooting in December 2012. Just as many other states had reacted to the tragedy with
hundreds of proposed school safety bills (Shah & Ujifusa, 2013), New Jersey proposed
its own school safety legislation, but the state’s Department of Education issued a
memorandum 4 days after the Sandy Hook shooting reminding all school leaders to
update their emergency management plans so they align with the minimum requirements
established in 2011 and now set a minimum number of two drills for each crisis (active
shooter, bomb threat, lockdown, and nonfire evacuation) to be held per school year
(NJSSTF, 2015).
A serious lack of school compliance with emergency planning, training, and
resources along with too few trained safety and security personnel at schools to
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implement effective plans, procedures, and training classes underscored the lack of
uniformity among school districts. In their 2015 report on the state of school safety and
security in New Jersey, the NJSSTF recommended a school safety specialist academy to
be modeled after a similar one in the state of Indiana, which would train representatives
from all schools in the best practices regarding school security and safety, stay current on
the most updated resources on school safety, provide ongoing professional development,
and take a leading role for school safety in the state (NJSSTF, 2015). Without an agency
or oversight organization to monitor safety and security planning and training in public or
private educational facilities, these activities will vary in effectiveness greatly placing
school safety in a state of vulnerability (Folks, 2008; Greenberg, 2007a; Hull, 2010;
Sharp, 2006).
Additional recommendations by the task force included allotting more time within
school schedules to train educators in emergency response, training all school personnel
and not just certified staff, annual turnkey training by the state to staff and students on
school emergency responses, such as lockdowns, bomb threats, and evacuations; and
annual ongoing training between schools and first responders to identify weaknesses and
improve school emergency response effectiveness (NJSSTF, 2015). Obviously, these are
progressive recommendations, which require time and many resources, so the task force
also suggested that minimally the state should establish uniform safety and security
training throughout the state as soon as possible. The NJSSTF (2015) reasoning behind
recommending the increase in frequency, statewide uniformity, and immediacy of
educator school safety and security training follows:
Because the majority of active shooter incidents is generally over prior to the
arrival of emergency responders, it is important that school staff and students
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understand their roles and responsibilities in emergency situations. Even in cases
where a police officer is on site during an emergency, school staff must
understand that they may be in a position to make life or death decisions for
themselves and/or others. School staff must have proper training regarding their
school’s emergency plan. (p. 19)
Paradigm Shift
In this post-9/11 era of security awareness and highly publicized school and
workplace shooting incidents, improving school safety is a nascent field. More than 15
years have passed since the Columbine shooting before which law enforcement protocols
emphasized containment and waiting for SWAT teams and educators simply assumed
kids would not commit such heinous activities. What has been learned is that a new
thought process was needed to combat and mitigate these black swan events because this
phenomenon is complicated. There are no definitive answers as to why it occurs, how to
predict it, or how to prevent it completely as they continue at both secondary and
postsecondary institutions.
School safety and security prevention and mitigation depend on the abilities of
school personnel to respond effectively, which is gained only through knowledge and
training. According to the USDOE (2013a), “Lessons learned from school emergencies
highlight the importance of preparing school officials and first responders to implement
emergency operations plans” (p. 1). It is this theoretical model, which this study is based
upon. Educators enter their profession without prior school safety and security training or
experience and are expected to be knowledgeable in the field of emergency response and
able to act under stressful and dangerous situations. This skill set is learned, however,
only at the school level and on the job. With no federal or state mandates on security and
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safety training curriculums, instructor certification requirements, or evaluation
instruments on training effectiveness school staff preparedness is often minimal and
ineffective.
While targeted school violence challenges educators and law enforcement, the
best practices model of creating a comprehensive school emergency response plan and
training all school staff in the implementation of that plan remains the most successful
theory behind mitigation to date. The need to create a safe school environment for
students and build preparedness self-efficacy among educators is paramount. Both
national and state governments recognize this theory and have created mandates requiring
law enforcement and school administrators improve protocols when confronting targeted
school violence (New Jersey Department of Law & Public Safety and NJDOE, 2015).
Manuals providing guidelines outline the steps for the creation of comprehensive
emergency management plans through a collaborative effort among stakeholders
(NJDOE, 2007a, 2007b; USDOE, 2013a, 2013b).
These mandates, requirements, and guidelines, however, do not ensure proper
plans are created or that school staff are trained effectively. Ultimately, school
preparedness remains varied in effectiveness among schools nationwide. School safety
and security experts in various states are recognizing this shortcoming and are beginning
to take steps, as in New Jersey, to improve uniform training and drilling standards
(NJSSTF, 2015).
In New Jersey, the policies and protocols for school safety and security are the
responsibility of school leaders and remain varied in comprehensiveness, scope, and
effectiveness. Prior to this research study, recommendations by New Jersey school safety
experts include aligning school emergency plans and procedures with the national
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guidelines using the concepts of the National Incident Management System and its
command structure called the Incident Command System, a standardized approach for
incident management to assist in improving plans, establishing more comprehensive
training programs for educators, and utilizing a stakeholder collaborative approach
(NJSSTF, 2015; USDOE, 2013a).
School leaders need to implement comprehensive emergency plans with
uniformity in procedures, multidisciplinary crisis response teams to employ the threat
assessment model to proactively mitigate targeted school violence, and effective training
protocols (USDOE, 2013a). School leaders must hold frequent and scheduled emergency
drills, best practices trainings for their staffs, and combined response drills with first
responders to improve the effectiveness of their emergency responses (New Jersey
Department of Law & Public Safety and NJDOE, 2015; NJSSTF, 2015). When educators
and law enforcement members respond together to a targeted school violence incident, a
symbiotic relationship is required to effectively carry out the emergency management
plans. Both organizations need to understand each other’s roles and responsibilities and
mutually support the other with effectual responses.
Summary
The purpose of this mixed-methods study was to assess the perceptions of
educators preimplementation and postimplementation of a comprehensive SSSP with
related training program at one K-12, private, New Jersey school. This review of the
relevant literature on targeted school violence and school emergency crisis preparation
has shown the best practices in mitigating targeted school violence include proactive
preparations by educators and law enforcement.
Researchers in school safety have attempted to identify the causes of the

68
phenomenon and use the profiling of the perpetrators in order to prevent possible future
incidents at both the secondary and higher educational levels. Experts from the fields of
sociology, psychology, criminology, law enforcement, education, and mental health have
deduced there are just too many reasons behind school shootings and any attempt to
profile these individuals are inadequate to prevent future incidents effectively. As a result
of this deduction, the literature cohesively includes the use of the process of threat
assessment, comprehensive emergency management plans, and awareness and
preparedness training as the best practices method of mitigating school violence.
The literature also included illustrations there are no formal instruments
developed, which can be used to measure levels of emergency management effectiveness
and degree of alignment with federal standards or guidelines for federal emergency
management. What the few studies of school emergency management plans and teachers’
perceptions of safety and security did show is that there is no consistency among schools
in the creation, maintenance, and updating of emergency management planning and
training.
Several common themes permeate the literature: the ineluctable conclusion that
this phenomenon will continue to occur, the responsibilities and accountability of
educators to maintain a safe environment for students, the necessity of creating effective
crisis management programs through collaboration and engagement of all stakeholders,
the forming of interdisciplinary crisis management teams, training of educators in crisis
response awareness and preparedness, and the necessity of practicing realistic drills to
enhance the response of educators to emergency situations.
Finally, this review underscores how school personnel (e.g., teachers,
administrators, and support staff) are considered first responders to school emergencies
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and, as such, require the knowledge and skills to perform the duties imposed on them as a
result of their initial contact with emergent events. Analyses of the perceptions of these
educators have revealed most do not feel prepared to fulfill their emergency response
responsibilities effectively and many would like to have more training in those areas.
Unfortunately, there are no federal laws mandating educators receive safety and security
training and state laws vary widely in the requirements of such training. Although
emergency management protocols to improve public school safety and mandating school
personnel be trained and prepared are promulgated by some state laws, such as in New
Jersey, there are no formal programs in place to provide school safety and security
training, professional development, or any compliance oversight. School emergency
plans and related training has been left to the individual public school districts and
nonpublic schools’ leaders. These school administrators often have little or no experience
or knowledge in the field of school safety and security yet they are the accountable party
in charge of school emergency plans and training.
Although the July 2015 report by the NJSSTF recommended many changes to
improve these noted shortcomings in the area of training, these recommendations have
not yet been completely acted upon. At the time of this study, the effects of these
shortcomings upon educators were the impetus and focus of this study.
Research Questions
Four research questions were utilized to guide this research study:
1. What are the perceptions of educators regarding the current status of safety and
security training at the school?
2. What are educators’ perceptions of their own abilities to respond effectively to
school emergency crises before taking part in a comprehensive school safety and security
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program?
3. Using a Likert-type scale, to what extent were the educators’ level of
confidence in their ability to respond to school emergency crises affected by the
implementation of a comprehensive school safety and security training program?
4. What do educators at the school consider are the training practices and
procedures, which enhanced their knowledge and abilities in preparing and responding
more effectively to emergency crises?
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Chapter 3: Methodology
The purpose of this mixed-methods study was to assess the perceptions of
educators preimplementation and postimplementation of a comprehensive SSSP with
related training program at one K-12, private, New Jersey school. This chapter includes
an explanation of the methodology used, describe the participants, discuss the
instruments used to collect data, and review the research design of this study.
Participants
The researcher selected the institution for this study through purposeful sampling.
The school, a private, K-12 school, is representative of the population of private K-12
schools in New Jersey in its organization and staffing requirements. The school is also
representative of all K-12 private and public schools in New Jersey in that it has to meet
the same state-mandated, school safety, and security drill requirements. As such,
administrators face the same challenges and issues in establishing SSSPs and related
training as all other K-12 schools in New Jersey.
Choosing this school through purposeful sampling allowed the researcher to
employ what Creswell (2008) called “theory or concept sampling, [a strategy, which can]
generate or discover a theory or specific concepts within a theory” (p. 216). By studying
this school that does not have a safety and security program, a theory can be generated
about the effectiveness of implementing a comprehensive SSSP for educators to increase
their abilities to respond to emergencies. Finally, the school was also chosen as the
director was willing to allow the school staff to participate in the study if they wanted.
The study’s sampling frame consisted of 60 state-certified teachers, support staff
(i.e., counselors, psychologists, health care professionals, resource professionals,
secretarial, and custodial), and administrators from one K-12 private school in New
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Jersey. All the school’s staff had been invited to participate in the study. The researcher
obtained permission to conduct the study from the school director. The researcher
announced the intended study at a school staff meeting and provided key details and
goals of the study, the length of time of the program and the study, and benefits and risks
of participating in the study. For those staff interested in participating, the researcher
provided further information necessary to answer any questions. Participants were given
a participation letter to read before completing the questionnaire.
The demographics of these educators were representative of K-12 educators at
other private and public K-12 schools. Their teaching certifications, academic
responsibilities, and school safety and security responsibilities were all similar under the
Department of Education teacher certification and induction process, New Jersey Core
Curriculum Content Standards, and the Uniform State MOA between Education and Law
Enforcement Officials, respectively.
The teachers in this school represented all grade levels (K-12) as the school has
elementary, middle, and high school level classes. The teachers, support staff, and
administrators varied in age, gender, and work experience. The career history of the
intended sample also varied from having taught at other public and private schools, prior
to coming to this school, to only having taught at this school. In all respects, the teachers,
support staff, and administrators at this school represented the typical characteristics and
work experiences of school personnel at other K-12 public and private schools in New
Jersey.
Finally, prestudy, the school had no formal safety and security plan or protocols
established and lacked a safety and security training program for its staff. The
participants’ experience in emergency preparedness at the school consisted of holding the
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basic state mandated monthly drills (e.g., lockdown drills, evacuation drills, and shelterin-place drills) once per month with no predrill or postdrill training or preparation. The
staff were never issued any documents or resources related to school safety and security
to utilize for reference or guidance. In these respects, the school was found to be typical
and representative in its preparedness for school emergencies of many K-12 public and
private schools in New Jersey.
Instruments
The researcher used a questionnaire, interviews, archival documents, and
observations to collect data. The researcher developed a questionnaire instrument with
three sections entitled Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training
Questionnaire (EPSSSTQ; see Appendix A). In the EPSSSTQ, respondents are required
to complete three sections: a background demographic, 5-point, Likert-type, response
items, and three open-ended response questions.
The first section of the EPSSSTQ contained five background questions (Items 1 to
5) to collect general background data on the participants for possible generalization of the
data results: number of years teaching (0-1, 1 to 3, 3 to 5, 5 to 10, 10 to 15, 15 to 20, or
20 or more), number of years at current school (0-1, 1 to 3, 3 to 5, 5 to 10, 10 to 15, 15 to
20, or 20 or more), position at school (teacher, administrator, support staff), if participant
had prior training in school safety and security (yes or no), and if participants had prior
experience working in law enforcement or security field (yes or no). These background
items enabled the researcher to take into consideration the effects of any prior safety and
security training on the current study any of the participants may have had.
The second section of the EPSSSTQ (Items 6 to 24) contained a 5-point Likerttype scale. A Likert-type scale is a rating scale used to obtain attitudes or opinions about
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a topic from participants (Creswell, 2008). The 5-point, Likert-type scale, agreement
level responses for this questionnaire’s 19 items ranged from 1 (disagree), 2 (somewhat
disagree), 3 (neutral), 4 (somewhat agree), and 5 (strongly agree). The 19 Likert-type
scaled survey items in this section of the survey were developed to allow the participants
to give their perspectives on general safety, safety and security training of the school, and
their individual abilities to perform the responsibilities required by the emergency
protocols.
A Cronbach’s alpha test was used to estimate internal consistency reliability of
these 19 Likert-type scaled survey items. Cronbach’s alpha measures the internal
consistency or average correlation of items in a survey instrument to gauge its reliability.
The coefficient is measured between 0.000 and 1.000 with the closer to 1.000, the higher
the internal consistency of the items. A reliability coefficient of .700 to .800 is considered
acceptable, .800 to .900 considered good, and .900 or higher considered excellent for
social science research (George & Mallory, 2010; Gliem & Gliem, 2003). The
Cronbach’s alpha for the EPSSSTQ was .887.
The Likert-type scaled survey items were analyzed overall, as well as by three
subgroups: seven items (Items 6 to 12) representing the staff’s knowledge about general
school safety and security at the school, seven items (Items 13 to 19) representing the
staff’s opinions about the school's specific safety and security training program, and five
items (Items 20 to 24) representing the staff’s opinions about their individual abilities to
perform the required emergency protocols. The Cronbach’s alpha for these three
subgroups follows: staff’s knowledge on general school safety .754, staff’s opinions
about the safety and security training program .804, and staff’s opinions about their
abilities to perform the protocols .793.
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Table 1
Cronbach’s Alpha Results for EPSSSTQ Likert-Type Scaled Survey Items

No. items

Cronbach’s alpha

19

.887

Staff knowledge on general school safety

7

.754

Staff opinions about safety training program

7

.804

Staff opinions about abilities to perform protocols

5

.793

Subgroups

Overall scale

Note. EPSSSTQ = Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training Questionnaire .

The third section of the EPSSSTQ included three open-ended questions
addressing the school safety and security training program, which enabled the
participants to qualify and elaborate on their beliefs and opinions. The first open-ended
question asked what aspect of school safety and security training the participants found
most challenging to learn. The second open-ended question asked what part of the
school’s safety and security program the participants found to be the weakest. Finally, the
third open-ended question asked what participants would like to see implemented to
improve the school’s safety and security training program. These individual perceptions
were valuable to identify themes regarding the participants’ views on school safety and
security training, as well as the effects of the training program implemented during this
study.
The researcher was able to produce evidence for the construct validity of the
EPSSSTQ through several methods in addition to Cronbach’s alpha testing. The first
method was an examination of the literature and related studies on SSSPs, trainings, and
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preparedness levels of educators, specifically the USDOE’s (2013a) Guide to Developing
High Quality Emergency Operations School Emergency Plans and NJDOE’s (2011a)
School Safety and Security Plans: Minimum Requirements, which guided and supported
the best practices content and lucidity of the questions. Several similar studies involving
analyses of educators’ perceptions on school safety and security have included
researcher-created surveys and had reliability and validity confirmed through a mixture
of pilot testing, expert reviews, and Cronbach’s alpha testing (Boyd, 2011; Brown, 2008;
Cooper, 2008; Dube, 2012; Gililland, 2015; Rider, 2015).
Rider (2015) employed a 5-point Likert-type scaled questionnaire for three item
subsets: seven items addressing teacher’s perceptions of emergency planning, four items
addressing teacher perceptions of preparedness for responding to an active shooter
incident, and seven items addressing teachers’ perceptions of practice and drills for active
shooter events. A Cronbach’s alpha test for reliability of these three sets of items scored a
.945, a .903, and a .959, respectively. In a similarly formatted study of teachers’
perceptions on school safety, Gilliland (2015) used a 19-item, researcher-created, Likerttype, scaled survey which scored a .861 in a Cronbach’s alpha test. Dube’s (2012) study
utilized a 25-item, Likert-type, scaled survey on school preparedness for terrorist attacks
which scored a .950 on Cronbach’s alpha. Boyd (2011) used seven items addressing
teacher preparedness, which scored a .859, while Brown’s (2008) Likert-type scaled
survey contained 11 items regarding teachers’ knowledge of emergency skills and four
items addressed teachers’ beliefs about being adequately trained scoring a .796 and a
.793, respectively, in a Cronbach’s alpha test. Cooper (2008) utilized the tested Crisis
Response Survey adapted from the Resource Guide for Crisis Management in Virginia
Schools designed by Atkinson (2002). Fifteen of the 20 Likert-type scaled survey items
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on the researcher’s EPSSSTQ created to address teacher preparedness and training are
similar in content to the Likert-type scaled items from these studies.
Table 2
Derivation of Researcher’s Items in Appendix A

Question

Study from which that question or concept came

6, 7

Brown (2008), Gilliland (2015)

8, 9

Brown (2008)

13

Rider (2015)

15

Cooper (2008)

16

Dube (2012)

17 to 21

Rider (2015), Boyd (2011)

22, 23

Brown (2008)

24

Rider (2015), Dube (2012)
Further evidence of content validity came from the researcher’s experience. The

researcher was a law enforcement officer for 21 years, a member of a county SWAT team
for 12 years, and currently serves as a high school teacher and school safety and security
coordinator. The researcher’s law enforcement career, spanning the time frame from preColumbine to well after the Virginia Tech incident in 2007, allowed a participant’s role
in the changing way of thinking and evolutionary role in tactics, procedures, and training
for responding to active shooter incidents. At the time of this study, as a high school
teacher, the researcher had experience in the classroom environment and the daily
responsibilities of a teacher’s accountability for student safety, as well as the schedule of
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trainings and emergency drills held throughout the school year. The researcher was also a
school safety and security coordinator responsible for the oversight, management, and
implementation of the SSSP, training, and drills. Through this position, the researcher
had the additional experiences of the many challenges facing educators in being
accountable and responsible for school safety and security. With this background, the
researcher had the knowledge required to construct appropriate content questions for the
questionnaire.
Finally, the researcher established evidence for content validity through the
review of the EPSSSTQ by eight experts in the field of school safety and security. These
experts consisted of chiefs of police, commanders of SWAT teams, school safety and
security directors, and educational leaders all of whom have had training and experience
in matters regarding school safety and security management. These professional reviewed
the EPSSSTQ and offered opinions and suggestions which assisted the researcher in
constructing items with appropriate content that would align with the goal of this study.
In addition to the EPSSSTQ, the researcher conducted interviews of several
teachers, administrators, and support staff. These interviews followed a semistructured
interview guide approach with open-ended questions to elicit detailed personal opinions
and information to identify themes that may not be obtained through the Likert-type
scaled items (see Appendices B and C). The interview guide approach uses
predetermined open-ended questions that can be reworded in any sequence to meet the
interview situation allowing for an interview that is systematic and conversational
(Zohrabi, 2013). Unlike the rigid formal interview or the loose informal interview, the
interview guide approach allows for focus upon the topic, flexibility during the interview,
and the ability to gather much more data from the interviewee.
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The researcher was able to produce evidence for the construct validity of the
interview questions being asked through the same methods used to develop the
EPSSSTQ. This construct validity also assured the questions were guided by the research
objectives. Questions were designed to illicit the stakeholders’ perceptions and opinions
of the state of their school’s safety and security training and drilling protocols and
procedures at the time of this study. The researcher created separate sets of interview
questions for teachers and administrators. School administrators’ questions reflected the
leadership side of the responsibilities of implementing safety and security plans and
related training.
Both interview protocols had several common questions in addition to the
individualized discipline questions, as the training and response procedures for teachers
and administrators are similar in many aspects of emergency response while
administrators are accountable for the oversight and leadership. Many core interview
questions related to the research questions were the same in both interview protocols,
although there were periphery questions, which were discipline related.
The interviews were tape recorded while the researcher took notes to ensure the
validity and reliability of the data. Participants were given a consent form to fill out prior
to the interviews. Subsequent to the interviews, member checks were utilized by the
participants to confirm the data reliability. Participants reviewed the transcripts to ensure
accuracy, which validates the study’s accuracy (Creswell, 2008). The researcher
transcribed the interviews and reread them several times to fully understand the content.
The data were investigated for recurring themes and the results of the interviews were
coded. This process allowed for the researcher to identify emergent patterns and themes
related to the phenomenon.
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Procedures
Design. This mixed-methods, cross-sectional study took place over a 3.5-month
period. In order to answer the research questions and address the research problem, the
researcher believed that a mixed-methods, cross-sectional design using both quantitative
and qualitative data was the best method for this study. Mixed-methods designs have
been around since 1959 and became more prevalent in the 1970s (Creswell, 2008).
Creswell stated that this method provides “a better understanding of the research problem
and questions than either method by itself,” especially when one of the research methods
alone “is not enough to address the research problem or answer the research questions”
(p. 552). A cross-sectional survey design is useful when gathering data on participants’
“current attitudes, beliefs, opinions, or practices,” thus the way they think about the
issues addressed (p. 389). In this study in which perceptions of teachers, administrators,
and support staff are being investigated regarding a school safety and security training
program, a cross-sectional design could aid in evaluating the program. This design further
allowed the researcher to explore the school emergency phenomenon and use both the
quantitative and qualitative data to identify any relationships that develop (Creswell,
2008). This strategy allowed the researcher to assess the perceptions of response abilities
through the information supplied by the participants.
The value of this method is the integration of numerous types of data into one
study, qualitative and quantitative, which allowed the researcher to employ triangulation
to compare the results. Through methods, triangulation evidence from several types of
data and sources can be cross-checked for corroboration of findings. Interviews
(qualitative data) can then be used to support or refute survey (quantitative data) thus
strengthening and confirming the findings to ensure a complete investigation (Creswell,
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2008).
The first phase of the study involved the use of the Likert-type scaled EPSSSTQ
and open-ended questions to gain an understanding of the perceptions of school personnel
of the practices and policies regarding safety and security training and preparedness at the
school at the time of this study (see Appendix A). The EPSSSTQ was administered to the
participants in a paper-and-pencil format at the school at a specific time and date with
time allotted to take the survey. The EPSSSTQ took approximately 30 minutes to
complete. A coding system was used whereby numeric identifiers were assigned to each
questionnaire to ensure confidentiality of the participants and continuity between the
preintervention and postintervention questionnaires. When completed, the participants
placed their confidential EPSSSTQs in a box marked completed questionnaires.
The second phase of the study was the implementation of a comprehensive SSSP
with related training program to include 8 hours of in-service classes, and expert guest
speakers; and providing tools, resources, and materials on school safety and security to
the staff. Observations were conducted during the classes and the eight emergency drills
(see Appendix D). The school safety and security training program was implemented for
a 15-week period.
The third phase of the study consisted of readministering the EPSSSTQ to the
participants postprogram to collect data on perceptions postintervention. The participants
were instructed to mark their questionnaires using the same numeric identifier from their
first questionnaire. As was done during the first phase, participants completed the paperand-pencil format at the school during a 30-minute time frame and deposited their
confidential EPSSSTQs in a box marked completed questionnaires when completed.
A fourth and final phase involved interviews to further investigate concerns and
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insights identified from the EPSSSTQ. Thirteen participants, several from each area
(teachers, administrators, support staff), were randomly chosen to interview. Interviews
were held at the school, guided by a semistructured interview guide approach with openended questions for one-on-one interviewing of the various stakeholders to obtain
qualitative data. There was one interview guide with 14 questions for teachers and
support staff (see Appendix B) and a separate interview guide with 13 questions for
administrators (see Appendix C). Although many of the questions were the same, a few
questions were different in scope to account for the supervisory responsibilities of the
administrators. The interviews lasted approximately 25 minutes. The data sets
(EPSSSTQs, interviews, observations, and documents) were referenced to answer the
research questions (see Table 3).
Table 3
Alignment Between Research Questions and Instrument Questions

Research Question

Type

Instrument

Item No.

1

Qualitative

EPSSSTQ
Interview questions-Staff
Interview questions-Administrator

25, 26
5, 6, 7, 8, 14
6, 7, 11

2

Qualitative

Interview questions-Staff
Interview questions-Administrator
EPSSSTQ

3, 4, 5, 10, 11
4, 5, 13
27

3

Quantitative

EPSSSTQ

6 to 24

4

Qualitative

EPSSSTQ
Interview questions-Staff
Interview questions-Administrator

27
5, 9, 12 to 14
4, 5, 8, 9 to 13

Note. EPSSSTQ = Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training Questionnaire .
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Data Analysis
The data-recording protocol the researcher used consisted of a 5-point, Likerttype, scaled survey questionnaire; open-ended short response questions; interview
protocols; field notes; observations; and archival documents. A discussion of the
quantitative and qualitative data collection follows.
Quantitative data. Quantitative data were collected from the 19-question, Likerttype, scaled EPSSSTQ (see Appendix A). Likert data were used to measure attitudinal
scales (Boone & Boone, 2012). Through the data, the researcher obtained a quantitative
measure of perceptions of the school staff regarding safety and security training and
abilities.
The data on the Likert-type, scaled EPSSSTQ were combined into a single
composite score and then by subgroups to measure educators’ perceptions and were
analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software. Multivariate
analysis, which is an analysis of the relationships between more than two variables
(Bryman & Cramer, 2011), was used to determine if there was a statistically significant
difference between the preimplementation and postimplementation questionnaire data
and to measure any relationship between the two variables: the safety training program
(independent variable) and the increased emergency awareness and preparedness of the
educators (dependent variable; Murray, 2013).
Qualitative data. Qualitative data were collected from the text of the open-ended
questions numbered 25, 26, and 27 on the EPSSSTQ (see Appendix A), the interviews of
teachers and support staff (see Appendix B), and the interviews of the administrators (see
Appendix C) through a coding process. Additional qualitative data came from
observations of training sessions and the safety and security drills held as part of the
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participants’ in-service training.
Four categories and themes were identified and exposed in the qualitative data:
first, deficiencies and best practices in school safety and security training procedures;
second, causal conditions for certain response procedures; third, various limitations and
goals stakeholders encountered when creating effective response policies; and, fourth, the
effects various training and drilling procedures had on developing effectual emergency
response abilities by the school personnel. It was expected that the researcher would find
patterns and concepts to develop relationships and a theory regarding achieving improved
emergency response abilities of the school teachers, administrators, and support staff.
The researcher used descriptive statistics to discuss findings and patterns from the
preimplementation and postimplementation questionnaire data. Transcripts of the staff
interviews were open-coded to define categories and concepts of the phenomenon being
investigated. Coding is described by Creswell (2008) as an inductive process of
segmenting and labeling text data to form themes. Initially, the text was open coded to
define categories and concepts of the phenomenon being investigated. During a second
phase of analysis, axial coding was employed to further define subcategories and
concepts of the interview responses. Finally, through selective coding, the researcher
developed a theory from the data categories. The researcher transcribed all interviews
verbatim to preserve and ensure the quality of original qualitative data. From the
transcripts, the researcher formulated categories and concepts through an initial phase of
open coding and a subsequent phase of axial coding. Open- and axial-coding methods of
qualitative data analysis were used to categorize data. In open-coding categories are
identified from the data. Categories are concepts that stand for phenomena, which are
important ideas found in the data (Corbin & Strauss, 2015). In axial coding, subcategories
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are formed from the identified categories and these subcategories identify the who, when,
where, why, how, and with what consequences a phenomena is occurring. Thus data
categories are related to their subcategories to explain the phenomena (Corbin & Strauss,
2015). Results of the data analysis are presented in narrative form describing concepts
and themes that were developed.
Additional qualitative data were obtained from school archival documents:
emergency reports, training logs charting the frequency of training activities, emergency
response reports, and emergency management plan reviews. The inferential statistics
measured the frequency of emergency training activities, the number of actual emergency
responses conducted at the school, and any updates or changes made to school emergency
management procedures regarding responses to emergencies. The researcher compared
the average performance of the school’s staff to determine the variables and generalize
the findings to the staff performance postintervention.
Field notes were made by the researcher during observations of emergency drills
and training activities held at the school during the study. The observation notes were
then analyzed for activities that address the research questions. The frequency, type, and
issues addressed during the drills and training activities were categorized and scored by
the researcher to establish patterns found and document events of challenges and issues
regarding the effectiveness of emergency responses. Field notes were also made by the
researcher in collecting pertinent data from archival documents relating to the school’s
emergency procedures and events.
Summary
This mixed-methods, cross-sectional study was conducted at a private, K-12, New
Jersey school over a 15-week period. The study began with administering a perceptions
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questionnaire to the staff, which was developed by the researcher, the EPSSSTQ. Then a
15-week comprehensive SSSP with related training program was implemented, after
which the EPSSSTQ was readministered to the staff. Interviews were conducted with
some of the participants and the school archival documents and emergency drills were
analyzed. The quantitative and qualitative data were statistically tested and the results are
presented in chapter 4.
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this mixed-methods study was to assess the perceptions of
educators preimplementation and postimplementation of a comprehensive SSSP with
related training program at one K-12, private, New Jersey school. Participants were
administered a perceptions survey on school safety and then took part in a comprehensive
SSSP with related training program over a 15-week period. Posttraining, the participants
were readministered the perceptions survey and some were interviewed regarding their
opinions of the program. The goal of the study was to assess educators’ perceptions and
determine the best practices in creating a comprehensive safety and security training
program for educators to prepare for a school crisis in order to offer a model for
stakeholders to follow or gain ideas from to improve their institution’s specific school
safety and security emergency plans. In chapter 4, the results of the statistical analyses
are presented.
Quantitative statistical analyses were conducted on the Likert-type, scaled
EPSSSTQ administered to participants before they participated in the school safety and
security training program (preimplementation) and on the EPSSSTQ administered to
participants after the training program was completed (postimplementation). Qualitative
analysis was conducted on three open-ended constructed response items (25, 26, and 27)
on the EPSSSTQ instrument, and the 13 interviews conducted and the archival
documents recovered. The researcher sought to determine if there were changes in staff
perceptions of their abilities to respond to a number of different school emergencies after
attending the training program and if these changes were statistically significant.
Participant Background
The 60 participants in this study were almost all (65) of the school staff members
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(teachers, administrators, and support staff) from one private, K-12 school in New Jersey.
Of the 60 participants, 30 were classroom teachers, 25 were support staff (counselors,
psychologists, health care professionals, resource professionals, secretarial, and
custodial), and five were administrators. Of the 60 participants, 14 were male and 46
female. Participants indicated their years of teaching experience in specific ranges: 13
participants indicated they had been teaching 0 to 1 year, seven participants 1 to 3 years,
six participants 3 to 5 years, nine participants 5 to 10 years, six participants 10 to 15
years, six participants 15 to 20 years, and 13 participants over 20 years. Additionally,
participants were asked to indicate their years of employment at this specific school: 37
had 0 to 3 years, five had 3 to 5 years, five had 5 to 10 years, two had 10 to 15 years, four
had 15 to 20 years, and seven over 20 years. Finally, of the 60 participants only 18 had
any prior school safety training and only two had any law enforcement or security
experience (see Table 4).
Data Analysis Results
The results and findings of the open-ended questions on the EPSSSTQ,
interviews, observations, and archival documents are presented in a narrative discussion
under Research Questions 1, 2, and 4. Descriptive statistics for the EPSSSTQ are
presented under Research Question 3.
Research Question 1
With Qualitative Research Question 1, the perceptions of educators regarding the
status of safety and security training at the school were reviewed. This question was
addressed by Survey Questions 25 and 26 on the EPSSSTQ (see Table 5). It was also
addressed by several questions from the interviews conducted postimplementation of the
13 teacher and support staff and the administrative members.
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Table 4
Demographics of Participants (N = 60)

Attribute

No. participants

Years teaching
0 to 1
1 to 3
3 to 5
5 to 10
10 to 15
15 to 20
Over 20

13
7
6
9
6
6
13

Years at the school
0 to 1
1 to 3
3 to 5
5 to 10
10 to 15
15 to 20
Over 20

17
20
5
5
2
4
7

Position
Teacher
Administrator
Support staff

30
5
25

Prior safety training
Yes
No

18
42

Prior law enforcement or security experience
Yes
No

2
58

Participants
Male
Female

14
46

For the teachers and support staff, Interview Questions 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, and 14
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addressed the perceptions of the SSSP prior to the comprehensive SSSP put in place
through this study (see Appendix E). Likewise, administrators answered Interview
Questions 6, 7, and 11 (see Appendix F). The interviews were conducted to gain deeper
insight into staff perceptions and elicit more detailed personal opinions and information,
which may not have been obtained through the open-ended questions on the EPSSSTQ.
Preimplementation analysis of Survey Question 25. In Open-Ended Question
25 on the EPSSSTQ, the participants were asked what aspect of school safety and
security training they found to be the most challenging to learn. Of the preimplementation
EPSSSTQ responses, three major themes were identified: different drills, active shooter,
and physical environment (see Table 5).
Table 5
Preimplementation EPSSSTQ Themes, Questions 25 and 26 (N=60)
Category

No. responses

Question 25 most challenging aspect to learn
Different drills
Active shooter drill
Physical environment
Leadership
Violent students
Drill release code
Student concerns

24
9
7
1
1
1
1

Question 26 weakest aspect of program
Physical environment
Communications
Drills
Student seriousness
Who is in charge

19
11
11
1
1

Note. There were 43 responses in total and 17 responses of no for each question. EPSSSTQ
= Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training Questionnaire .

91
Different drills. More than half (24) of the respondents identified the emergency
drills in the school safety plan (i.e., active shooter, bomb threat, evacuations, shelter-inplace, and others) as challenging to learn. Difficulty in remembering the different
response steps to take in each of the various procedures for each of the different drills
was a redundant response. Some of the responses follow:
[1] Differences between what to do in different emergency situations.
[2] The different requirements for the different scenarios.
[3] Recalling all processes and procedures for every security emergency.
[4] Difficult to remember the different types of drills.
[5] The many types of drills and responses.
Active shooter. Just under a quarter (9) of the respondents claimed an active
shooter emergency response was what they found difficult to learn. Memorizing the exact
response steps and committing them to mental imagery for muscle memory response
under psychobiological stress appeared to be the concerns of many participants. Some of
the responses of participants follow:
[1] How to respond when an emergency takes place such as a shooter, how can
we remain calm so that the kids feel safe?
[2] Knowing the exact priority of response if I witness an active shooter prior to a
lockdown
[3] Active shooter–hard to imagine I could keep a cool head and follow
procedures in this particular circumstance.
[4] How to arrange my classroom in the event we have an active shooter situation.
Physical environment. The school’s physical environment was the third most
difficult aspect of school safety and security to learn, according to the respondents.
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Adapting to different environmental obstacles and understanding the strategies for
survival, such as cover and concealment, created this difficulty. Varied sizes and layouts
of different classrooms in the school, many of which had several entrances, large
windows, and glass partitions challenged the staff when learning how to implement a
lockdown scenario in order to keep out intruders. Five of the participant responses
follow:
[1] Each classroom is set up differently so knowing what to do vary depending on
where you are.
[2] Getting all the doors locked in a timely manner.
[3] Too many entrances to cover.
[4] So many glass windows and doors that it is hard to find a place out of sight.
[5] Securing multiple entrances.
Postimplementation analysis of Question 25. When participants were asked to
explain what aspect of school safety and security training they found the most
challenging to learn after attending the 15-week school safety and security training
program (Question 25 on the EPSSSTQ), two answers remained the same as before:
active shooter and the different drills conducted. The majority of the respondents stated
learning all the different drills remained challenging. The second and third greatest
number of participants responded that remaining calm during an emergency was hard to
learn and proper response to the active shooter continued to challenge them. Although
seven other safety concerns were mentioned, these responses were few (see Table 5).
Different drills. Participants were educated in the various elements of the state
mandated drills (i.e., active shooter, lockdown, bomb threat, and shelter-in-place) learned
about the numerous scenarios each drill is meant to address, and studied other emergency
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responses, such as nonfire evacuations, off-site relocation, and lockouts in the 15-week
training program. Through this comprehensive approach to dissecting each emergency
and its corresponding response procedures while instilling an understanding that every
crisis is different, fluid, and evolving, participants were exposed to the complexity of a
crisis response. Many respondents found remembering and performing the correct steps
for each response a challenging obstacle. Five of the participant responses follow:
[1] All the different drills and expectations for each.
[2] Distinguishing each drill / emergency from one another.
[3] Recalling the differences between the different drills.
[4] Trying to recall all the procedures for the various types of emergencies the
school could face.
[5] There are so many scenarios and it is hard to remember.
Remaining calm. How they would act in a real-life crisis situation was repeated
to be a major challenge of respondents. During the training, participants analyzed
national school emergent events, such as active shooters, and were exposed to simulated
crisis scenarios created by law enforcement members, which engaged them in problem
solving under highly stressful situations. Educating teachers in the realities and
responsibilities as first responders in a critical incident engendered concerns about selfefficacy. Four participant responses follow:
[1] During an active shooter I do not trust my ability to respond as trained.
[2] I am not sure how I will deal with a student for 3 to 4 hours alone in my room
during certain situations.
[3] How to keep calm and keep the kids calm during a real active shooter
situation.
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[4] How to remember what to do for each drill without panicking.
Active shooter. After being trained in active shooter response procedures, some
respondents still found this event to be onerous to learn. The themes in this situation
centered not how to respond, but more on remembering what to do (procedures) while
stressed, remaining calm and keeping students calm, and providing a safe haven in the
classroom. A summary of the themes is presented in Table 6. Three participant responses
follow:
[1] Before the training, I would have opened my door for a student banging on it
to get in, but now I know better, but that is a hard thing to do.
[2] How to announce a lockdown if I see an active shooter.
[3] To be able to remain clear headed and think clearly.
Preimplementation analysis of Question 26. In Open-Ended Question 26 on the
EPSSSTQ, participants were asked to explain what they considered to be the weakest
aspect of the school’s safety and security program. This question was one of the four
elements of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats matrix, which is a
standard, structured, planning tool used to identify an organization’s competencies and
plan steps to achieve future goals (Harvard Business School Press and the Society for
Human Resource Management, 2006). Three major weakness themes surfaced from the
responses: physical environment, communications, and different drills (see Table 5).
Physical environment. The largest number of respondents stated they felt the
physical environment was the weakest aspect of the school’s safety and security program.
Participants cited inoperable classroom doors, an unsecured front entrance foyer door,
unsecured areas within the school, and no safe zones in some classrooms due to glass
windows or room configurations as major security concerns. Three of the responses of
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participants follow: “No room to hide in the classroom. . . . Classroom doors only locking
from the outside. . . . [ and] Lack of locked areas for potentially dangerous tools and
equipment” made staff uneasy about the school’s security.
Table 6
Postimplementation EPSSSTQ Themes, Questions 25 and 26 (N=60)
Category

No. responses

Question 25 most challenging aspect to learn
Different drills
Remaining calm
Active shooter
Physical environment
Scared students
Violent students
More safety instructions
Calling a lockdown
Student locations
Missing students

26
6
4
2
2
2
1
1
1
1

Question 26 weakest aspect of program
Physical environment
More training
Students not serious
Communications
Weapons in school
Organization
Being prepared

14
12
12
7
1
1
1

Note. There were 46 responses in total and 14 responses of no for Question 25, and 48
responses in total and 12 responses of no for Question 26. EPSSSTQ = Educators’
Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training Questionnaire .

Communication. Communication was a second major concern noted by 11
respondents. Teachers not having instant communication capabilities with supervisors, or
each other, during emergent incidents, such as missing students or student violent
behavior troubled many. Two responses of participants, “An inability to communicate
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among each other during an emergency when locked down. . . . [and] No ability to
communicate during an event to account for all students,” revealed concern for students
during an emergent event.
Drills. School safety drills was the third major theme that respondents mentioned
as a weakness. No postdrill analysis or feedback, inadequate knowledge about protocols
for certain drills, and a lack of varied types of drills conducted were weaknesses,
according to these staff members. Four responses resonated among the respondents: “Not
enough practice. . . . Certain drills are not done enough for practice. . . . More drills
needed. . . . [and] Not sure of what is expected of me in certain situations.”
Postimplementation analysis of Question 26. When asked to explain what they
considered to be the weakest aspect of the school’s safety and security program
postimplementation of the 15-week school safety and security training program (Question
26 on the EPSSSTQ), the researcher coded four consistent themes. These four major
elements identified by participants’ responses follow: physical environment, more
training, students not serious about drills, and communications.
Physical environment. Of the respondents, the largest group considered the
building’s physical environment still a major weakness. This was a reasonable and
expected result as the 15-week training program period was too short to allow structural
changes in the school’s infrastructure. Again, the consensus centered on concerns about
unlocked or unsecured areas, glass walls or windows that could be broken by an assailant,
and classroom configurations. Responses from some of the participants follow: “Our
building is the greatest weakness . . . terrible design. . . . The building itself, the first floor
is all windows. . . . Unmanned entrance doors. . . . [and] No secure place in classroom to
hide.”
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More training. A quarter of the respondents identified the need for additional
training as a safety and security program weakness at the end of the 15-week training.
After exposure to the myriad scenarios and types of crises that could occur and needed to
be addressed in a SSSP, participants recognized the skill set they were practicing to
develop was immense. Participants believed more practice was necessary to improve both
memory and efficiency. They also saw a lack of conducting drills with law enforcement
as a deficiency and of importance to improving their understanding of real-life
emergency response. Some of the participant’s responses follow:
[1] I don’t think it is weak, I just think we (I) need more practice.
[2] Repetition for memory.
[3] Need more training for staff and students.
[4] Training with law enforcement on premise.
[5] We have not drilled yet with law enforcement on lockdown.
[6] Need the opportunity to drill with law enforcement so we can understand fully
what would happen in a real emergency when they are present.
Students not serious about drills. A subtheme only mentioned by one participant
as a weakness before the school safety and security training program, students’
lackadaisical responses to drills, was now the second major weakness noted by 12
respondents to this question. Some participants’ responses that underscored this theme
follow: “The students don’t take it seriously. . . . Students understanding they need to
remain quiet. . . . [and] The students’ understanding of its importance–their behavior at
some drills is often not serious.”
Communications. The fourth most frequent theme mentioned by respondents as a
weakness after the 15-week program, communications, had been the second most
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mentioned before the program. Although improved radio communications among the
supervisors and key staff was implemented in the training program, participants still
perceived the need for more efficient and instantaneous communications among all staff
in the building as an important safety measure. Similar to the physical environment
issues, the implementation of updated communications systems available to all staff
members was impossible to complete due to time and financial constraints in this study.
Some deficiencies were noted by participants: “All staff not being able to be reached in
an emergency. . . . Radios for every classroom. . . . Communications during emergencies
/ drills. . . . [and] The ability to communicate effectively via phone and e-mail.”
Postimplementation interviews. Thirteen random participants, 10 teachers and
support staff and three administrators, were interviewed subsequent to the 15-week safety
and security training program at the school. The interviews conducted to obtain more in
depth opinions and explanations than retrieved from the open-ended responses were
analyzed for concepts and themes developed from the results of the two EPSSSTQs
(preimplementation and postimplementation) and concepts or themes not discovered
from these questionnaires.
Regarding the interview questions related to Research Question 1, in the status of
safety and security training at the school, all, but, one of, the themes developed from the
interviews matched the themes developed in the analysis of the EPSSSTQ results. The
physical environment (i.e., classrooms, doors, building hardware), mastering all the drill
protocols, missing students, and minimal communications among staff remained
significant themes of concern with interviewees mentioned. Dissecting drill protocols, an
intensive training program, and safety-related resource materials were seen as strengths
of the status of the safety program implemented in this study. A new theme did emerge
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from the interviews, which was coded from statements related to the strengths of the
current safety program and training resource materials: assurance in safety because of the
presence of law enforcement experience on campus. This theme is discussed under
Research Question 4.
Interview Question 6 asked what participants felt was the most pressing safety
need in the school. Several issues were raised by the teachers, support staff, and
administrators. The physical environment, missing students, and communications were
the main themes needing to be addressed. Not surprisingly, teachers and support staff
worried about their classrooms while the administrators were concerned about the entire
building. Unsecured doors, glass windows that could easily be broken for entry by
unauthorized individuals, and an entrance door not outfitted with a slide card access
reader were mentioned by teachers. Many classrooms had glass partitions for walls and
teachers felt they were at a disadvantage when trying to lockdown their classrooms for an
emergency, such as an active shooter incident. Two teacher participants’ responses
follow: “We need strong Plexiglas or bulletproof glass because we can’t secure our
classroom. . . . [and another was] unsure how to protect their students when doors do not
lock.”
Administrators considered total building security and target hardening a safety
necessity. One administrator admitted that, in their position, access points to the school
and controlling them at all times was a primary pressing safety need, which they
struggled with each day. The fear of a stranger or an unauthorized individual getting into
the school and committing violent acts made target hardening of the school a goal for
them. A second administrator stated that before the school training program, they would
have stated that everything related to school safety and security was a pressing need to be
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addressed. However, with the recent education of the staff in the field of emergency drills
and responses from the training program, this administrator now only worried about
building hardware, (locks, windows, and doors) and the ability to lockdown the entire
school building securely and quickly.
Missing students raised concerns among teachers, support staff, and
administrators. When students left the classroom, either with permission or without, and
could not be found, panic set in and the need to establish protocols to locate students who
may or may not have exited the building was frequently mentioned as a major safety
concern necessitating additional attention in training. Two participant responses follow:
“When a student is gone for too long, how do we know if there is a situation we need to
take care of? . . . [and] When a student leaves without permission, it is hard to get
assistance immediately.” This type of event occurred often and was, therefore, a priority
concern. With the responsibility of accounting for every student under their immediate
supervision, teachers and support staff focused on missing student incidents as one of the
scariest events they experience.
Communications, a recurrent theme, was discussed as a pressing safety need by
teachers, support staff, and administrators. While a better, more efficient means of
communications between staff was a common theme, one element of that theme was
being capable of increasing the speed to locate missing students. Some participant
comments follow:
[1] Delays in reaching administrators in the event of a student that has not
returned to class makes me anxious and disrupts my teaching duties.
[2] Radios in every room would help.
[3] Sometimes calling via the classroom phones leads to unanswered phone calls
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or delays in responses.
[5] [One administrator also viewed communications as a pressing safety need and
admitted] the ability to connect more quickly is currently being addressed with the
administration.
Interview Question 7 asked which school emergency teachers, support staff, and
administrators feared the most. All 13 participants interviewed noted the active shooter
event as the one school emergency that they feared the most. The consensus of the
respondents was nationwide incidents, fears of serious injuries and deaths, and the
feelings of helplessness when the shooting begins all combined to make the active
shooter a preeminent terror. None of the participants hesitated in their response to this
question, and those who expounded on their answer further also added the difficulty in
protecting against such an attack made it the most fearful emergency to face.
Interview Question 8 asked teachers and support staff about an emergent incident
that occurred that needs to be addressed in training. Again, missing students was the main
theme that raised concerns among teachers, support staff, and administrators.
Interview Question 10 asked teachers and support staff what drills they found
difficult to perform. As found in the EPSSSTQ responses, the varied emergency drills in
the school safety plan (active shooter, bomb threat, evacuations, shelter-in-place, and
others) were mentioned as hard to learn. Difficulty in remembering the different response
steps to take in each of the various procedures for each of the different drills was the
cause for this belief. Respondents also mentioned the active shooter response because of
the serious nature of the event and the need to get it right.
Finally, Interview Questions 11 for administrators and 14 for teachers and support
staff asked what they felt needed to be updated or improved in the SSSP. Administrators
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believed professional development in training needed to continue and attention to the
physical environment was an area of necessary constant improvement. The school’s
physical environment and communications remained the repetitive themes for teachers
and support staff.
Research Question 2
Qualitative Research Question 2 was intended to take a look at the educators’
perceptions of their individual abilities to respond effectively to school emergency crises
before taking part in a comprehensive school safety and security program. This question
was addressed by Survey Questions 27 on the EPSSSTQ (see Table 7). It was also
addressed by several questions from the interviews conducted postimplementation of 13
teacher and support staff members, and administrative members. Themes were developed
from the Interview Questions 3, 4, 5, 10, and 11 for the teachers and support staff (see
Appendix E) and from Interview Questions 3, 4, 5, and 13 for administrators (see
Appendix F).
Table 7
Preimplementation EPSSSTQ Themes for Question 27 (N=60)
Themes wanted implemented to improve program
More training and drills

No. responses
29

Physical environment

6

Communications

3

Violent students

1

Note. There were 39 responses in total and 21 responses of no for the question. EPSSSTQ =
Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training Questionnaire .
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Postimplementation interviews. Before taking part in the comprehensive school
safety and security training program in this study, only 18 of the 60 participants reported
having any prior school safety and security training (see Table 4). After the 15-week
school safety and security training program, interviews were conducted and Interview
Question 3 was asked of participants if they received any formal school safety and
security training. Of the randomly chosen 10 teachers and support staff interviewed for
this study, only three had some type of previous school safety and security training. Of
the three administrators interviewed, only one previously attended any type of training.
These four participants elaborated on their training.
Interview Questions 3 and 4 for teachers, support staff, and administrators queried
the previous training. The scope of these safety trainings can be measured from the
responses in the interviews. The trainings these participants attended at their previous
schools were described as being superficial and general in substance. One participant
stated their previous training was conducted through in-service trainings and mock drills
at several schools where they had taught in New Jersey, but all were minimal in depth
and intensity. “We did not go into each drill and examine the various scenarios or
responses, and not multiple times.” A second explained that the school where the training
previously was taught (also in New Jersey) offered webinars twice a year on school
safety and security and two or three professional development trainings per school year.
However this teacher described the information taught was “cursory, generalized, and did
not cover all the different types of drills.” This teacher felt that safety training that
involved watching webinars was not interactive and prevented them from asking
questions and getting answers as they attempted to problem solve various scenarios.
Another participant explained they had attended a 6-hour countywide (New Jersey)
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training program for educators that had been designed as more of a basic introductory
overview of the field to introduce educators to the topic rather than any specific plans or
individualized crisis responses for educators to follow.
The final participant with safety and security training experience had attended a
more formal “incident command, . . . search and rescue, . . . [and] response to active
shooter on a school campus” training, but this was from a school in another state.
Although interesting courses, the teacher admitted, only the active shooter class was
considered useful for this teacher’s daily responsibilities in the classroom. The common
themes among all four were trainings had been rudimentary, minimal in substance or
depth, not consistent or regularly scheduled, not designed for the specific needs of the
classroom teacher, and had no commonality in format.
Interview Question 5 for all participants asked about their abilities to respond
effectively to school emergency crises prior to the comprehensive school safety and
security training program in this study. Nine participants stated they had no prior training
and the consensus was they felt underprepared for emergencies. The four with some prior
training believed they had only a cursory knowledge and were generally unsure of their
familiarity of emergency responses due to minimal and sporadic training.
Interview Question 10 for teachers and support staff asked what emergency drills
participants found difficult to perform. Respondents basically answered all of the drills
were difficult. They stated lockdowns during an active shooter emergency, shelter-inplace, and knowing the proper procedures for other crises, such as bomb threats and
evacuations. Some emergency responsibilities these educators lacked knowledge in and
feared their inadequacies follow:
[1] What are the best ways to respond to an active shooter emergency.
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[2] Understanding my exact role in each drill / incident.
[3] What is expected of me in each type of emergency.
[4] What I am supposed to do in a shelter-in-place.
[5] Hiding during a lockdown.
[6] Keeping kids quiet.
[7] Knowing all the different drill responses.
Interview Question 11 asked teachers and staff what safety responsibilities they
believed were important for their respective positions, but were unsure how to perform.
The same themes from Interview Question 10 were repeated. Teachers and support staff
focused on lockdowns to mitigate active shooter outcomes, committing all the correct
drill responses to memory so as to effectively react, and “understanding my exact role in
each drill or incident.”
Archival analysis. The lack of archival documents recovered by the researcher
substantiated the minimal substantive SSSP in place and minimal training participants
received at the present school prior to this study’s training program. The archival
documents the researcher intended to collect were school drill logs, emergency logs,
school safety and security management procedures, security training logs, and security
training curriculum.
The researcher only recovered one binder in the school’s administrative office
files referencing a SSSP and emergency procedures and responses. The binder contained
procedures for the school principal to follow in the cases of a lockdown event, severe
weather event, explosion, chemical spill evacuation, and student threats. The binder was
created and distributed to all schools in a school district where this school had previously
been located over 7 years ago. These procedures had not been updated since that time and
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each emergency’s response procedure was one page in length. Each emergency procedure
explained the steps the school principal was to take and who to contact: the appropriate
personnel and authorities, informing staff of the emergency event, and the proper
announcements to be made over the public address system. The only information found
in the binder directed to the teachers’ responsibilities were a few sentences under the
lockdown emergency page. Teachers in the classrooms were directed to do only three
things: to lock classroom doors, account for students, and wait for further instructions.
The binder was kept in the administration office and each page in the binder was stamped
confidential. No copies of this binder’s information, emergency response instructions, or
any additional resource materials were distributed to the staff for reference or direction.
This practice was substantiated by one administrator interviewed who has been employed
at this school for the past 10 years and stated that they never received safety resources
and there was no formal safety and security training beyond conducting monthly fire
drills and the occasional lockdown drill.
School emergency logs and safety logs recovered from the administrative offices
of the school also failed to offer much more additional information regarding previous
school safety and security training. The log book listed only the emergency drill dates for
monthly fire drills. No security drill log was kept. No logs were recovered referencing
safety and security training, postdrill analysis, or emergency response results by the
school staff that may have required lockdown, shelter-in-place, bomb threat, or
evacuation responses. Again, this lack of a SSSP with any related training and drills was
substantiated by two administrators interviewed who had been with the school for the last
8 and 10 years, respectively.
Preimplementation analysis of Survey Question 27. Before the participants
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began this study’s safety training program and had only minimal or cursory experience in
school safety, they were asked what they would like to see implemented to improve
school safety and security training in Open-Ended Question 27 on the EPSSSTQ. The
participants responded to this question and identified three major themes: training and
drills, physical environment, and communications (see Table 7).
Training and drills. Twenty-nine respondents asked for more drills, more handson practice, different emergency training scenarios, joint drills conducted with law
enforcement, and resource materials to better understand the steps they needed to follow
and to utilize during drills as emergency response instructions. Some responses of the
participants follow:
[1] More practice time allowed for drills.
[2] More opportunities to practice safety drills with real-life scenarios.
[3] Classroom specific training for active shooter emergency.
[4] Take home materials distributed for review.
[5] Drills that involve a law enforcement member responding to a mock active
shooter scenario and the actions staff take upon specific requests from the law
enforcement official [were common requests].
Physical environment. The school’s physical environment was referenced as an
area of needed safety improvement by six respondents. Teachers and support staff
showed concern with their classrooms and individual responsibilities to protect those
classrooms. Classroom safety and overall building safety were common themes in these
responses:
[1] Training specific to different classrooms.
[2] Universal room keys to lock and unlock classroom doors where I may need to
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hide.
[3] Little used rooms / areas with unlocked doors or glass doors should be locked.
[4] Training to arrange my classroom in the event of an active shooter.
Communications. The final theme of safety and security training improvement
identified by Survey Question 27 was communications. This theme mentioned by three of
the respondents dealt with staff abilities in signaling an emergency if they witnessed one
and in real-time communication during an event when staff are isolated in their
classrooms. Two suggestions in the responses follow: “An effective texting system for
alerts or warnings. . . . [and] Ability to communicate with supervisors and staff during a
critical event.”
Research Question 3
Quantitative Research Question 3 looked at the extent to which the educators’
level of confidence in their ability to respond to school emergency crises were affected by
the implementation of a comprehensive school safety and security training program. The
Likert-type scaled survey items were analyzed together as a whole and by three
subgroups: Subgroup 1 (Likert-type scaled Survey Questions 6 to 12) representing the
staff’s knowledge about general school safety and security at the school, Subgroup 2
(Likert-type scaled Survey Items 13 to 19) representing the staff’s opinions about the
school's specific safety and security training program, and Subgroup 3 (Likert-type scaled
Survey Items 20 to 24) representing the staff’s opinions about their individual abilities to
perform the required emergency protocols.
Overall scale. For the overall scale, consisting of all 19 Likert-type scaled survey
items, the results from a within-subjects analysis of variance indicated a significant
difference from the preimplementation program, (M = 3.79, SD = .585) to the
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postimplementation program (M = 4.43, SD = .317), F(1.59) = 89.492, p <.001, partial η2
= .603 (see Table 8). These results were indications that, overall, participants believed
they increased their emergency response knowledge and abilities to perform response
procedures after attending a comprehensive school safety and security training program.
The data included suggestions that this type of school safety training for educators is
significantly effective at preparing educators for emergency responses, especially when it
addresses the specific needs of the teacher in the classroom.
Table 8
Mean and Standard Deviation Results for Overall LikertType Scaled Survey Items on Preimplementation and
Postimplementation EPSSSTQ (N=60)

Overall

M

SD

Preimplementation

3.79

.585

Postimplementation

4.43

.317

Note. EPSSSTQ = Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and
Security Training Questionnaire.

Subgroup 1: Staff’s knowledge about general school safety and security at
the school. An analysis of variance for Subgroup 1 indicated a significant difference
from the preimplementation program, (M = 3.57, SD = .663) to the postimplementation
program (M = 4.32, SD = .410). The descriptive data for the seven Likert-type scaled
Survey Items (6 to 12) referencing the staff’s knowledge about general school safety and
security at the school prior to the participants taking part in the comprehensive school
safety training program (preimplementation EPSSSTQ) are presented in Table 9. The
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wide variance in standard deviations (.78 to 1.31) show the basic safety and security
information educators are responsible to know in their positions as first responders for
their students was not common knowledge among everyone.
Table 9
Descriptive Statistics for Preimplementation EPSSSTQ Survey Items 6 to 12 (N = 60)

Survey item

D

SWD

N

SWA

SA

M

SD

6. I am knowledgeable in New Jersey laws
mandating school safety and security laws.

9

4

15

29

3

3.21

1.15

7. I am knowledgeable in my school’s
emergency management plan.

2

1

5

42

10

3.93

0.79

8. I am knowledgeable in the roles of
the Crisis Response Team.

2

11

15

28

4

3.41

0.97

9. I am knowledgeable in my roles and
responsibilities regarding safety and security.

1

2

6

27

24

4.13

0.87

10. During an emergency, I know who the
schools’ Incident Commander is.

7

6

4

25

18

3.67

1.32

11. I am familiar with the emergency response
procedures expected of me when LE arrive
during an active shooter crisis.

2

13

10

29

6

3.39

1.04

12. I am familiar with the emergency response
procedures expected of me when LE arrive
during other types of emergencies.

2

16

13

23

6

3.26

1.06

Note. EPSSSTQ = Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training Questionnaire, D =
disagree, SWD = somewhat disagree, N = neutral, SWA = somewhat agree, SA = strongly agree, and LE =
law enforcement.

After taking part in a 15-week comprehensive SSSP with related training
program, participants’ responses to the EPSSSTQ, Likert-type, scaled, survey questions
regarding knowledge on general school safety and security showed a significant increase
in knowledge (see Table 10). Although the results show an increase in knowledge in all
areas, there were some notable changes. Item 7 showed a 27% increase in participants
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who strongly agreed they better understood the school’s emergency plan. Item 8 showed
a 22% increase in those who strongly agreed they had an increased awareness of the roles
of the school’s Crisis Response Team. Most notable, however, were Items 11 and 12 that
indicated a 47% and a 30% increase, respectively, of participants who strongly agreed
they felt more familiar with their responsibilities when law enforcement arrive during
both an active shooter incident and other emergent events.
Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for Postimplementation EPSSSTQ Survey Items 6 to 12 (N = 60)

Survey item

D

SWD

N

SWA

SA

M

SD

6. I am knowledgeable in NJ laws mandating
school safety and security laws.

0

3

13

35

9

3.80

0.74

7. I am knowledgeable in my school’s
emergency management plan.

0

0

1

33

26

4.38

0.53

8. I am knowledgeable in the roles of the
Crisis Response Team.

0

2

5

36

17

4.04

0.70

9. I am knowledgeable in my roles and
responsibilities regarding safety and security.

0

0

1

24

35

4.50

0.53

10. During an emergency, I know who the
schools’ Incident Commander is.

0

0

1

21

38

4.59

0.52

11. I am familiar with the emergency response
procedures expected of me when LE arrive
during an active shooter crisis.

0

2

3

21

34

4.38

0.74

12. I am familiar with the emergency response
procedures expected of me when LE arrive
during other types of emergencies.

0

2

3

31

24

4.23

.71

Note. EPSSSTQ = Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training Questionnaire, D =
disagree, SWD = somewhat disagree, N = neutral, SWA = somewhat agree, SA = strongly agree, and LE =
law enforcement.

Subgroup 2: Staff’s opinions about the school's specific safety and security
training. An analysis of variance of Subgroup 2 indicated a significant difference from
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the preimplementation program (M = 3.86, SD = .679) to the postimplementation
program (M = 4.53, SD = .398). The descriptive data for the seven Likert-type scaled
survey items (13 to 19) referencing the staff’s opinions about the school's safety and
security training program before taking part in this study’s training program are presented
in Table 11. When questioned about the school’s safety and security training offered to
staff at the school preimplementation of this study’s comprehensive safety and security
plan with related training program, participants’ responses were as varied as their
backgrounds.
Table 11
Descriptive Statistics for Preimplementation EPSSSTQ Survey Items 13 to 19 (N = 60)

Survey item

D

SWD

N

SWA

SA

M

SD

13. If I have a question about school safety and
security I know where to find the answers.

2

1

3

23

31

4.34

0.91

14. I feel my concerns about school safety and
security are addressed when voiced.

1

2

7

29

21

4.15

0.86

15. The school has allocated sufficient time for
safety and security preparedness training.

2

3

11

24

20

4.0

1.01

16. The school has provided resources and materials
on school safety and security preparedness.

1

3

11

22

23

4.17

0.96

17. The school conducts drills throughout the day
to prepare emergency responses for any daily
situation.

1

1

7

22

29

4.32

0.86

18. School personnel along with local LE coordinate
together in active shooter drills.

13

16

11

12

8

2.65

1.35

19. Overall the school’s present safety and security
training program is effective for preparing staff
for emergencies.

1

8

15

28

8

3.52

0.94

Note. EPSSSTQ = Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training Questionnaire, D =
disagree, SWD = somewhat disagree, N = neutral, SWA = somewhat agree, SA = strongly agree, and LE =
law enforcement.
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The majority of participants had minimal to no exposure to training and the
majority answered neutral or somewhat agreed to all the items except Survey Item 13.
There were a higher number of participants answering strongly agreed to knowing where
to find answers about school safety and security due to the fact that the researcher was
known by participants as having law enforcement experience and assisting school
administrators in emergency issues prestudy. As for staff concerns about school safety
(Item 14), the amount of time allotted staff for safety training (Item 15), providing staff
with resource materials for school safety (Item 16), training done in coordination with
law enforcement (Item 18), and overall effectiveness of safety training (Item 19), a large
segment of the participants did not think the school offered a training program that
afforded them the specific information necessary to be effective responders.
After implementing the 15-week comprehensive SSSP with related training
program, the participants’ responses in this subsection regarding opinions training also
showed a significant increase in positive opinions towards the program (see Table 12).
More than double the number of participants now strongly agreed their concerns about
school safety and security were addressed (Item 14). Likewise, more than double the
amount of participants now strongly agreed the school allotted a sufficient amount of
time given to safety training (Item 15). Regarding training materials, more than double
the number of participants now strongly agreed the school afforded them resources and
materials to train for emergency responses (Item 16). Finally, there was a significant
increase in the participants’ belief in the integrity about the overall effectiveness of the
training program. Preimplementation of the program, only eight participants strongly
agreed the school’s training was effective for preparing staff for emergencies.
Postimplementation of the 15-week program, 37 participants (an increase of 48%)
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strongly agreed the type of training they received for school safety and security was
effective for preparing them to respond to emergencies.
Table 12
Descriptive Statistics for Postimplementation EPSSSTQ Survey Items 13 to 19 (N = 60)

Survey item

D

SWD

N

13. If I have a question about school safety and
security I know where to find the answers.

0

0

0

14. I feel my concerns about school safety and
security are addressed when voiced.

0

1

15. The school has allocated sufficient time for
safety and security preparedness training.

0

16. The school has provided resources and materials
on school safety and security preparedness.

SWA

SA

M

SD

4

56

4.90

0.25

5

10

44

4.54

0.71

0

1

11

48

4.83

0.45

0

0

1

7

52

4.83

0.40

17. The school conducts drills throughout the day
to prepare emergency responses for any daily
situation.

0

1

3

15

41

4.57

0.66

18. School personnel along with local LE coordinate
together in active shooter drills.

6

5

19

17

13

3.5

1.21

19. Overall the school’s present safety and security
training program is effective for preparing staff for
emergencies.

0

1

3

19

37

4.5

0.67

Note. EPSSSTQ = Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training Questionnaire, D =
disagree, SWD = somewhat disagree, N = neutral, SWA = somewhat agree, SA = strongly agree, and LE =
law enforcement.

Of significance in this subgroup was Item 18 regarding the coordination of
training with law enforcement during active shooter drills. This was the only item where
there was little change as depicted by the statistical results. The results (SD = 3.5) showed
participants felt there was too little or no coordinated training with law enforcement. This
result was to be expected as this one element of school safety and security training was
not possible to implement multiple times in the short time period of this study (15
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weeks).
Subgroup 3: Staff’s opinions about their individual abilities to perform the
required emergency protocols. An analysis of variance of Subgroup 3 indicated a
significant difference from the preimplementation program (M = 3.99, SD = .745) to the
postimplementation program (M = 4.44, SD = .477). The descriptive data for the five
Likert-type scaled Survey Items (20 to 24) referencing the staff’s opinions about their
individual abilities to perform the required emergency protocols prior to attending the 15week training program are presented in Table 13. Data results indicated a number of
participants unsure of their ability to effectively respond to a significant crisis like the
active shooter. Participants were unsure of arranging classrooms so as to provide safety
from an active shooter and unsure how to properly respond to an active shooter.
Table 13
Descriptive Statistics for Preimplementation EPSSSTQ Survey Items 20 to 24 (N = 60)

Survey item

D

SWD

N

SWA

SA

M

SD

20. I am confident in my ability to arrange my
classroom for an active shooter.

7

7

10

16

20

3.45

1.36

21. I am confident in my ability to respond to an
active shooter emergency.

3

5

13

25

14

3.52

1.56

22. I am confident in my ability to respond to a
bomb threat emergency.

2

2

8

35

13

3.86

.88

23. I am confident in my ability to respond to a
nonfire evacuation emergency.

0

2

3

28

27

4.39

0.72

24. I am confident in my ability to respond to a
shelter-in-place emergency.

1

2

2

21

34

4.52

0.84

Note. EPSSSTQ = Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training Questionnaire, D =
disagree, SWD = somewhat disagree, N = neutral, SWA = somewhat agree, and SA = strongly agree.

Responses to the Likert-type scaled Survey Items 22, 23, and 24 also indicated a
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consensus of inadequate abilities to respond to a bomb threat, nonfire evacuation, or
shelter-in-place emergency. These four specific school crises are the emergency drills
school staff mandated by New Jersey state law to have knowledge in and perform on a
monthly basis throughout the school year. Postimplementation of this study’s
comprehensive SSSP with related training program, there was a significant result in the
increase in confidence in the staff’s perceptions of their abilities to respond effectively to
a school crisis (see Table 14). Although the training program only lasted 15 weeks, a
higher percentage of participants either somewhat agreed or strongly agreed they were
confident in their abilities in these four different response emergencies.
Table 14
Descriptive Statistics for Postimplementation EPSSSTQ Survey Items 20 to 24 (N = 60)

Survey item

D

SWD

N

SWA

SA

M

SD

20. I am confident in my ability to arrange my
classroom for an active shooter.

0

2

4

23

31

4.35

0.76

21. I am confident in my ability to respond to an
active shooter emergency.

0

2

3

28

27

4.30

0.72

22. I am confident in my ability to respond to a
bomb threat emergency.

0

2

3

28

27

4.35

0.72

23. I am confident in my ability to respond to a
nonfire evacuation emergency.

0

1

1

24

34

4.52

0.62

24. I am confident in my ability to respond to a
shelter-in-place emergency.

0

0

1

20

39

4.64

0.51

Note. EPSSSTQ = Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training Questionnaire, D =
disagree, SWD = somewhat disagree, N = neutral, SWA = somewhat agree, and SA = strongly agree.

The percentage of participants whose confidence in their abilities to arrange their
classroom for an active shooter rose from 60% to 90%. The number whose confidence in
responding to an active shooter rose from 65% to 91%. An increase of 78% to 92% of
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participants agreed or strongly agreed to their abilities to respond to a bomb threat. The
results included indications that less of an increase from the preprogram status of staff
abilities regarding nonfire evacuations and shelter-in-place drills. Staff confidence was
fairly high preimplementation of the program. This may be a function of the drills
themselves that require less procedural knowledge and problem solving than active
shooter and bomb threats.
Research Question 4
Qualitative Research Question 4 required looking at what educators at the school
consider are the training practices and procedures that enhanced their knowledge and
abilities in preparing and responding more effectively to emergency crises. This question
was addressed by Open-Ended Question 27 on the EPSSSTQ. It was also addressed by
several questions from the interviews conducted postimplementation of 13 teachers,
support staff, and administrative members. These were Interview Questions 5, 9, 12, 13,
and 14 for teachers and support staff and Interview Questions 4, 5, 8-13 for
administrators (see Appendices E and F).
Postimplementation analysis of Question 27. After attending the 15-week
comprehensive school safety and security training program, participants were asked on
the EPSSSTQ (Question 27) what they would like to see implemented to improve school
safety and security training. This same question was asked during the interviews (Items
12 and 14 for teachers and staff and Item 11 for administrators). The respondents’
answers were coded into two major themes: more training and drills, and
communications (see Table 15). Interestingly, these themes were the same two of the
three suggestions (improved physical environment was the third) respondents made to
this same question preimplementation of attending the training.
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More training or drills. Twenty-nine of the participants stated they would like to
see more training and more drills implemented going forward in the school’s safety and
security program. Upon learning about and understanding the many different types of
school emergencies, the various response steps for each, and that emergent events are
fluid and evolve as they progress, participants realized problem solving was one of their
emergency responsibilities.
Table 15
Postmplementation EPSSSTQ Themes, Question 27(N=60)
Themes wanted implemented to improve program
More training and drills

No. responses
29

Communications

6

Physical environment

3

Students not serious

3

Room supplies
Armed staff

1
1

Note. There were 46 responses in total and 14 responses of no for the question. EPSSSTQ =
Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training Questionnaire .

Fearful they would not be able to think quickly enough and properly respond to
events as crises unfolded exposing them to stressful conditions, participants felt the need
to practice. Practicing drills, remembering specific response protocols, becoming more
efficient and comfortable when performing emergency responses when under stressful
conditions, and training with law enforcement were the elements of training the
participants requested. Some of the responses of participants underscored this feeling of
heightened awareness of their responsibilities to perform effectively:
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[1] More hands on practice.
[2] Interaction with law enforcement response.
[3] An active shooter drill with police response.
[4] Engaging scenarios.
[5] More and different drills.
[6] More practice.
[7] Situational discussions to better remember how to respond.
[8] More hands on activities and practice scenarios.
Communications. The second major theme for improving the safety and security
training program centered on communications. Immediate notification of a critical
situation and the ability to stay in communications during an emergency again was
important to staff who felt isolated in their classrooms. Respondents requested, “Text
message system to alert all staff, . . . Radios throughout the school, . . . An e-mail to go
out when active shooter drill is actually a drill, . . . . [and] Cell-phone- or texting-based
emergency communications system.”
Postimplementation interviews. Participants interviewed after the 15-week
SSSP implementation were asked several questions related to Research Question 4
regarding the training practices and procedures they feel enhance their response abilities
(see Appendices E and F). Interview Question 5 for teachers and support staff, and
Questions 4 and 5 for administrators asked if the educators felt the 15-week training
program in school safety and security prepared them to respond effectively to school
crises. All, but two, of the respondents claimed they believed they were prepared and
confident. Their responses follow:
[1] I definitely feel like its prepared me, the possible scenarios that could happen,
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just the various drills and what to do.
[2] Yes, I used to be more paranoid about what on earth would I do if something
happened and then each time we had one of our professional development
trainings another possible school emergency scenario was addressed, so I got
closer and closer to being more prepared.
[3] I feel that I have been prepared to respond effectively because of the
emergency guide handed out and the emergency response posters in each room.
[4] Yes because I did not know how to deal with the kids during an emergency
and now I feel more ready to do so.
[5] Yes I think having the drills every month or twice a month have been very
good and the mock drills are effective too just getting us prepared for the feeling
of what it is like in the event we have to do an actual emergency response.
[6] Yes I do think I can be effective because it has helped me think through the
scenarios that could possibly happen in our school and prepare for a variety of
emergencies that I hadn’t thought about prior to the training.
Two participants were not completely certain of the effectiveness of the training
on their response abilities. One participant initially agreed to feeling prepared, but then
clarified the answer stating,
[1] But I do think, though, in an emergency you follow your instincts and you
would hope people would use common sense. [Another participant questioned the
effectiveness of the theory alone:]
[2] I think it helped, but it has not prepared me to handle a true, true emergency.
Not having experienced a real situation, it’s hard to visualize going through the
event. With the variety of different crises, I don’t have the experience.
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Interview Question 9 for teachers and support staff and Interview Question 12 for
administrators asked how educators learned school safety and security responses the most
effectively. Participants felt better prepared and confident after attending the safety
training program, but how they learned best was of significant importance. The training
program included drills, mock scenarios, tabletop exercises, PowerPoint presentations,
videos, guest speakers, reference materials (i.e., handouts, articles, emergency reference
flip chart, posters), and question-and-answer sessions. Twelve participants interviewed
stated they learned the course material best through drills and mock scenarios, and one of
them stated this in conjunction with the emergency reference flip chart. In addition, nine
stated the flip chart also helped after the drills and scenarios, while three also added
videos assisted them in absorbing and retaining the safety information.
[1] By drills or mock scenarios, being able to do it.
[2] From mock scenarios and doing, like when we did a missing person drill one
day.
[3] I think personally what is most effective are mock scenarios just because when
you are watching a presentation there are questions not raised as when people are
acting out a scenario and come across issues needed to be worked out.
[4] I personally learn the best through mock scenarios, I am very hands on.
[5] I learn from the materials given to us and drills, but I learned more from the
training materials.
[6] The manual (flip chart) that we now have has synthesized the training and
responsibilities and a greater understanding.
From the administrators’ points of view, the school staff learned safety and
security responses through all the methods of delivery that were provided in this study’s
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training program, but also hinted they needed more. Two responses follow:
[1] I think they learn from all of them, through all of them. It seems the staff had
so many more questions than you would think they would have, they need ample
time to learn.
[2] I believe for our staff they need more hands-on kinesthetic drills are best, they
have heard the classwork, they need to do the ‘do’ part to see how they react.
Interview Questions 13 and 10 for teachers and support staff, and for the
administrators, respectively, asked participants to evaluate what they felt was the strength
of the school’s safety and security training program. Nine respondents stated the school
safety and security emergency reference flip chart, a resource which was issued to all
school staff during the program, coupled with the organized training was the strength.
The flip chart was developed by the researcher and listed each emergency and the
requisite steps to take by teachers and administrators. The quick reference pages included
each type of school emergency response and also the building floor plans, contact phone
numbers, student medical concerns, and documents staff would utilize for attendance and
student-parent reunification. Having a flip chart delineating the emergency response steps
for each type of emergency that allowed quick and easy reference was highly valued by
these participants. Some of the common participant responses follow:
[1] Our flip chart, for sure, one-hundred thousand percent, the flip chart.
[2] The guide makes it easier to remember or refresh memory of the correct
response for each emergency.
[3] The in-service emergency instruction classes and the flip chart has taken
safety training to a higher level.
[4] The implementation of the protocol steps to take for emergencies and the flip
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chart for quick reference, I feel that quick reference is an absolute strength.
[5] You and the flip chart.
[6] You and the flip chart [identified a new theme not developed on the
EPSSSTQ: assurance in safety because of the presence of law enforcement
experience on campus].
Eight participants interviewed stated that they believed the researcher’s
background combined with the instructional training was the strength of the safety
program. Having a retired law enforcement officer as part of the school’s staff made them
feel safe and assured them that the training they received was proper and suitable for their
needs. Having someone with the background, knowledge, and experience to develop,
organize, and conduct a school safety training program was a valuable asset to them.
Their expectations were grounded in the notion that school safety and security responses
to emergencies were skill sets possessed only by law enforcement members, and not
educators. To these educators, law enforcement personnel were the experts trained in and
solely qualified to teach this field. Some of the responses of teachers and support staff
follow:
[1] Having you here to educate us. I don’t think a lot of public schools have that
opportunity. You could answer a lot of questions much more easier than a
Principal could, I believe.
[2] Honestly, I think the fact that we have a retired police officer here, although
you are a teacher now, but to answer questions and give us our training, this has
got to be the best part of our school safety plan.
[3] You. No, I do, I think that your knowledge, and confidence, and your
background is what’s going to help our school to understand what we need to do
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as a group and to keep our kids safe.
Administrators shared this belief and reiterated it in an additional question
(Question 8) asking them who was in charge and responsible for the school’s SSSP. The
administrators interviewed admitted, although ostensibly being responsible for school
safety and security, they had no experience or training to prepare them to sufficiently
instruct their staff properly in emergency management and response. The responses of
two administrators follow:
[1] We have a good (safety) leader who is giving us good information and we are
ahead of many other schools in terms of what that information is.
[2] I think you are the strength of the program, our safety officer. Having a person
in charge that takes school safety and security seriously and has the knowledge
the rest of us do not have.
A final strength, mentioned by six participants, was the training drills and
scenarios held during the 15-week training program. A set training schedule, participation
in drills on a regular basis, practicing scenarios to allow problem solving, and actual
hands-on activities were seen as the elements that made the SSSP useful. Four of their
responses follow:
[1] Having the consistency in training on a regular basis in order to learn
[2] Hands on drills and the monthly drills to get us prepared for the feeling of an
emergency.
[3] The flip chart coupled with mock scenarios and drills.
[4] I think the fact that we do it on a consistent basis, there is a lot of variety in
terms as to how we are exposed to the information. I mean the different ways the
information is presented. The movies are helpful to make it sort of real for some
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people who maybe don’t want to think about these kinds of things.
Finally, administrators were queried about the biggest barriers to improving
school safety and security in Question 9. The two major themes administrators discussed
were centered on finances to obtain necessary resources and the time constraints of
running a school and meeting the myriad demands of testing, curriculums, and other
educational responsibilities.
Summary
The purpose of this mixed-methods study was to assess the perceptions of
educators preimplementation and postimplementation of a comprehensive SSSP with
related training program at one K-12, private, New Jersey school. The researcher
administered a safety and security questionnaire, the EPSSSTQ, with the Likert-type
scaled items and open-ended questions to 92.3% (60 of 65) of the total staff consisting of
teachers, support staff, and administrators to obtain the perceptions of staff regarding
school safety. The researcher then implemented a SSSP with scheduled training to the
staff over a 15-week period. Subsequent to the training the EPSSTQ was readministered
to measure changes in the participants’ perceptions. Additional data were collected from
13 randomly chosen participants who were interviewed after the training program for
more in-depth analysis of opinions and ideas. After transcribing the interviews, member
checking was completed by having participants review the transcripts to ensure accuracy
of the information collected.
Using methods triangulation, the researcher checked the findings of the
quantitative results (EPSSTQ) and the qualitative results (interviews, archival data, and
observations) against each other to compare results. The data results in this study
included indications that educators benefitted from a comprehensive school safety and
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security training program. Data results from the EPSSSTQs and the interviews indicated
that a comprehensive safety and security training plan with related training for staff
increases the self-confidence perceptions of the staff when they reflect upon their abilities
to effectively respond to school emergencies. The major themes developed from the data
indicated teachers are concerned with knowing how to protect their classrooms, obtaining
more training to make emergency response an activity they can perform under stressful
situations, understanding their specific responsibilities when facing a crisis, and getting
support from the school administrators in various ways so they can be better prepared to
face a crisis. Notable in the responses was that administrators who are charged with
school safety and security by the state acknowledged their inadequate preparedness to
provide proficient safety and security training and their reliance upon professionals in the
field to fill this void. Most significantly, the data results showed educators had a desire to
learn much more about school safety and security and were very aware and concerned
about their lack of knowledge in the subject. Educators expressed their specific concerns
and made known their requests to better enable them to respond effectively to a school
emergency.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Overview
Chapter 5 includes a discussion of the study’s findings. The purpose of this
mixed-methods study was to assess the perceptions of educators preimplementation and
postimplementation of a comprehensive SSSP with related training program at one K-12,
private, New Jersey school. The goal of the study was to assess the educators’
perceptions and determine the best practices in creating a comprehensive safety and
security training program for educators to prepare for a school crisis in order to offer a
model for stakeholders to follow or gain ideas from to improve their institution’s specific
school safety and security emergency plans.
The researcher administered a safety and security questionnaire, the EPSSSTQ, to
staff consisting of teachers, support staff, and administrators at a private K-12 New
Jersey school. These educators then took part in a 15-week comprehensive SSSP with
related training program and were then readministered the questionnaire to measure their
changes in perceptions. Additionally, 13 participants were interviewed and school
archival documents reviewed.
Findings
Population. Participants taking part in this study were all school employees in a
private, K-12, New Jersey school. Their positions included classroom teachers, support
staff (counselors, psychologists, health care professionals, resource professionals,
secretarial, and custodial), and administrators. The demographics of these educators were
representative of educators at other private and public K-12 schools. Their teaching
certifications, academic responsibilities, and school safety and security responsibilities
were all state mandated. Many participants previously worked at other New Jersey
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schools. In all respects, these participants represented the typical characteristics and work
experiences of school personnel at other K-12 public and private schools in New Jersey.
The 60 participants in this study made up 92.3% of the total staff at the school, which
was a significant factor in the overall school safety and security training program. The
school drills held during the 15-week program were conducted with a near entire
contingent of trained staff, which allowed for almost complete untainted results regarding
learned skills from this program.
Research Question 1. Research Question 1 follows: What are the perceptions of
educators regarding the current status of safety and security training at the school?
Preimplementation of this study’s training program, participants noted the different state
mandated drills (active shooter, lockdown, bomb threat, and nonfire evacuations) and
managing the school’s physical environment under emergency scenarios as the most
challenging aspects of school safety to learn. These responsibilities required skill sets
participants were not prepared for or taught when they became educators. They were,
however, expected to be as knowledgeable in this topic as they were for building content
area curriculums or knowing classroom management skills.
After the 15-week safety program intervention, the participants’ answer to the
same question generated similar results. The different emergency drills were still the
major challenge. Although the data did not show any change after the program regarding
participants’ difficulty in learning the different drills, the challenge was not in the
understanding, but in the implementation of the drills. Participants’ interview statements
exposed that once the participants were educated in each drill’s specific response
protocols, they were more worried about practicing and mastering the numerous steps
required rather than knowing what crises the drills were meant to mitigate. Data did
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indicate the training program was successful in increasing self-efficacy in the active
shooter response abilities of participants.
Even a more challenging skill to master was the ability to remain calm during an
emergent crisis. The training program exposed participants to the real-life results and
factual information of past school crises, instructed them in the numerous skills required
as a first responders to a school crisis, and disseminated specific information about the
different emergencies school personnel may face. After absorbing these facts, the
respondents now questioned their ability to react effectively under stressful situations.
Educators’ perceptions about what they considered to be the weakest aspect of the
school’s current safety and security program resulted in three major “weakness” themes
before the training program: the school’s physical environment, communications, and
drills. Postprogram safety training weakness responses again included the school’s
physical environment for the same reasons, communications for the same reasons, and
drills because of the belief not enough were conducted for effective mastery. Participants
wanted more drills to hone their newly learned skills and acclimate to crisis scenario
situations. A fourth notable weakness developed from the training program–students’
lack of seriousness during drills. Respondents explained students would talk during
lockdown drills, not follow teachers’ directions, and generally took the different drill
situations lightly and lackadaisically. Respondents suggested safety and security training
designed for students to remedy this shortcoming.
The final two areas addressed under Research Question 1 follow: (a) the most
pressing safety need at the school and; (b) the most feared emergency. The consensus of
surveys and interviews identified the building’s physical environment and
communications among staff as safety issues that needed immediate attention. Not
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surprisingly, teachers and support staff focused upon the individual classroom’s physical
environment concerns while administrators focused on total building target-hardening
challenges. All the interviewees gave the same answer, however, when asked about the
school emergency they feared most. Unequivocally, they all stated they feared the active
shooter event.
Research Question 2. Research Question 2 follow, What are educators’
perceptions of their own abilities to respond effectively to school emergency crises before
taking part in a comprehensive school safety and security program? The majority (70%)
of participants had no formal school safety and security training prior to this study. For
the remainder that had attended school safety and security training programs from their
previous schools, the feedback suggested these different programs were superficial in
scope, introductory in purpose, and randomly offered lacking any formal or
comprehensive formatting. Educators hinted that they left these programs with more
questions than answers.
Those who had no exposure to safety and security training stated they felt
underprepared for emergent situations. The school’s archival documents underscore the
lack of a SSSP and emergency protocols to assist these educators in their response needs.
The paucity of the archival records included confirmation that there was no formal school
emergency plan, no organized or consistent training, and the absence of resource
materials for distribution among the staff. These respondents perceived their
shortcomings were in the areas of knowing the exact protocols for various drills,
understanding the specific responsibilities expected of them during a crisis event, and
how to obtain these skills effectively.
To address these perceptions of inadequacy, respondents were asked what they
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wanted implemented to improve safety and security training. Three themes were
developed in their responses: more drills to practice skills, training in creating a safer
classroom environment during emergencies, and more access to communications at the
classroom level.
Research Question 3. Research Question 3 follows: Using a Likert-type scale, to
what extent were the educators’ level of confidence in their ability to respond to school
emergency crises affected by the implementation of a comprehensive school safety and
security training program? Results from a within-subjects analysis of variance indicated a
significant difference from the pretraining program (M = 3.79, SD = .585) to the
posttraining program (M = 4.43, SD = .317), F(1.59) = 89.492, p <.001, partial η2 = .603.
These results included indications that postimplementing the 15-week comprehensive
SSSP with related training program, participants believed they increased their emergency
response knowledge and abilities to perform response procedures. The data suggested this
type of school safety training for educators is significantly effective at better preparing
educators for emergency responses, especially when it addresses the specific needs of the
teacher in the classroom.
Likert-type scaled survey item subgroups individually presented data supporting
the effectiveness of the program. In the first subgroup, analyzing staff knowledge about
overall school safety and security, the respondents indicated an increased knowledge
about the SSSP, role of the Crisis Response Team, and individual staff member’s
responsibilities in an actual emergency.
Subgroup 2, referencing staff opinions about the school’s specific training
program, displayed increased improvement regarding staff safety concerns, time allotted
by the school for staff safety training, and availability of resources and materials for

132
safety subsequent to the training program implementation. However, one area did not
change in the staff’s opinions and that was coordinated training with law enforcement.
This outcome was not surprising as this one element of the safety and security training
plan was not possible to implement multiple times in the short time period of this study.
Subgroup 3, addressing staff abilities to perform emergency protocols, presented
significant increases in the percentage of participants whose confidence to arrange their
classrooms for lockdowns and respond to an active shooter event rose. The results
included indications that less of an increase in staff abilities performing nonfire
evacuation drills and shelter-in-place drills, which may be a function of the drills
themselves requiring less individual procedural knowledge and problem solving than
active shooter or bomb threat drills.
Research Question 4. Research Question 4 read: What do educators at the school
consider are the training practices and procedures, which enhanced their knowledge and
abilities in preparing and responding more effectively to emergency crises? Data
indicated more drills and training were the primary avenue for enhancing knowledge and
abilities. Respondents requested more drills, mock scenarios, and hands-on training to
build muscle memory and acclimate to stressful situations.
Finally, the participants interviewed considered the strength of this study’s
implemented safety and security plan with related training program was twofold: the
safety and security emergency reference flip chart and law enforcement experience. The
flip chart allowed quick and easy referencing of various protocols many respondents were
struggling to memorize or recall under stressful situations. In addition to this resource,
62% of respondents believed having law enforcement personnel on staff to train them
made the overall safety and security plan relevant to the safety needs of the school and
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appropriate in context and information.
Relationship of Findings to Literature
The findings of this study on school safety and security training would offer
research-based strategies important for both school administrators and members of law
enforcement. These findings are of extreme relevance to the goals of proper preparation
for and mitigation of the tragic outcomes of school emergency events.
Research Question 1. Regarding the perceptions of educators regarding safety
and security training at their school one result of importance to note elucidated a major
flaw in the battle against school targeted violence: the deficiency of adequate safety and
security training for educators. Research was documented that many educators feel
underprepared to face school emergencies due to minimal training (Bergh, 2009; Brown,
2008; Church, 2011; Cooper, 2008; Dube, 2012; Kanner, 2015; Perkins, 2015).
Participants in this study indicated similar perceptions of inadequacy. This study showed
that, despite these best practices and recommendations, 70% of the participants had no
prior safety and security training even given the fact that 40 of them had been teaching in
excess of 3 years.
Like the school in this study, many schools do not have a SSSP in place, do not
train with first responders jointly in drills, and fail to train regularly for emergency
procedures (Neiman & Devoe, 2009; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007b).
Cooper (2008) found faculty and staff not understanding the concepts involved in crisis
response due to a lack of a comprehensive school safety plan. The consensus among the
professionals in the field of school safety and security at the time of this study confirm a
comprehensive SSSP incorporating, among other things, a formal training curriculum
with regularly scheduled drills to identify gaps and weaknesses in the plan is paramount
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in preparing for and subsequently responding effectively to a school emergency
(NJSSTF, 2015; USDOE, 2013a).
Federal recommendations call for creating and maintaining a SSSP with related
training while the state of New Jersey mandates drills be regularly conducted with related
educator training (NJDOE, 2015; USDOE, 2013a). In the USGAO’s (2007b) nationwide
assessment of emergency management planning, the school districts that were found to
have implemented emergency management plans had plans with significantly varied
content. For the 30% of participants in this study who did have exposure to school safety
and security training from other schools where they previously worked, the findings
indicated their training programs varied in depth and substance. There was no common
theme or structure to the programs and these participants admitted to being insufficiently
trained when entering this study’s school safety and security program. Educators’ safety
and security preparation has to be content driven with a specific lexicon and common
procedures that ready them to effectively respond to a crisis and afford them a working
knowledge when moving to another school within the state.
Research Question 2. In reference to educators’ perceptions of their own abilities
to respond effectively, most participants believed they were underprepared. Similar
research on educators’ perceptions was documented that many educators do feel illprepared to face school emergencies as a result of little or no training (Bergh, 2009;
Brown, 2008; Church, 2011; Cooper, 2008; Dube, 2012; Kanner, 2015; Perkins, 2015).
The value in studying the perceptions of educators is in gaining an understanding of their
physiological and psychological needs to respond to emergency situations. Educators are
expected to perform emergency responses under stressful situations, which are hard to
create during normal drills. Studies by Morgan (2014), Strahler and Ziegert (2015), and
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Zdziarski et al. (2007) concluded training scenarios held in a natural and realistic
environment were a more valid approach to enabling individuals to handle the biological
and emotional responses real-life stressful situations create. In this study, some
participants indicated a fear of how they would perform during a real-life emergency. A
majority stated, however, they learned emergency response skills best through hands-on
activities, such as drills, mock scenarios, tabletop exercises, and joint training with law
enforcement. Leaders at the USDOE (2013a) posited realistic simulated events with
practice and training would foster effective actions by school stakeholders. Additionally,
the USDOE suggested full-scale exercises with multiagency attendance to execute
realistic training, while Martinez (2012) highlighted the imperativeness of the police and
school official coalition to prepare. Participants’ perceptions and feedback in this study
support this concept. Sixty-three percent wanted more training and drills and many called
for these to be in conjunction with law enforcement to attain a more realistic setting.
Another important finding relative to the stressfulness participants felt due to the
enormity and critical nature of their emergency responsibilities was their search for
assistance in preparing themselves. Research from safety and security professionals
included conclusions that best practices include making available appropriate and
relevant resources on the SSSP, its policies, and its procedures (i.e., a quick reference
guide) as a way of supporting educators’ response capabilities (USDOE, 2013a). One
SSSP element in this study’s program was the creation and adoption of a school safety and
security emergency response reference chart. The researcher developed and designed this
reference guide in a flip chart format for ease of use and as a quick reminder to the specific
response steps required by each type of school emergency. The participants’ survey and
interview responses overwhelmingly considered this tool one of the strengths, if not the
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overall strength, of this study’s training program. The flip chart assisted them in times of high
stress when memory fails or nervousness sets in to cloud judgement. A resource, such as this,
was expected to be of value by the researcher from observations and information in this
study. Educators, working in a field not primarily concerned with the first responder trade
and lacking emergency response skills, go to work with a teaching mindset. Unlike law
enforcement, which is geared towards crises management and trained with the survivalist
mindset to confront dangerous situations, educators find it difficult to shift into a first
responder mode and react with lucid responses. Therefore, supplementing training with
materials and tools is of significant value in school safety and security management.

The results in this study illustrated another gap in overall school safety and
security management at educational institutions, which concerns staffing. Research and
recommendations by the NJSSTF (2015) identified the need for a law to require school
safety and security training for all of a school’s staff, not just certified teachers. Several
lessons learned from previous school shootings centered on all stakeholders being trained
in emergency responses (Dorn et al., 2013). Staff at the USDOE (2013a) noted that
everyone involved in the SSSP must know their individual roles and responsibilities, and
specifically cited substitute teachers as a group necessitating school safety and security
training. Almost half of the participants in this study were support staff (counselors,
psychologists, health care professionals, resource professionals, secretarial, and
custodial); some who also act as classroom substitutes. Werner (2014) found school
counselors have greater self-efficacy in school crises if they are more active in crisis
planning and training. These support staff are often not considered as significant to
student safety as the classroom teachers that are thought of when viewing nationwide
school tragedies. On a daily basis, substitutes are found throughout all schools and an
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integral part of the staffing process, yet never attend in-service training for school issues
and procedures.
Research Question 3. The EPSSTQ quantitative survey data included findings
that educators’ perceptions of their confidence to respond to school emergency crises
changed significantly after attending a comprehensive SSSP with related training.
Participants felt more prepared and these results replicated those of one previous research
study in which school staff members attending crisis management training also increased
their levels of crisis response performance (Cooper, 2008). The participants’ increased
self-efficacy in crisis response, as posited by Zdziarski et al. (2007), requires regularly
scheduled training so all staff can understand their various responsibilities and be
prepared during a crisis. The varied methods of training implemented in this program
(e.g., conferences, workshops, tabletop exercises, drills, and simulation exercises) are
best practices identified by experts in the field (Harvey, 2011; Kapucu & Khosa, 2012;
USDOE, 2013a; Wilson 2007; Zdziarski et al., 2007).
Research Question 4. Educators found the training practices and procedures
enhanced their knowledge and abilities in crisis response. Participants emphasized they
learned from drills and hands-on activities, which allowed them to practice. Research in
the field of school safety was documented that often educators will be the first responders
to a critical school event because of the brevity of emergent incidents and the time lag
between calling 9/11 and the arrival of law enforcement (Blair & Martindale, 2013; Blair
& Schweit, 2014; Shah, 2013b). The New Jersey Security Task Force (2015)
recommended training for school staff to enable them to slow and retard the advances of
school aggressors so as to give law enforcement members time to arrive. The data in this
study included findings that a significant percentage of participants requesting more
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training and drills to hone their response skills be incorporated into the school’s SSSP.
These educators were enlightened to their first responder position and their understanding
they would need to react and mitigate an emergency personally while law enforcement
staff are en route, and want a more proactive approach to their training. A resulting
change in the cultural mindset occurred among the staff and administrators as a
consequence of a comprehensive safety training program aimed at educators.
This change in the cultural mindset of educators and the value placed upon
emergency training and drills is very essential to improve school safety and security.
Research has shown that crisis response requires regularly schedule and consistent
training for staff to understand their responsibilities, educators are better prepared for
crises, educators are more confident in their abilities, and training increases the likelihood
of a successful crisis response (Dorn et al., 2013; Hough & Spillan, 2005; USDOE,
2013a; Zdziarski, 2006; Zdziarski et al., 2007). The recommendations for improving
school safety and security by the NJSSTF (2015) included formal annual turnkey training
for school staff on safety training and school districts allocate adequate time within
school schedules for training sessions. The results in this study included an increase in
the self-efficacy perceptions of participants having attended regularly scheduled and
consistent training, albeit only 15 weeks in length. This study included confirmation that
administrators shifted their mindset to acknowledging the priority of school safety as they
witnessed the intense interest of their staff and numerous questions participants had
regarding their expected responsibilities.
Participants in this study also noted they felt safer and more confident in the value
of the school’s SSSP because of direct law enforcement involvement. A majority of
participants interviewed elaborated on their confidence that they were presented with an
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appropriate and meaningful safety program because it was developed by someone with
law enforcement knowledge and experience and not just a school administrator.
Educators, by virtue of their positions, understand more than anyone about content area
expertise. New Jersey, state-certified, highly qualified teachers must have a higher
educational degree in their content area in order to teach. Just as math teachers may not
feel proficient in teaching English, educators are cognizant of the fact they do not possess
the skill sets and experience to instruct school safety and security. To add to this finding,
the researcher also made note of numerous statements made by teachers, administrators,
and even students at the school in which feelings of safety and security were heightened
simply by having a retired law enforcement officer on staff, even if in the position as an
educator in the classroom. These perceptions are valuable to understand by school
administrators and law enforcement as most school districts appoint an educator as the
school safety and security liaison to organize and run school drills, while SSSPs are to be
developed by school administrators who may or may not utilize law enforcement
expertise.
Another relevant issue substantiated by this study was the placement of
accountability for school safety and security. Staff and administrators wanted an
appropriate training program. As stipulated by New Jersey state laws, the responsibilities
regarding school safety and security lay with the school administrators at the county or
district level, and for private schools at the individual school level. Charged with creating
a comprehensive SSSP and establishing adequate and effective emergency response
protocols, school administrators do not have the training or background sufficient to
fulfill this immense obligation (McCarty, 2012). Administrators at the school in this
study were no different in their lack of training for this facet of the job. They all admitted
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they were not sufficiently prepared or knowledgeable to manage school safety and
security and, ultimately, looked to law enforcement experience for assistance and
guidance.
To remedy this shortcoming, state laws included suggestions that school leaders
work together with their local law enforcement agencies to create a comprehensive SSSP,
but the issues uncovered in this study confirmed a lack of time, minimal personnel
resources in both professions, and a cultural attitude placing school safety as a low
priority, which can limit these joint collaborations accomplished (Greenberg, 2007b;
USGAO, 2007b).
The only document mandating New Jersey school safety and security compliance
is the MOA. Meant to ensure joint collaboration on school-related emergencies and
criminal issues (New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety & NJDOE, 2015), the
MOA calls for school safety and security joint collaboration and suggests annual
consultations between school administrators and local law enforcement on SSSPs,
educator safety training, and joint drills with first responders by school administrators.
However, as was substantiated by this study, there is no oversight to ensure compliance
or to what extent these activities are followed and performed. The results, therefore, can
be as minimal as exemplified in this study, which found an outdated and ineffectual
SSSP, and no interagency collaboration.
Conclusions
In this study, a SSSP with related training program was implemented for a private
New Jersey school that did not have a substantive or updated emergency plan. The SSSP
and training was designed within the parameters of the mandates of the state, using the
best practices in the field of school safety and security as posited by federal and state
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school safety and security management experts. With this SSSP and related training
program at the time of this study, the school now meets the state requirements for school
safety management. As a result, the data from the preprogram and postprogram
questionnaires on educators’ perceptions on school safety and security and the
participants’ interview statements showed a statistically significant improvement in the
emergency response self-efficacy perceptions of the staff.
An analysis of this study on the school safety and security policies and training
procedures may be presented in an executive summary and a full report that is both a
critique and guide to inform the school leadership and governance, county prosecutor,
and local law enforcement agencies. This analysis can be offered for ideas to improve the
type and methods of training made available to K-12 school personnel on school safety
and security for effective responses to targeted school violence. The results of this
research study may assist in three ways: (a) school administrators to establish or
reorganize training programs and response protocols for school personnel, (b) county
prosecutor’s offices in their efforts in formulating any countywide protocols and
programs for local law enforcement and schools to train, and (c) local law enforcement
agencies in collaborating with their respective schools when creating or updating SSSPs
and related training and drills for preparing to respond to targeted school violence
incidents and other emergencies.
The findings of this study have significant implications for school administrators
and law enforcement officials involved in school safety and security for schools in New
Jersey and other states. With respect to New Jersey schools’ present emergency response
capabilities, not all schools have similar SSSPs or training programs. Although the state
leaves school emergency plans and training to the local districts and private institutions to
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organize and develop, there are minimal parameters and similar challenges all the schools
must contend with to be responsible and effective when a school emergency or violent
incident occurs. This study has shown the lack of oversight, compliance, and conformity
throughout the state can result in underprepared school staff charged with the enormous
responsibilities as first responders to violent school incidents.
Until such time as some of the recommendations by the NJSSTF (2015) are
implemented, such as a state-run school safety specialist academy to disseminate
common knowledge and training to staff at all schools, full-time security personnel on all
campuses, more intensive safety training and drills involving schools and law
enforcement, more allotted time during school hours for staff safety training, and
communication systems connecting all staff to school administrators, schools must focus
on more effective training for their staff.
This study provides insights into what the teachers need and want from their point
of view and positions to better prepare themselves for their emergency responsibilities.
From the unique viewpoint of the researcher who has been both a law enforcement
officer and educator in the classroom, members of each profession have unique responses
and different concerns when confronting the same school emergency. Educators focus
primarily on the safety of their students while members of law enforcement focus
primarily on the school intruder.
On their own, most educators will not seek out the requisite information or speak
openly about their insufficient knowledge on the topic of school safety. Equally, most
educators do not know where to look for assistance in gaining school safety and security
resources and knowledge believing they will receive it when their superiors in the
administration deliver it. Finally, the SSSPs, trainings, and resource materials finally
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offered may not always be pertinent or reliable depending on the source.
Just as not all school administrators are sufficiently prepared to develop their
staff’s emergency capabilities, similarly, not all law enforcement members are prepared
to understand the unique settings and challenges educators face in classrooms. Teachers
are confined to rooms filled with students and separated from coworkers and real-time
information. During an emergent incident, this isolation combined with the unfamiliar
feelings of stress and fear affect teachers.
This study included exemplifications of the imperative need for schools to have a
SSSP with a comprehensive training program to increase staff response effectiveness
proactively. These plans and training programs must be developed by school
administrators with law enforcement expertise so that the collaborative product includes
the mutual understanding of each other’s roles in their common goal of stopping or
mitigating targeted school violence. This study offers recommendations for training to
enable a more complete understanding of the roles of each discipline in their common
goal to employ the best practices available to maintain a high level of efficient response
to violent incidents at school campuses.
Limitations
The purpose of this study was to assess the perceptions of educators regarding
school safety and security training. This study was limited to the staff of only one school
in which 60 of 65 members of that staff took part. Although these participants may be
similar in regard to age, gender, and experiences in the field of education and
representative of educators at other schools in New Jersey, the results of the study may
not necessarily generalize to the field of school safety and security in all other schools.
Personal prejudices will be an issue that may impact the findings of this study
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and, therefore, must be considered as a limitation to the research. Interviews may not
completely uncover the shortcomings of any policies and procedures due to the
sensitivity of some aspects of the topic and the personal feelings of those who may have
taken part in creating these policies and procedures. Additionally, the possibility that
participants may offer socially or politically desirable answers may contribute to
limitations to the research.
A final limitation of this study was related to time. A common problem in the
educational system, allotting and scheduling adequate time to gather all staff together and
implement training specific to just one topic is always extremely difficult. This safety and
security training intervention was conducted over a 15-week period. Classroom training
was only 8 hours in total while drills, conducted during school hours, were limited in
duration as well. Brevity of time is not conducive to effective learning and these time
constraints may have some impact on the data results.
Recommendations for Local Practice
As has been discovered in this study, the researcher recommends New Jersey
schools take a look at their current SSSPs and ensure there is related training for staff to
understand the responsibilities outlined in the SSSPs. The state leaders mandate schools
have a 91-point SSSP covering all aspects of school operations and planning for all types
of emergencies. Yet this manual is useless if all stakeholders at the school are not
acquainted or knowledgeable in the specific responses that relate to these safeguards.
Additionally, in conjunction with that training, the researcher recommends one
common crisis response program with one lexicon and similar protocols be adopted
statewide so emergency responses and emergency training are similar school to school.
This shared program will enable all educators to have a common foundation in safety and
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security skills, which they can take with them as they change jobs from school to school.
One common response protocol will enable law enforcement agencies to respond with
similar tactics and strategies when they assist neighboring districts in these highly
dangerous events that require massive first-responder turnouts. Finally, and, most
importantly, one common and shared emergency response protocol will allow these two
disciplines–education and law enforcement–to work seamlessly in their symbiotic
relationship as they prevent and mitigate targeted school violence and school crises.
Recommendations for Future Research
The focus of this study was to measure the effects of implementing a
comprehensive SSSP with related training to the staff at one private K-12 school. While a
school’s safety and security training curriculum can be created with meaningful and best
practices standards, the ultimate effectiveness of that program can only be measured
through the eyes of the teachers it was developed to educate. Further research on the
effectiveness of school safety and security management should include similar studies
analyzing these implementations on a larger number of schools to establish
generalizations to the population. Future researchers should investigate how these
implementations influence staff responses at different types (i.e., public, charter,
elementary, middle, and high school) of schools as well. Demographic-driven research
collecting data on safety program effectiveness by gender, age, and time in-service
training of educators may prove helpful in creating future programs.
A suggestion for future research would be a study that encompasses analyses of
schools with established SSSPs and training to determine if that training is effectively
meeting the needs of teachers. Research should analyze the methods of creating those
schools’ emergency training programs, as these programs are, at best, to be a product of a
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collaborative effort between administrators and law enforcement members. Researchers
should also conduct a comparative study of SSSPs and training programs comparing
those created by school administrators with those created by law enforcement personnel
to provide insights into strengths and weaknesses of different skill sets and related
methods of operations.
Of extreme value would be comparative research analyzing SSSPs at schools
where law enforcement officers are stationed on campus. This specific research should
correlate whether educators feel the same emergent need to learn and be knowledgeable
in matters of school safety and security with the presence of first responders on site to
those of schools without law enforcement presence.
A final recommendation is to conduct research on real school crises events at
schools with and without SSSPs and related training programs. Analyzing the responses
at schools, with and without SSSPs and training programs in place, which have
experienced real-life emergencies to include, but, not limited to, bomb threats,
evacuations, active shooter, weapons on campus, and medical emergencies, may offer
insights into the specific training practices that have benefitted educators.
Summary
This study was conducted to gain a deeper contextual understanding of the
perceptions of educators regarding their school safety and security response capabilities
and needs. The goal was to determine the best practices in creating a comprehensive
safety and security training program to prepare educators for a school crisis in order to
offer a model for stakeholders to follow or gain ideas from to improve their institution’s
specific school safety and security emergency plans. Best practices in the field of school
violence prevention and mitigation dictate stakeholders must be educated in SSSPs and
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the related crisis response procedures. Educators are the first responders to school
emergency crises and must be ready to create time barriers against intruders until law
enforcement officers arrive.
With the continuation of these black swan events, a paradigm shift has occurred
and the cultural thinking in education has been changed to accept and adopt the new
responsibilities these events present. Yet the organizational aspects of preincident
preparation are substantially inadequate to meet the demand of school safety and security
sufficiently. Leaders in both fields of education and law enforcement must understand the
shortcomings of localism and exclusivity when combating a common foe, and make up
for lost time with comprehensive and mandated programs for educators. Prioritizing
safety and security training is the only way to prepare for the exigencies of the next black
swan.
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Educators’ Perceptions of School Safety and Security Training Questionnaire
Background information. For each of the following please check the response that most
closely represents your experience.
1. Number of years teaching:
___0-1 ___1-3 ___3-5 ___5-10 ___10-15 ___15-20 ___20+
2. Number of years at current school:
___0-1 ___1-3 ___3-5 ___5-10 ___10-15 ___15-20 ___20+
3. Position:
_____Teacher
_____Administration
_____Support Staff (Health care professionals, counselors, psychologists, secretarial,
custodial)

4. I have had prior training in school security and safety procedures (professional
development, in-service classes) prior to working at this school:
_____YES _____NO

5. I have had prior experience working in the law enforcement / security fields.
______ YES _____NO
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Likert Items. For statements 6-24 mark the response that most closely represents your
feelings.
6. I am knowledgeable in the New Jersey laws mandating school safety and security
protocols.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
7. I am knowledgeable in my school’s emergency management plan.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
8. I am knowledgeable in the roles of the Crisis Response Team.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
9. I am knowledgeable in my role and responsibilities regarding safety and security
as a school staff member (teacher, administrator, support staff).
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
10. During an emergency I know who the school’s Incident Commander is.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
11. I am familiar with the emergency response procedures expected of me when law
enforcement arrive during an active shooter crisis.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
12. I am familiar with emergency response procedures expected of me when law
enforcement arrive during other types of emergencies.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
13. If I have a question about school safety and security, I know where to find the
answer.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
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14. I feel my concerns about school safety and security are addressed when voiced.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
15. The school has allocated sufficient time for safety and security preparedness
training.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
16. The school has provided resources and materials on school safety and security
preparedness.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
17. The school conducts drills throughout the day (various times: lunch, class hours,
before school, after school) to prepare emergency responses for any daily
situation.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
18. School personnel, along with local law enforcement, coordinate together in active
shooter response drills.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
19. Overall the school’s present safety and security training program is effective for
preparing staff for emergency crises.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
20. I am confident in my ability to arrange my classroom for an active shooter
incident.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
21. I am confident in my ability to respond to an active shooter emergency.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
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22. I am confident in my ability to respond to a bomb threat emergency.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
23. I am confident in my ability to respond to a nonfire evacuation emergency.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
24. I am confident in my ability to respond to a shelter-in-place emergency.
__ disagree
__ somewhat disagree
__neutral
__ somewhat agree
__ somewhat agree
Open-ended short-answer questions. For questions 25-27 please answer the question
and use examples to support your opinions. There is no limit on your response. If more
space is needed for comments please use the back of this form and identify which
question (by number) you are answering.
25. What aspect of school safety and security training do you find most challenging to
learn?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
26. What do you feel is the weakest part of your school’s safety and security program?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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27. What would you like to see implemented to improve school safety and security
training?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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Interview Questions for Teachers and Support Staff
1. What is your position at the school?
2. How long have you been in your current position?
3. What, if any, formal training do you have in school safety and security?
4. What types of training have you had?
5. Do you feel the training you have received in school safety and security has
prepared you to respond effectively? Why?
6. What do you believe is the most pressing safety need in your school? Why?
7. What school emergency do you fear the most?
8. Can you explain an emergent incident that you have experienced in the school which
you feel needs to be addressed by the safety and security training program?
9. How do you feel you learn school safety and security responses the most effectively
(classes, drills, mock scenarios)?
10. What, if any, emergency drills do you find difficult to perform?
11. Can you explain the safety responsibilities you believe are important for you to know
in your position yet are unsure of how to perform?
12. What emergency drill activities, if any, would you like to see incorporated in your
school’s training program?
13. What do you feel is the strength of your school’s safety and security program?
14. What do you feel needs to be updated or improved regarding your school’s safety and
security response plan?
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Interview Questions for Administrators
1. What is your position at the school?
2. How long have you been in your current position?
3. What, if any, formal training do you have in school safety and security?
4. Do you feel the training you have received in school safety and security has
prepared you to manage school safety and security effectively? Why?
5. Do you feel the training you have received in school safety and security has
prepared you to respond to an emergency effectively? Why?
6. What do you believe is the most pressing safety need in your school? Why?
7. What school emergency do you fear the most? Why?
8. Who is in charge (responsible) for maintaining the school safety and security
emergency plan, updating it, and why?
9. What do you believe are the biggest barriers (factors inhibiting) to improving school
safety and security in the school?
10. What do you feel is the strength of your school’s safety and security emergency
management plan?
11. What do you feel needs to be updated or improved regarding your school’s safety and
security emergency management plan?
12. How do you feel the staff learn school safety and security responses the most
effectively (classes, drills, mock scenarios)?
13. Can you explain the safety responsibilities you believe are important for you to know
in your position yet are unsure of how to perform?
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192

Proposed School Safety & Security Implementations
by Ronald P. Rinaldi
The following activities are being proposed to bring training classes, emergency
drills, tools, and other resources to the faculty, administration, and support staff in order
to create a more effective emergency response program for our school.
Over the course of 3 months writer would like to implement several interventions
for the entire staff of the school regarding training and practicing for the state mandated
emergency drills: active shooter, lockdown, bomb threat, and evacuation. It is the goal
that with these interventions teacher, administrator, and support staff knowledge and
abilities to be prepared for and respond effectively to any number of possible school
emergencies will be increased and ultimately more effective than the current present
levels.
Presently our staff’s safety and security experience varies due to 1) each
individual’s years in the profession, training previously received, and understanding of
security protocols; 2) an informal and sparse training program and; 3) the common
challenges of time constraints and acclimation to a new campus environment. To respond
effectively as a whole, it is imperative that this level of safety awareness and
preparedness be equal among the school’s personnel and brought to a level of
effectiveness suitable to meet the safety needs of our population.
It is intended that the following proposed schedule of activities and interventions
will be a more fully comprehensive program and accomplish much of the training
necessary to attain a higher level of awareness and maintain a proficient level of
preparedness. The program will 1) address the myriad issues which writer has found to be
major challenges and impediments to getting our school’s personnel at a basic
preparedness and awareness level of proficiency; 2) initiate a training program which will
bring all personnel to a common starting point upon which to build and; 3) commence a
regularly scheduled training program for the school. Once attaining the intended level of
proficiency through these interventions, a regularly scheduled training program will need
to be implemented for the future to maintain proficiency, update information and
response procedures as needed, and meet the state requirements dictating all school board
employees be regularly trained and proficient in school safety and security response
protocols.
In order to perform the following activities over the course of the next few months
it will be necessary to allot a certain amount of time to the training, drills, and
interventions. Writer is requesting that this request is taken into consideration as the
results of the proposed activities will be of immense value to the school.
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Proposed Schedule
Month 1:
-

Survey to gather information on faculty and staff.
2 in-service training classes on emergency drills and awareness (In-house)
2 emergency drills
1 Crisis Response Team meeting
Follow up with staff on results of 2 emergency drills
Individualized classroom safe zone inspections
Addition of tools and resources (Posters, reference manual, related articles)

Month 2:
-

3 in-service training classes on emergency drills and awareness (In house/LE)
Training videos
3 emergency drills
1 Crisis Response Team meeting
Follow up with staff on results of 3 emergency drills
NJDOE inspection of drill
Addition of related materials for instruction (articles, state laws)

-

Month 3:
-

3 in-service training classes on emergency drills and awareness(In house/LE)
Training videos
3 emergency drills
1 Crisis Response Team meeting
Follow up with staff on results of 3 emergency drills
Survey on results of interventions.

-

Tools:
- Resource materials (professional articles, state laws, state documents)
- Training videos
- Radio assignments/ Radio log
- Staff expertise form
- Emergency posters
- Emergency electronic chat room/drop box
- Communications equipment
- Floor plan of school with zones marked
- Flip Chart Reference Manual
- Attendance sheets
- Reunification sheets
- Front entrance emergency sign
- Room numbers/classroom safe zones

